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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to examine the notion of ‘human dignity’ in Kant by means of a 
conversation with three Kantian scholars. 
 One cannot understand Kant’s notion of human dignity without placing it in the 
context of his moral thought. For this reason we look in Chapter One at the philosopher 
Roger Sullivan. His major work Immanuel Kant’s moral theory includes a highly detailed 
treatment of human dignity. I shall present an analysis of his understanding within the 
context of his methodology and his general approach to Kant’s moral philosophy. 
We look in Chapter Two at Susan Shell’s ‘Kant on Human Dignity.’ In addition to 
this, we consider Shell’s methodology and some of her work on the early Kant where we 
find the roots of Kant’s conception of dignity. 
Chapter Three addresses Oliver Sensen’s novel interpretation of Kant’s use of 
the term ‘dignity.’ Utilizing the tools of Analytical Philosophy, he enters into dialogue 
with Kantian interpreters, suggesting that their understanding of dignity in Kant 
harbours elements at odds with Kant’s thought and that they thus fail to grasp the 
radical nature of Kant’s notion. 
In the final and Fourth Chapter, I try to bring these scholars into a conversation 
with each other. First, I show the strengths of each position and then, using insights of 
Sullivan, Shell and Sensen, I venture to ask whether one could not develop the notion of 
a phenomenology of dignity. I also consider whether in both Shell’s and Sensen’s 
account there is not an implicit dynamic at work, which suggests the necessity of 
transcendence and the Good.
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Introduction: Kant and the Question of Dignity 
 
 
1. The Place and Importance of Dignity 
 
 
The notion of ‘human dignity’ is not new. It was originally, at least in the religion 
of the Bible, thought in the context of the Divine. Doron Shultziner shows that the 
Hebrew concepts ‘human’ (Ha’adam) and ‘dignity’ (Kvod/Kavod) appear throughout the 
Bible, but the combination Kvod Ha’adam (‘human dignity’) is, as such, absent. In fact, 
Kavod, which denotes ‘dignity, honor, glory and respect’ is most often used in referring 
to the God of Israel. As such, the phrase ‘dignity (Kavod) of God’ can be a substitute for 
‘the presence or glory of God.’1  
According to Shultziner the ‘two core pillars’ that ground the Biblical notion of 
dignity in the Jewish tradition is Psalm 7:6 and the creation story in Genesis 1.The 
former says: ‘Yet thou hast made him a little less than the Divine, and thou dost crown 
him with glory and dignity’ [Shultziner’s translation2]. Genesis 1:27 recounts how 
mankind is created in the image of God (Tzelem Elohim), thus expressing ‘an essential 
and inherent human worth that must not be violated [and which] entails special 
protection and reverence.’3 This prohibition extends even beyond the grave to the dead 
                                                                
1 Shultziner 2006, 666 ff. He refers for instance to Ezekiel 3:23; Psalm 24:7-10; Psalm 
29:1-3; 1 Samuel 6:5; and Jeremiah 13:17. 
2 Shultziner 2006, 666 n 5. 
3 Shultziner 2006, 667. Quoting from Genesis 1:27 he adds: ‘So God created Man in his 
own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.’ And 
the commandment that flows from this reads ‘whoso sheds man’s blood by man shall 
his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man’ (Genesis 9:6).  
 2 
– the body of a dead person or executed criminal must not be defiled, because that 
would be an ‘affront to God.’4 Schultziner writes: ‘By this view, God implanted in human 
beings a sacred kernel of worth, and demanded that we protect human dignity in us and 
in others, and thus damaging human dignity is a direct offence to God.’5 This notion of 
human dignity develops throughout the Bible (the Torah, Prophets, and Writings) and 
the Jewish Law (the Halakhah). In Jewish Law the concept ‘Kvod Habriyot’ is taken as 
being synonymous with ‘human dignity.’ Moreover, Shultziner points out that this 
concept is in the plural and the meaning points to the dignity of the people i.e., of the 
many, revealing the necessarily communal aspect to (individual) dignity in that ‘a person 
is an integral part of a collective.’6  
Shultziner identifies three characteristics of the Jewish conception of dignity. 
One, human dignity has an ‘extrinsic divine source’; two, the ‘dignity of the people’ 
prevails over ‘personal autonomy and liberty’; and three, everything diminishes in the 
face of ‘God’s dignity.’7 Of the latter he writes, ‘the reliance on God as the ultimate and 
only source of human dignity seems to heighten the diminution of personal dignity with 
                                                                
4 Shultziner 2006, 667. He refers to Deuteronomy 21:23. In the case of someone hanged 
(executed) from a tree, he writes: ‘his body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but 
thou shall surely bury him that day. For an impaled body is an affront to God: you shall 
not defile the land that the Lord your God is giving you to possess.’ 
5 Shultziner 2006, 667. 
6 Shultziner 2006, 669. 
7 See Shultziner 2006, 672 ff. He writes elsewhere that ‘elevating God’s dignity entails 
devotion to his commandments’ and cites from Yairah Amit who says: ‘The idea of 
human dignity in the Bible and its implications reveal to us a principle, which is bound by 
a cluster of values such as the sanctity of life, basic equality between human beings, and 
a demand to get close to God’s sacredness by following his paths and fulfilling his 
implicit and explicit commandments, be they universal commandments or those relating 
to the Israelites’ [emphasis Shultziner’s]. Ibid., 667 n 7. 
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regard to God’s dignity.’8 Having said this, however, he points to the significance of how 
in the Talmud, ‘Kvod Habriyot was set in the Halakhah as a theoretical principle that can 
override biblical commandments [and this] is a significant landmark in establishing the 
importance of human dignity.’9 Shultziner summarizes the Jewish conception thus: 
‘Human beings have dignity because of an extrinsic entity that bestowed it upon them, 
with all moral prescriptions that would follow from this status. This means that dignified 
and undignified conducts are dictated by God’s commandments rather than by an 
intrinsic autonomous human trait detached from the divine. Thus, for example, apart 
from the strict prohibition of murder, the issues of abortion and euthanasia are 
primarily decided upon, and interpreted by, the biblical principle of the sanctity of life 
and not upon an intrinsic human trait such as a Kantian autonomous reasoning.’10 
                                                                
8 Shultziner 2006, 674. See also Ibid., 674 n 11, where the beautifully close bond 
between God’s dignity and human dignity is eloquently expressed by Rabbi Dov 
Soloveitzik: ‘Dignity is a divine virtue when one respects oneself, and thereby realizes 
the human being’s greatest mission which stems from the image of God inside oneself. 
Only then does the dignity of the messanger become like the image of his creator.’ 
9 Shultziner 2006, 670. This relates to cases where enforcement of the law would lead to 
the shaming and humiliation of an individual, which would lead to a violation of one’s 
dignity. Friedman discusses twenty cases from the Talmud. He quotes the Babylonian 
Talmud (Berachot 19b-20a) which states that ‘[t]he value of human dignity is so great 
that it supersedes a negative commandment of the Torah.’ See Friedman, Human 
Dignity in Jewish Law 2005, 16. He discusses a striking case dicussed in the Post-
Talmudic Halachic Literature. For instance, in order to remain pure a (kohen) priest may 
not be under the same roof as a dead person. However, if he were to sleep without 
clothes and someone dies in the house he is not to be awakened or leave immediately 
because his nakedness will shame him and others (the community) and lead to a 
violation of dignity. In this case the principle of dignity overrides the negative command 
not to be in proximity with a dead body. See Friedman, Human Dignity in Jewish Law 
2005, 30. There are many other examples as well. See also Friedman, Human Dignity 
and the Jewish Tradition 2008. 
10 Shultziner 2006, 673. 
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However, the Judaic-Christian and the Islamic mind-set were not the only 
provenances of this notion. Ancient Greece and Rome entertained this notion even if it 
was initially applied only to the ‘aristocratic’ few. Mette Lebech points out that no one 
Greek word captures the exact meaning of dignity. However, the notion of dignity is 
present in Aristotle through ‘expressions semantically related to dignity,’ although he 
proffered no theory about it.11 Lebech shows how the Greek axioma and axia are 
translated into Latin ‘more or less systematically by dignitas.’12  
In Aristotle there is no concept of equal dignity shared among all people. He has 
rather a two-fold notion of dignity that found its way into the Middle Ages. This is the 
notion that, on the one hand, dignity relates to personal honor or value and, on the 
other hand, it refers to a ‘non-demonstrable fundamental principle.’13 The concept 
axioma has theoretical/scientific significance for Aristotle. It relates for Lebech to the 
concept of arche, ‘axiom,’ or ‘first principle,’ which, as the Metaphysics states, is ‘that 
from which a thing can first be known.’14 As she says: ‘From this we may reason, by 
analogy, that in the same way as axioms are basic to demonstration but cannot be 
                                                                
11 Lebech 2009, 32, see 30-45. 
12 Lebech 2009, 31. She discusses a number of passages from the Nicomachean Ethics to 
make her point. One concerns Aristotle’s dicussion of the magnanimous man, who is 
said to be ‘worthy.’ ‘The magnanimous person, then, seems to be the one who thinks 
himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them.’ See Aristotle 1985, 1123b2 
ff. See also Irwin 1985, 432 where he translates axia with ‘worth’ and sometimes as 
‘value’ or ‘desert.’ He refers the reader to the same passages in the Nicomachean Ethics 
as does Lebech, to wit 1123b2, 1131a26, 1133b24, 1158b27, 1159a35, 1160b33.  
13 See Lebech 2009, 30-31 ff. 
14 Lebech 2009, 43. She refers to Metaphysics V, 1013a14-15. Aristotle writes: ‘Again, 
“beginning” means the point from which a thing is first comprehensible, this too is 
called the “beginning” of the thing; e.g. the hypotheses of demonstrations.’ See 
Aristotle, Aristotle Metaphysics 1985-2007. 
 5 
proven, so dignity (axia, axioma) is basic to what follows from it (rights and duties). 
Axioms and dignity are also alike in that they must be relied upon, in order that what 
follows from them may not disintegrate.’15 She identifies this ultimately not with an 
intuition or proposition, but with rationality: ‘In this sense rationality can be said to be 
the principle of principles, the principle, namely, which is an absolute beginning. Hence 
the fact that human beings are rational animals means for Aristotle that they in this 
manner reflect the absolute beginning, and thus are beginnings in themselves: that their 
knowledge as such cannot be any further founded, but must in the last resort rely on 
itself as rational.’16 This rationality and intuition (nous) account for our independence 
from nature and our ‘super-eminence’, and ‘dignifies’ us. Lebech admits that when it 
comes to applying this dignity in a social system as in Aristotle’s day, where he 
disregarded women and upheld slavery, one can only say ‘his understanding of human 
dignity was but vague.’17 
It was this Greek notion of reason that would later be taken up by the Stoics and 
especially by Cicero, who applied it to each human being and as such democratized the 
Greek notion of dignity, stealing its privileges from the aristocrats and rulers. Thus the 
dignity of human rational nature became the provenance of all of mankind.18 It would 
be the Church Fathers, preceding the Middle Ages, that would combine the two notions, 
viz. Tzelem Elohim / Imago Dei and the rational principle or Logos of the Stoics to 
                                                                
15 Lebech 2009, 42. 
16 Lebech 2009, 43. 
17 Lebech 2009, 43. 
18 See Lebech 2009, 45-58. 
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develop a deeper notion of the dignity of humanity. This places dignity in the context of 
the divine and brings one to the dawn of the modern period.19  
It was humanism, especially in the works of Pico della Mirandola, together with 
the optimism of early modernity, that paved the way for the modern view. It was then 
that a shift occurred in that man with his rational capacity enabling and safeguarding his 
autonomy superseded the traditional religious vision. And thus arose the central and 
most decisive philosopher of the modern period, Immanuel Kant. ‘We now move more 
squarely to “the central existential claim of modernity – man’s autonomy, his capacity to 
be lord of his fate and the shaper of his future.” In the Enlightenment, the dignity of 
Man in this sense came to be developed philosophically, and used as the basis, most 
famously, of Immanuel Kant’s use of the concept,’ writes Christopher McCrudden.20 
Admitting that it would be near impossible to claim a full understanding of Kant’s 
notion of dignity ‘since it is notoriously contested territory,’ McCrudden, nonetheless, 
identifies three aspects to Kant’s idea of dignity. ‘First,’ he writes, ‘although it is 
anything but clear what exactly he intended, a passage in which the term is used in the 
Metaphysics of Morals21 has become the best-known source for the subsequent belief 
that Kant’s understanding of human dignity required that individuals should be treated 
as ends and not simply as means to an end. Secondly, over time, this connection 
between dignity and Kant has become probably the most often cited non-religiously-
based conception of dignity. Some, indeed, regard him as “the father of the modern 
                                                                
19 See McCrudden 2008, 658 ff. 
20 McCrudden 2008, 659; see also 659 n 28. He quotes from Bognetti 2005, 75, 79. 
21 He refers to Metaphysics of Morals 6:462. See McCrudden 2008, 659 n 27. 
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concept of human dignity.” Thirdly, whether rightly or wrongly, the conception of 
dignity most closely associated with Kant is the idea of dignity as autonomy; that is, the 
idea that to treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous individuals able to 
choose their destiny.’22 
The superlative words describing Kant’s account in McCrudden’s brief summary 
(above) are, given the brevity of the account, indicative of the esteem and importance 
of Kant’s account. We read that Kant’s ideas of dignity are ‘most famously,’ ‘notoriously 
contested,’ ‘anything but clear,’ ‘has become the best-known source for the subsequent 
belief,’ ‘probably the most often cited non-religiously based conception of dignity.’ And 
then we read of the regard for him as ‘the father of the modern concept of human 
dignity.’ These speak for themselves and one needs nothing more to justify exploration 
of this notion in Kant. Glenn Tinder talks of ‘the most powerful modern affirmation of 
human dignity, that found in the moral philosophy of Kant.’23 
In fact, at the end of his paper, McCrudden concludes that determining a ‘precise 
conception’ of human dignity ‘beyond […] minimum consent’ proves difficult. He lists 
the main (traditional) and cultural-political sources of dignity currently operative and 
which might act as resources to determine a conception of dignity that would ground a 
legal system and be sufficiently accepted by all to make it applicable. He writes: ‘It could 
be, therefore, that the interpretation of dignity within Catholic social doctrine, or within 
a social democratic framework, or within an Islamic framework, or within the Jewish 
                                                                
22 McCrudden 2008, 659-660. 
23 Tinder, Facets of Personal Dignity 2003, 240. 
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tradition, or based on Kant, might fulfil this role.’24 My point is not to engage his 
conclusion.25 What is striking is that, whereas most candidates refer to either 
institutional cultural realities or religious traditions, only one carries the name of a 
singular man and his philosophy – Immanuel Kant. The fact that he is the only 
philosopher considered comparatively with other lived-cultural realities like religious 
traditions or liberal democracy speaks volumes for the power and influence of Kant’s 
ideas. 
Indeed it is in this connection that one may say that dignity, today, enjoys 
unprecedented popularity and status. This is in no small measure the result of Kant’s 
work, even though it is not solely his doing. His taking up of this thematic and his 
incorporation of it in his systematic thought succeeded in placing dignity on the map in a 
secular framework and giving it as such a new status. Kant’s ideas in this regard did 
reach beyond his moral thought into his political philosophy as well. But in identifying 
the chief protagonists responsible for the political popularization of dignity McCrudden 
turns elsewhere.  
                                                                
24 McCrudden 2008, 723-724. 
25 Martin O’Malley follows another approach. See O'Malley 2011, 75-101. He makes the 
same point, namely, that a consensus regarding the meaning of dignity is lacking, hence 
his own attempt at providing a performative definition that honors all the dimensions of 
dignity with the provision that ‘the law is the most apt location for observing the 
performance of human dignity. […] Human dignity as the recognition of human 
worthiness is an all-encompassing principle that contains the moral wisdom of the past, 
and possesses the potential to deal with present and future violations. The law is not 
the only context in which human dignity can be broached, but it is an essential tool for 
both protecting and advancing it.’ Ibid., 99. His performative definition, which he 
unpacks in the course of the article reads: ‘Human dignity is the recognized affirmation 
that humans, qua humans, have a status of distinctive and exceptional worth expressed 
and thus discernible in law.’ Ibid., 79. 
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Pivotal was the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the events of the French 
Revolution, including the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789.26 
Other figures, statesmen, and authors, mentioned by McCrudden, who used ‘the 
language of dignity’ are Thomas Paine, the proto-feminist Mary Wollstonecraft, William 
Wordsworth, and Charles Renouvier. Rousseau’s more communitarian emphasis 
influenced Latin American notions of human rights. Dignity and the development of 
Republicanism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seemed to accompany 
each other. During the struggle for the abolition of slavery this notion was taken up by 
Simon Bolivar, among others. In Germany the founder of the Social Democratic Party, 
Ferdinand Lassalle, for instance, argued that it was the responsibility of the state to 
‘improve the situation of the lower classes, who had fallen into poverty and starvation, 
and thus provide a true humane existence for everyone.’27 
McCrudden points out that in developing a response to the social ills at the end 
of the nineteenth century the Catholic Church built its comprehensive social teaching 
around the principle of human dignity. Different Popes (especially Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI, 
John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II) and the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et Spes 
did so as well.28 
                                                                
26 McCrudden quotes from Article 6: ‘[a]ll citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are 
equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to 
their abilities, and without distinction except that their virtues and talents.’ One can see 
how ‘dignities’ reflect and are meant to counter ‘aristocratic privileges.’ McCrudden 
2008, 660 incl. n 29. 
27 As quoted by McCrudden 2008, 661, see also 660 ff. 
28 See McCrudden 2008, 662. 
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The Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain incorporated dignity into his 
philosophy. He applied the insights dignity brought to Anthropology to his political 
philosophy and had it govern all personal relationships through utilizing the 
accompanying notion of human rights. These human rights were meant to serve the 
furtherance of the common good and were not in the first instance meant to advance a 
‘radical ethical individualism.’ McCrudden writes: ‘For Maritain, dignity was a fact (a 
metaphysical or ontological status, as well as a moral entitlement), and it was he who 
brought it into practical international politics in the post-Second World War period.’29 
He was an active man in addition to being a philosopher and was heavily involved in the 
reconstruction of society after the Second World War. As such he was deeply involved in 
the founding of the United Nations. His influence with regard to human rights was felt 
far and wide.30 
The rise of Marxism and Communism followed by two World Wars with their 
‘untold sorrow to mankind’ lead to the founding of the United Nations (UN). Roberto 
Andorno writes about the formation of this body thus: ‘Former United Nations (UN) 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld often said that the UN was not created to take 
                                                                
29 McCrudden 2008, 662. 
30 William Sweet writes that it is difficult to determine his place in 20th century 
philosophy. Yet, ‘Maritain's most enduring legacy’ he writes, ‘is undoubtedly his moral 
and political philosophy, and the influence of his work on human rights can be seen, not 
only in the United Nations Declaration of 1948 but, it has been claimed, in a number of 
national declarations, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
preamble to the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic (1946). […] Maritain's 
Christian humanism and personalism have also had a significant influence in the social 
encyclicals of Pope Paul VI and in the thought of Pope John Paul II. Interestingly, since 
the end of the Cold War, there has been a revival of Maritain's political ideas in Central 
and Eastern Europe.’ Sweet 2013. 
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humanity to heaven but to save it from hell. By this aphorism, he meant that although 
the UN has its weaknesses and limitations, it has an irreplaceable role in our conflictive 
world by promoting peace, respect for human rights, and social and economic 
development. The UN is imperfect because it mirrors the world, with its divisions and 
disagreements. Nevertheless, it is the only forum where humanity speaks in its entirety 
and where it is able to express, as best as it can, its collective hopes and convictions.’31 
Sandwiched, as it were, between past horrors and a possible (future) nuclear 
annihilation, one can understand the sense of mission and urgency attached to this 
body. This only adds weight to the concept of dignity, which found its way into both the 
Preamble and the Declaration of Human Rights.32 
The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945; 
the Preamble reads: ‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for 
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
                                                                
31 Andorno 2007, 150. 
32 O’Malley discusses the question of the relationship between dignity and the ‘untold 
sorrow to mankind’ which are brought to bear upon each other in the Preamble, when 
he raises the question of the ‘relationship of the “experience” of the war’s inhumanity 
to the “meaning” of the principle [of dignity].’ O'Malley 2011, 8; for a fuller discussion 
see also 7-9. 
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maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom, […]’ [Emphasis mine].33 
Many countries include and build on ‘dignity’ in their Constitutions. A recent 
example is The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). The Bill of Rights, 
                                                                
33 See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (Copyright © United Nations 2013) 
1945. Dignity occupied a place of honor. In the final Declaration it was mentioned five 
times, including Articles 22 and 23, dealing with socio-economic rights. See McCrudden 
2008, 677. The Preamble to The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the 
UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948) reads: 
• ‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world, 
• Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom 
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people, 
• Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law, 
• Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations 
between nations, 
• Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person 
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
• Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation 
with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
• Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the 
greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, 
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, 
[…]’ [Emphasis mine]. See United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Copyright © United Nations 2013) 1948. See also McCrudden 2008, 667, 668-671. 
McCrudden points out that both The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights [ICESCR], (see © OHCHR 1996-2012 1966) and The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], (see © OHCHR 1996-2012 1966) ‘state 
that all human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’ McCrudden 
2008, 656. 
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(Chapter Two) reads simply: ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.’34 McCrudden lists many countries that included 
‘dignity’ in their Constitutions. Among these he mentions Japan (1946), Italy (1948) and 
West Germany (1949). He mentions the influence of Kant on the German understanding 
of dignity, alongside the Catholic and social democratic notions.35 There is a debate as 
to which entity influenced the UN understanding of dignity most, the Christian or 
Kantian notion. According to Knoepffler, however, the UN notion brings something new, 
even though one can identify elements of both Christianity and Kant.36  
The history of dignity continues and debates are raging. It is interesting to note 
that a word count in a fairly recent special publication of The UNESCO Courier dedicated 
                                                                
34 South Africa is an interesting case. This post-Apartheid Constitution was heavily 
influenced by Germany. See McCrudden 2008, 673. McCrudden ponts out, however, 
that in South Africa’s legal system, which is based on Roman-Dutch Law, ‘[i]nfringement 
of a person’s dignitas constituted a delict and compensation could be claimed with the 
actio iniuriarum’ (Ibid., 657). In Roman Law dignity was regarded as ‘a right of 
personality and status’ (Ibid., 657). It is interesting to note that this law was in effect 
during all of Apartheid and was somehow unable to prevent the injustices and horrors 
of Apartheid. Another note of interest (which Prof Sensen brought to my attention) is 
the involvement of the South African General and former Prime Minister, Jan Christian 
Smuts, who authored the original draft of the Preamble. According to McCrudden it is 
unclear whether he actually used the word ‘dignity’ or not, but ultimately it was used to 
express his terminology used in the first draft of the Preamble. See Ibid., 675 ff., and 
especially 676 n 154. 
35 See McCrudden 2008, 664 ff. He adds a host of other countries before the war, for 
instance, Weimar Germany, 1919; Mexico, 1917; Ireland, 1937; etc. See Ibid., 664-675 
for a thorough discussion of the place of dignity in International and National 
Constitutional and Legal texts. 
36 See Knoepffler, Menschenwürde heute – ein wirkmächtiges Prinzip und eine echte 
Innovation 2011, 16 ff., 21 ff. One difference with Kant is that, whereas Kant relies on 
duties, the UN relies on a legal framework which embodies human rights. What is new is 
that its understanding goes beyond the pure regulative function to the real potential of 
the UN (dignity) notion to resolve conflicts. This explains the references to the horrors 
of the war and for Knoepffler should be seen especially in the context of the Shoah. See 
Ibid., 25-28. 
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to the theme of ‘Humanism: A New Idea’ uses the word Kant sixteen times and the word 
dignity eighteen times.37 Kant seems alive and well in the UN – even if the same might 
not be said for dignity. 
 
2. The Question of Dignity in Kant 
 
 
Critics of Kant range from Arthur Schopenhauer to Jürgen Habermas. 
Schopenhauer wrote in 1837: ‘[T]his expression “Human Dignity,” once it was uttered by 
Kant, became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind 
that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of 
any basis at all which was possessed of an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly 
enough that their readers would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a 
“dignity” that they would be quite satisfied.’38 Habermas, on the other hand, states that, 
in Kant’s philosophical conception, dignity has found for our times its valid expression.39 
This is echoed by Glenn Tinder, who writes: ‘[W]hat is now usually called “the dignity of 
the individual,” or, in the terminology of Immanuel Kant, […] the quality by virtue of 
which every person should be treated as an end and never merely as a means […] I 
believe to be the primary intuition of Western moral consciousness and indispensable to 
liberal democracy.’40 These critics find themselves on opposite poles of appreciation. 
                                                                
37 See The UNESCO Courier © UNESCO 2011; and especially Seth 2011, 6-9. 
38 As quoted by McCrudden 2008, 661. 
39 As quoted by Knoepffler, Menschenwürde heute – ein wirkmächtiges Prinzip und eine 
echte Innovation 2011, 11. He writes: ‘Habermas behauptet, “dass der philosophische 
Begriff der Menschenwürde […] bei Kant seine heute gültige Fassung erlangt hat.”’ 
40 Tinder, Against Fate: An Essay on Personal Dignity 2003, 11. 
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Another, perhaps more balanced view, is that of Hardy Jones. In 1971 he wrote: 
‘[Kant’s] famous dictum concerning human dignity—the second formulation of the 
categorical imperative—is widely regarded as one of the most significant of his insights. 
He refers to it as the principle of humanity: “Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end.” […] Many readers will perhaps insist 
that this remark does not provide much insight. But most would surely, upon reflection, 
find it perplexing. […] Though Kant evidently believed it to be very important, he 
devoted a surprisingly small amount of space to its analysis and application. Partly as a 
consequence of the sparse character of his discussion, the principle has very often been 
quite badly misunderstood. Another factor which has led to considerable confusion is its 
evident emotional appeal. In many discussions of moral problems, one finds it treated 
as little more than a platitude. And it is often reduced to the status of a mere slogan.’41 
For Jones dignity in Kant forms an integral part of Kant’s moral thought. He continues: 
‘What is needed is a sustained examination of the principle within the context of Kant’s 
whole ethical theory. Kant’s second formula can be understood and explained only 
when one grasps its relation to certain central doctrines of his moral philosophy.’42 
It is clear that the notion of dignity in Kant is not only important, but also 
profound. And this notwithstanding at least two major hurdles that need to be 
addressed, if not overcome. The first relates to the inherent difficulties in Kant’s own 
                                                                
41 Jones 1971, 3. According to its cover jacket this book ‘represents the first thorough 
critique of the of [Kant’s] doctrine […] of human dignity […] a significant statement of 
the absolute value of human beings.’ 
42 Jones 1971, 3. 
 16 
texts. As Jones sees it: ‘Kant’s remarks about dignity betray a certain amount of 
terminological confusion.’43 The second hurdle concerns the disagreements among 
Kantian scholars seeking to interpret Kant despite such ‘terminological confusion.’ 
 
2.1 Kant’s ‘Terminological Confusions’? 
 
 
Toward the end of his book, Jones looks at the question of moral worth and 
human value. He analyzes an important passage from the Groundwork.44 He starts by 
saying that in order to present ‘persons as ends-in-themselves […] not to be treated 
merely as means’ Kant must ‘hold that persons have intrinsic values.’45 The context of 
this passage and what follows show that Kant’s real intention is to demonstrate that 
moral worth, i.e., virtue, involves dignity. Jones suggests that, if one understands this 
with reference to the good will, one might think that Kant’s claims pertain in reality to 
persons of good moral character. However, this contradicts Kant’s notion that ‘being an 
end-in-itself [which all persons are] is dependent upon the possession of absolute value 
                                                                
43 Jones 1971, 129; see also 131. 
44 Kant writes: ‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has 
a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all 
price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity. What is relative to universal 
human inclinations and needs has a market price; what, even without presupposing a 
need, accords with a certain taste—that is, with satisfaction in the mere purposeless 
play of our mental powers—has a fancy price (Affektionspreis); but that which 
constitutes the sole condition under which anything can be an end in itself has not 
merely a relative value—that is, a price—but has an intrinsic value—that is, dignity.’ This 
is Jones’ translation of the Groundwork (henceforth G) 434 ff. passage. See Jones 1971, 
127 ff. 
45 Jones 1971, 128. 
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[or] dignity.’46 So, if absolute value is contingent upon virtue (the good will), not all 
persons will have it, and if this is the case, not all persons will be ends-in-themselves. 
Jones writes: ‘These points suggest several important questions. What things, in Kant’s 
view, have dignity? Do persons have a value which is independent of whatever virtue 
they may have achieved? If they do, what is this value based upon and which of man’s 
characteristics give him this quality?’47 Jones says that Kant identifies ‘dignity’ with 
‘intrinsic value.’ Presenting his own understanding of ‘[t]his sort of value’ he writes: ‘a 
thing has intrinsic value if its value is not limited to its usefulness as a means, if it has 
value in itself’ [Jones’ emphasis].48 He links this with the second formula of the 
Categorical Imperative, but notes immediately that in the next section Kant seems to 
present quite ‘another characterization of dignity (Würde).’49 In this passage Kant 
defines dignity as ‘unconditioned and incomparable worth’ and for Jones it suggests 
‘that intrinsic value is not sufficient for dignity.’50  
It is not the purpose of this study to evaluate Jones’ attempted resolution of the 
problems, he sees.51 Jones’ analysis and remarks are presented here as illustrations of 
the difficulties Kant’s texts can raise for anyone seeking to interpret them. 
                                                                
46 Jones 1971, 128. 
47 Jones 1971, 128. 
48 Jones 1971, 128. 
49 Jones 1971, 129. He refers to G 435 where Kant writes ‘For nothing can have a value 
other than that determined for it by the law. But the law-making which determines all 
value must for this reason have a dignity—that is, an unconditional and incomparable 
worth—for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 
‘reverence’ is the only becoming expression. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the 
dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.’ [Jones’ empahsis].  
50 Jones 1971, 129. 
51 See Jones 1971, 129-135. 
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It is not surprising, then, that Kantians will differ among themselves in their 
attempts to understand Kant. And their differences have far-reaching implications, 
touching even upon questions of metaphysics and epistemology, as well as Kant’s moral 
and political philosophy. 
In this study I propose to examine the work of three Kantian scholars: Roger 
Sullivan, Susan Shell, and Oliver Sensen. They each give differing accounts of Kant’s 
conception of dignity. I give a fairly detailed analysis of each one’s work, accompanying 
them, so to speak, in their reading of Kant and his teaching. In the end I place them into 
conversation with each other. 
 
3. Kant on Dignity: Scholars in Conversation  
 
 
Taking seriously what Jones (as quoted above) says, namely, that an 
understanding of Kant’s notion of human dignity cannot be approached without placing 
it in the context of his moral thought, we look in Chapter One at the philosopher Roger 
Sullivan. His major work Immanuel Kant’s moral theory includes a highly detailed 
treatment of human dignity. I shall present an analysis of his understanding within the 
context of his methodology and his general approach to Kant’s moral philosophy. 
We look in Chapter Two at Susan Shell’s ‘Kant on Human Dignity.’ In addition to 
this, we consider Shell’s methodology and some of her work on the early Kant where we 
find the roots of Kant’s conception of dignity. 
 19 
Chapter Three addresses Oliver Sensen’s novel interpretation of Kant’s use of 
the term ‘dignity.’ Utilizing the tools of Analytical Philosophy, he enters into dialogue 
with Kantian interpreters, suggesting that their understanding of dignity in Kant 
harbours elements at odds with Kant’s thought and that they thus fail to grasp the 
radical nature of Kant’s notion.  
In the final and Fourth Chapter, I try to bring these scholars into a conversation 
with each other. First, I show the strengths of each position and then, using insights of 
both Shell and Sensen I venture to ask whether one could not develop the notion of a 
phenomenology of dignity. I also consider whether in both Shell’s and Sensen’s account 
there is not an implicit dynamic at work which suggest the necessity of transcendence 
and the Good.
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Chapter One: The Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons: 
Roger Sullivan’s take on Human Dignity in Kant 
 
 
Prelude 
 
Sullivan takes Kant’s articulation of the second formula as the classic expression 
of human dignity, of what it is, of its place within Kant’s system, especially within his 
moral philosophy. In this part of the dissertation we shall present Sullivan’s 
interpretation of Kant. After a short introduction we shall look at what Sullivan 
envisages to be Kant’s strategy and aim within the Groundwork, where the second 
formula makes an explicitly argued appearance in relation to the first formula. After this 
short interlude we shall look at Sullivan’s understanding of the second formula, 
following for the most part his chapter dedicated to this theme. After this we look at 
Sullivan’s exposition on the difference between persons and things. This will set the 
stage for turning to the concept of respect that belongs irrevocably to the concept of 
the dignity of the human person, and is the required attitude when approaching 
persons. Within this notion we shall look at respect for persons, then self-respect, our 
own right to happiness, and finally respect for others.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In a chapter entitled ‘The Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons,’ Sullivan 
presents his understanding of Kant on dignity. The title of the chapter actually refers to 
Sullivan’s way of referring to the second formula. After H. J. Paton, most writers have 
referred to this formula as the ‘Formula of an End in Itself,’ but for Sullivan the more 
elegant title would be the ‘Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons.’1 
According to Sullivan, Kant tends to present the rather abstract concepts 
pertaining to our moral abilities (or ‘faculties’) like empirical, practical (that is, 
prudential) reason and pure practical (that is, moral) reason as concrete realities, 
resulting in our seldom finding ‘flesh-and-blood people in the pages of [Kant’s] books;’ 
but Sullivan concedes, with respect to human dignity (especially in the Formula of 
Respect for the Dignity of Persons), Kant gives voice to his realization that human 
morality needs an emotional dimension. Kant says as much in the Groundwork, namely 
that with its emphasis on people (or persons) this Formula ‘would “bring an Idea of 
reason … nearer to feeling,” [… and this] subjective foundation of human morality 
consists of the dispositions of self-respect and respect for others.’ 2 
This Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons is, however, the second 
formula and it stands in a symbiotic relationship to the first formula. Before we look at 
the exact nature of the relationship between these two formulae as Sullivan sees it, it 
might be helpful to look briefly at Sullivan’s understanding of what Kant is aiming for in 
                                                                
1 Sullivan 1989, 356 n 1. 
2 See Sullivan 1989, 193. Sullivan refers to G 436. 
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the Groundwork. It is here that Kant first formulated these systematically and also 
where dignity gets a treatment and placement within a body of systematic thought. We 
shall thus make a short detour to this end.  
 
2. Interlude: Background  
2.1 The Strategy of the Groundwork I 
 
 
As important background, as well as correctly to place the presence of dignity in 
the second formula within the context of Kant’s aims and argument we will now look at 
Kant’s strategy especially in the first section of the Groundwork as presented by 
Sullivan.3 
In his preface Kant admits that he has one purpose: ‘to seek out and establish 
[i.e., defend] the supreme principle of morality.’4 What is at stake then is to state and to 
defend the ‘objective validity of the ultimate moral norm.’ In his first chapter he sets out 
to identify this principle, which he does through an analysis of the nature of ‘morally 
good character.’ This Sullivan takes to be the ‘good will’ to which Kant refers and about 
which he famously says: ‘There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the 
world, or even out of [beyond] it, which can be regarded as good without qualification 
[limitation], except a good will.’5 Sullivan’s own take on this is that Kant here reflects 
                                                                
3 See Sullivan 1989, 296 n 9. 
4 See G 392. 
5 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 393. Compare also Mary Gregor’s 
translation on key concepts (provided in square brackets) at Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:393. 
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what he holds to be the ‘reasoned judgment of ordinary people’6 that a good moral 
character is the only thing ‘intrinsically and unconditionally good.’ Kant continues now 
by highlighting in effect three questions relating to the nature of a ‘human morally good 
character’ and his answers will become his ‘propositions.’  
His first question asks what makes a person morally good (that is, to have a 
‘good will’) and his answer is that it is not because of the good things one accomplishes 
                                                                
6 The expression ‘ordinary people’ should be taken ‘as an honorific title, [and] not a 
denigrating expression.’ See Sullivan 1989, 297 n 10. This points to Sullivan’s conviction 
that for Kant ‘the ultimate data of moral philosophy – beginning with the inner 
experience of moral obligation – must be found in what he called “ordinary moral 
consciousness.”’ Sullivan says this does not mean that Kant denied the fact that people 
make moral mistakes or even act deliberately in morally wrong ways, but that looking at 
the ordinary experience of all we shall find something of the universal in it, and that 
even though this consensus is not on its own sufficient to claim validity it ‘still can be a 
sign of truth, for “objective validity affords the ground for a necessary universal 
agreement” [CPrR 13; CPR A 820-22/B848-50].’ He adds, ‘Kant had great respect for 
scientific consensus; in moral matters, with which everyone must be aquainted, he had 
even more respect for common convictions.’ One last quote to drive this point home 
follows a retort that Kant would not have held that ordinary moral or religious 
consciousness would of necessity yield ‘the ground for the apodictic nature of moral 
demands’ in an examination of this consciousness and that it required a critique of 
practical reason which on its own requires an ‘advanced stage of moral enlightenment.’ 
To this position Sullivan responds: ‘However, any attempt to understand morality in 
terms of or to base it on anything but itself would only destroy morality. Kant’s critique 
of practical reason therefore analyzes what the concept of “a moral agent” must mean 
and then shows that human agency can be understood (insofar as it can be understood) 
only in terms of our actually being moral agents. There is an inevitable circularity here 
(as in every moral theory), but the circularity need not be vicious as long as the critique 
of practical reason and the analysis of morality are done with sufficient care’ (Sullivan 
1989, 279 n 10).  
I have quoted this whole section because to me it points to two significant 
insights, the first is the importance of the ordinary man and the experience of 
consciousness that all share alike. This reveals something of the universal and even 
democratic nature of morality and it affects dignity similarly. The second, which 
emphasizes the last (democratic) point as well, highlights that the moral law is of 
necessity and (with some ambiguity) its own ground, and that one cannot base morality 
on anything but itself. See Sullivan 1989, 297 n 10. 
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but because of one’s intentions. ‘It is good only through its willing. i.e., it is good in 
itself’ says Kant.7 Sullivan acknowledges that Kant did not make this first proposition 
explicit with the unfortunate result that there is among Kant scholars no consensus as to 
exactly which claim is the ‘first proposition.’8 
His second question comes after an introduction, which looks at the difference 
between two types of motives (intentions); one, an action done from a desire for 
happiness, and the other, performed from the motive of duty. By implication then Kant 
asks, if the above-mentioned first proposition is correct, what kind of intention would 
make a person morally good? And the answer is: the intention (motive) to act from 
duty. Duty, as explained by Sullivan, means to act consistently in accordance with a rule 
or maxim that determines the action.9 The second proposition reads as follows: ‘An 
                                                                
7 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 394 
8 See for instance James Ellington’s remark in a footnote to Kant’s formulation of the 
second proposition where he says ‘The first proposition of morality says that an action 
must be done from duty in order to have any moral worth. It is implicit in the preceding 
examples but was never explicitly stated.’ Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals 1981, 399 n 12. 
9 Sullivan notes elsewhere (Sullivan 1989, 309 n 14) that Kant seems to use the term 
‘maxim’ in two different ways. Sometimes it refers to ‘any practical rule that is 
“subjective” in the sense that it is a rule a person (or “subject”) possibly can or in fact 
does adopt, whatever the moral quality of the action and whatever the person’s 
motivation may be’ (see CPrR 20; MM 398). In this sense then subjective maxims are 
also ‘objective principles or laws if they are fit to hold for every rational being’ making 
them thus rules ‘on which any rational agent could act’ (see CPR A 812/B 840, G 400n). 
Other times ‘maxim’ refers to a rule that is ‘subjective,’ meaning that it is based on 
‘subjective factors such as a person’s inclinations and even […] ignorance so that it holds 
only for that person, in contrast to objective principles, which ignore all purely 
subjective considerations and therefore are fit to hold for all rational agents’ (see G 
420n; MM 225, 389; CPrR 19-20). Sullivan himself uses ‘maxim’ in the first sense ‘[s]ince 
Kant’s various formulations of the ultimate moral principle uniformly mandate the form 
that our maxims should have (whether or not they do) [… and hence as] any rule of 
conduct which people actually do or possibly can adopt and use and which may or may 
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action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by 
it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined.’10  
The third question according to Sullivan is then ‘what does it mean to adopt the 
maxim to act “from duty”?’11 To which the answer is that it is the intention ‘to do 
whatever morality obligates one to do, out of the motive of respect for the ultimate 
standard or law of morality.’12 Finally Kant asks what is this ultimate moral law that can 
demand (or cause) such respect as to ‘outweigh every other motive?’ As Kant said 
before, it cannot be a rule relating to one’s effectiveness in fulfilling or achieving some 
purpose. It is neither oriented nor fed by one’s ‘subjectivity,’ hence it will be identified 
and found only in reference to its character, which will be purely formal and as such it 
relates to the maxim of an action, ‘namely that it can be a maxim on which any and 
every person may rationally act.’ Without much ado, Kant states: ‘I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal 
law.’13 This is the first principle, and it is also a formal principle, known as the 
Categorical Imperative.14  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
not also qualify as a morally acceptable rule or law.’ See Sullivan 1989, 310 n 14. In the 
Groundwork Kant compares the kingdom of ends analogically with the kingdom of 
nature: both function according to laws. The former, however, not ‘laws of efficient 
causes necessitated from without’ but only ‘through maxims, i.e., self-imposed rules.’ 
See Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 438. 
10 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 399. 
11 Sullivan 1989, 296 n 9.  
12 Sullivan 1989, 296 n 9; or in Kant’s words: ‘The third proposition, which follows from 
the other two, can be expressed thus: Duty is the necessity of an action done out of 
respect for the law.’ Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 400. 
13 G 402. See Sullivan 1989, 296 n 9. 
14 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 402 n 15. 
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Kant, however, in claiming that the third proposition is ‘an inference from the 
two proceeding’ unwittingly unleashed distraction and confusion insofar as people 
assume the second must also be an inference from the first, which leads them to read 
the first chapter as ‘an enthymematic “argument.”’15 This has had the result that many 
creative suggestions are put forward in order to make the argument ‘explicit and valid.’ 
But all of this, according to Sullivan, misses the point. Kant is here trying to determine 
‘what there is about morally good character that leads people to regard it as uniquely 
good (if there is such a thing as morally good character).’16 And again ‘inference’ is not 
to be confused with logical inference but is Kant’s particular way of argument, starting 
from his belief that ordinary people can be morally good and that this goodness lies not 
in great deeds but in one’s moral character. Kant then comes to the point that moral 
character ‘must be a quality intrinsic to the person [emphasis added].’17 And according 
to Sullivan this means simply that  ‘A person’s character must depend on that person’s 
intentions.’18 And the good person’s intentions are based on the determined 
decision/commitment to act according to duty. Sullivan notes that Kant’s inclusion of 
the notion of respect is to show ‘how important moral sentiment is […] to human 
                                                                
15 Sullivan 1989, 297 n 9. This means it is read as an argument (with a syllogistic form) 
with an unstated, allbeit asssumed, premise. 
16 Sullivan 1989, 297 n 9. In the first part of the Groundwork the only thing that can be 
regarded as ‘good wihout qualification’ is ‘the good will’ (G 393). Sullivan notes that in 
Kant’s subsequent discussions here all other ends are limited to subjective and 
prudential goods. ‘There are no preparation’ he says, ‘for his later claims that 
personhood and the total final good are absolute goods.’ This confusion leads to 
differing interpretations among his interpreters. See Sullivan 1989, 323 n 14. 
17 Sullivan 1989, 297 n 9. 
18 Sullivan 1989, 297 n 9. 
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virtue.’19 In the end from his analysis of dutifulness or respect for the moral law, Kant 
‘elicits the ultimate moral norm by which ordinary moral judgment determines the 
moral quality of a person’s maxims of conduct.’20 Note the emphasis on ordinary human 
awareness that opens the way to morally good character and that this character is 
described as being a quality that is moreover intrinsic to the person. In explicating this 
‘intrinsic-ity’ Sullivan equates it with the person’s intentions (that is his/her will). 
Furthermore, in talking about duty as the explicit, en-acted (or facial) expression of this 
intrinsic quality, he mentions respect as the humanising sentiment that makes it human 
virtue. But in talking of this he relates duty with respect. Again it is not duty or respect in 
itself but solely for the moral law, and in all of this we are empowered to judge morally 
on the moral quality of a person’s maxims of conduct, that is, the rule a person adopts 
that is expressed in action.  
 
2.2 The doctrine of the two view-points 
 
 
Sullivan, in his analysis of Kant, will appeal to ordinary moral awareness. This is in 
his view how Kant approached the subject as well. But Kant’s moral philosophy does not 
stand on its own. It is embedded and is part of his whole system and cannot be thought 
apart from it. This is why he warns explicitly: ‘It is difficult – perhaps, finally, impossible 
– either to conceive of or defend Kant’s philosophy (particularly insofar as it is critical in 
                                                                
19 Sullivan 1989, 297 n 9. 
20 See Sullivan 1989, 296-97 n 9. 
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character) apart from the doctrine of the two viewpoints.’21 This doctrine refers to the 
noumenal-phenomenal distinction that plays a pivotal role in Kant’s thinking. For 
Sullivan this results in two different methods, which Kant used in his moral writings, 
namely the analytic and the synthetic methods. Sullivan follows the analytic method, 
which studies (analyses and clarifies) the ‘common knowledge’ of the morality of 
ordinary people. The synthetic method builds on the doctrines and definitions he had 
previously established concerning the nature of human morality. Kant’s use and 
meaning of some concepts like ‘freedom’ and ‘heteronomy’ is often contingent on the 
method he is using. It is thus good to be aware of this distinction. However concerning 
his own interpretation Sullivan states: ‘I shall refer to that doctrine as sparingly as 
possible and concentrate instead on Kant’s analytic exposition of ordinary moral 
consciousness.’22 Among the reasons he offers is the fact that there seems neither one 
way to understand this doctrine, nor anything positive we might legitimately say about 
the noumenal world. In fact, most Kantian ethicists today adopt the conceptual analysis 
and set aside the problem of freedom and determinism, which lies partly at the heart of 
this doctrine. Sullivan warns, however, if one focuses solely on the analysis of ordinary 
moral language and dismisses this doctrine with its epistemological and metaphysical 
frames of reference, one runs the risk of ‘the destruction of morality.’ For that would 
imply ignoring those elements Kant thought indispensible to human morality, like 
freedom, the postulates of pure practical reason, the importance of the notion of the 
                                                                
21 Sullivan 1989, 307 n 37. 
22 Sullivan 1989, 307 n 37. 
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final good and ‘the essentially religious nature of his enterprise and of the human race’s 
ultimate destiny.’23  
Sullivan’s own take is that the noumenal-phenomenal distinction is an 
epistemological, rather than a metaphysical distinction. It reflects the limits of our 
theoretical knowledge. ‘I do not believe’ says Sullivan ‘that Kant ever held that there are 
two different worlds – the one we experience and another one behind the world we 
experience.’24 We are now ready for a deeper look into Sullivan’s analysis and approach 
to Kant’s understanding of human dignity. We shall look to his chapter dedicated to this 
theme. 
 
3. The Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons 
 
 
The beauty of the second formula is that it equates in an explicit manner the 
‘class of moral agents’ with the ‘class of all human beings because of [the] “humanity in 
our person” in contrast to our “animality.”’25 Under ‘humanity’ Kant understands ‘that 
                                                                
23 Sullivan 1989, 307 n 37. 
24 Sullivan 1989, 307 n 37. For more on this doctrine and its relation to the concepts of 
freedom, heteronomy and autonomy see Sullivan 1989, 279-86. 
25 Sullivan 1989, 193. The first formula is the universal formula of the Categorical 
Imperative. ‘But one does better always to proceed in moral appraisal by the strict 
method and put at its basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative: act in 
accordance with a maxim that can at the same time make itself a universal law.’ Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:437.  
Sullivan provides a helpful list of Kant’s different formulations of the second 
formula: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end’ (G 429); ‘For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat 
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functional complex of abilities and characteristics that enables us to set ends and make 
rational choices.’26  
The relationship between these two formulas might be described as being equal, 
with the first one as the first among equals. It is the first because from it the other will 
also be determined. The two thus live in a symbiotic relationship towards and off each 
other. In fact, even without the second formula, we would still have arrived at the 
recognition of another’s dignity. As Sullivan points out: ‘The imperative that we should 
act only on maxims capable of being universal laws, Kant writes, inevitably “will lead to” 
our recognizing that we must respect every human person as having objective and 
intrinsic worth or dignity (Würde).’27 This quote is important because in it Sullivan 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in 
themselves’ (G 433); ‘A rational being, as by his very nature an end and consequently an 
end in himself, must serve for every maxim as a condition limiting all merely relative and 
arbitrary ends’ (G 436); ‘So act in relation to every rational being (both to yourself and 
to others) that he may at the same time count in your maxim as an end in himself’ (G 
437); ‘A subject of ends, namely, a rational being himself, must be made the ground for 
all maxims of action, never merely as a means, but as a supreme condition restricting 
the use of every means – that is, always also as an end’ (G 438); ‘Do not make yourself 
into a mere means for others, but be at the same time an end for them’ (MM 236); ‘Act 
according to a maxim of ends which it can be a universal law for everyone to have’ (MM 
395); ‘Man is obligated to regard himself, as well as every other man, as his end’ (MM 
410); ‘Man cannot be used merely as a means by any man (either by others or even by 
himself) but must always be treated at the same time as an end’ (MM 462). See Sullivan 
1989, 356 n 1. 
26 Sullivan 1989, 193. He refers to G 437; Rel 26; MM 392, 447-48. Sullivan explains that 
for Kant the first formula is an analytic a priori proposition with the second one a 
synthetic a priori proposition. The first would be a formal determination in that the 
universality as requirement is given priority while the second one adds something in 
virtue of its statement that human beings are ‘morally obligatory ends’. See Sullivan 
1989, 193. 
27 Sullivan 1989, 193. Sulllivan refers to G 436, 437-38; MM 382. 
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describes his understanding of dignity as being both objective and intrinsic. In addition, 
dignity conveys something of the value or worth of the person, which he/she has.28 
Designating dignity, moreover, as objective seems to fly in the face of what we 
said if we take objectivity to mean factual actuality or something that does not take 
subjective feelings into account as the grounding source. That is, if one were to take 
objective to mean something not being dependent on the (subjective) mind, the fact 
that the maxim will inevitably lead us to the recognition (arguably a subjective 
experience/operation) of the objective dignity of all, seems at a first glance 
contradictory. But this is not the case. 
                                                                
28 Has describes something owned but not necessarily something that designates the 
being of a subject. We ask here whether one may on the basis of Sullivan’s use of the 
word have say that dignity is something that one is in possession of in the sense that we 
have it and that we have ownership of it but not in the sense that we are it? In other 
words does having dignity describe a state of ownership or a state of affairs? Or is it 
perhaps something of both?  
It is really the difference between being and having: When we talk of someone 
‘being good’ and especially of someone ‘being a human being’ we imply a level of depth 
and meaning by those phrases that is absent when we talk of someone ‘being dignified.’ 
The phrase ‘she is a human being’ describes her essence. Whatever else she has or does, 
she is above all a human being. That is her defining reality. It seems having designates a 
category that is not of the same foundationally grounding and differentiating power that 
is conveyed by is and being.  
To put it differently: if we are to think in terms of the concepts of species and 
genus we might say ‘having x’ does not distinguish or determine the species in the same 
way as ‘being x’ does. This might be a helpful way of approaching the subject insofar as 
it can help us clarify the role and function of dignity and pinpointing whether it belongs 
indeed to the structure of essentiality of being human. In other words, does dignity 
pertain to the form or accident of being human?  
One would have to look at the concept of (moral) personhood and also of 
humanity. Kant often speaks of the humanity in one’s person and dignity is related to 
our humanity. 
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In terms of its intrinsic nature, dignity might refer to something ontologically 
within the human person’s being; or, alternatively, it might say that dignity has no need 
for reference and dependence outside of itself. In other words, if the former meaning 
refers to something necessarily given and found within, the latter means a self-
consistent, self-reliant dynamic reality or state of affairs, that is intrinsic to itself, but not 
a depiction of an ontological given. I have raised these possibilities in order to highlight 
the questions and implications associated with the words used by Kant (and per 
definition, by Sullivan) in describing the nature of dignity. Mentioning it here will allow 
us in the course of our summary on Sullivan’s interpretation of Kant on dignity to be 
attentive to how he uses these concepts and what their use implies.  
 Earlier Sullivan speaks of objectivity in the context of the grounds (or reasons) 
for accepting claims as true, which he says ought to be only objective grounds, that is 
‘grounds that can hold publicly, for all rational beings, which can be sufficient to support 
the assent of anyone who thinks rationally.’29 The following elements are related to 
objectivity. It has to do with grounds, which Kant understands as sufficient reasons.30 
These reasons must be able to withstand a two-fold test. In the first place they have to 
pass the test of ‘the Public Square or marketplace’ so to speak, where things are open, 
transparent and democratic. In fact, these reasons must be so open that they are 
universal, i.e., valid for all. There is, however, in the second place, also the individual 
element, where this sufficient reason is tested or assented to by anyone who thinks 
rationally. This assent is nothing else but individual judgment. And as such it is a process. 
                                                                
29 Sullivan 1989, 192. 
30 Sullivan 1989, 300 n 4. See also Caygill 1995, 217-19. 
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The kernel of this entire public and personal process is that it be rational. If we keep in 
mind that in this short explication of objectivity Sullivan twice refers to rationality we 
might even say that objectivity for Sullivan is an open, rationally transparent process, for 
rational beings, by rational beings, and, through rational means (process).31 This 
rationality in its practical application requires, by implication, that we come to recognize 
and therefore respect our own autonomy and that of other persons (‘whether human or 
not’32). 
The two formulas are thus ‘at bottom the same;’ the second one a different 
representation of the first –the original and ultimate moral Law of Autonomy.33 In 
showing this equivalence between the two formulas, Sullivan states that the second 
formula (Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons) ‘simply restates the 
requirement that moral actions should conform to the Law of Freedom in both its 
negative and positive meaning.’34 The negative meaning forbids us to act 
heteronomously to the satisfaction of our sensuous nature, while the positive meaning 
                                                                
31 See also Sullivan’s note that the meaning of objectivity depends also on the context in 
which Kant uses it. However he states that generally, ‘[p]ractical claims are called 
“subjective when they are regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will” and 
“objective” (or laws) when they are “valid for the will of any rational being,” even if they 
are not recognized as such by every person.’ See Sullivan 1989, 301 n 7. See also CPrR 
19. 
32 Sullivan 1989, 193. The point being that it is about persons. Personhood here 
functions like a class and human beings as a set of this class. Personhood is related to 
reason, responsibility and autonomy. 
33 See G 437, 436. The ‘original ultimate moral Law of Autonomy’ as Sullivan calls it is 
according to his own references the formulation of the Categorical Imperative. ‘But one 
does better if in the moral judgment he follows the rigorous method and take as his 
basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative: Act according to that maxim 
which can at the same time make itself a universal law.’ Kant, Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 437. See Sullivan 1989, 193. 
34 Sullivan 1989, 194. 
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states that we are subjects (agents) that determine ourselves and must act therefore in 
autonomy. This Law of Autonomy is ‘a purely rational norm’ and that means it is 
objective and universally valid for all rational agents. Within and because of this 
rationality there is a dynamic of reciprocity embedded in the Law of Autonomy insofar 
as it effects our interpersonal relations with others: ‘[The Law of Autonomy] therefore 
requires us not only to obey it in our own actions but also to recognize the right and 
obligation of every other person to do the same.’35  
Kant is so concerned to avoid even the merest hint of any motive that might 
smack of heteronomy that it might seem as if the negative aspect of the formula is 
overemphasized. And within the formula it applies similarly to the functioning of the 
concept of the ‘person,’ which is ‘purely formal’ and so ‘must be conceived only 
negatively.’ This means disregarding any positive, empirical information providing 
grounds for distinguishing between people and for providing information ‘necessary for 
acting heteronomously.’36 Indeed Sullivan states that ‘because each person has intrinsic 
worth just by being a person’37 the formula legislates both positive and negative duties. 
Keeping only the negative duties that would result in an avoidance of people out of fear 
of infringing on their dignity is not morally right, as it could mask actual indifference or 
disdain towards them: ‘We must go beyond negative duties “to make man as such [our] 
                                                                
35 Sullivan 1989, 194. 
36 Sullivan 1989, 194. 
37 See Sullivan 1989, 194. He also refers the reader to G 437.  
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end,” both by striving for our own virtue and by acting justly, benevolently, and 
beneficently towards others.’38 
Returning then to the relationship between the two, Sullivan states that the first 
formula (Law of Autonomy) is logically prior to any ends it would generate or identify as 
having objective moral worth.  This is because ‘the ultimate “moral fact” for us is our 
awareness of the Law of Autonomy in the form of an imperative. […] The Law of 
Autonomy remains the “sole determining ground [Bestimmungsgrund] of the pure will” 
and so the ground both for identifying morally obligatory ends and for our obligation to 
respect, and, when appropriate, to promote them.’39 Sullivan emphasizes again that this 
process is rational and hence purely formal, which means that it abstracts from all 
subjective ends, which he takes as ends grounded in desires. We have to keep in mind 
that ends are objects of moral willing and thus not ultimate. Even the notion of ‘person’ 
that is generated and grounded ‘in a completely a priori way is as formal a notion as the 
norm of universality itself.’40 As he states elsewhere: ‘Persons are “objective ends,” that 
is, morally necessary ends for everyone, but they are also the “subjective ground” of 
morality in the sense that they are the self-legislating subjects in whom the moral law 
resides.’41 The second formula is the more attractive expression since it appeals to the 
                                                                
38 Sullivan 1989, 194. Here he quotes from the Metaphysics of Morals (MM 395): ‘Act 
according to a maxim of ends which it can be a universal law for everyone to have.’ He 
notes however that legislating respect for persons independent of empirical knowledge 
limits the moral law in the sense that by itself it is unable to discriminate between 
persons with regard to ‘wide and positive duties.’ 
39 See Sullivan 1989, 194 (with reference to CPrR 109). 
40 Sullivan 1989, 195. 
41 Sullivan 1989, 357 n 3. 
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‘person’ or ‘humanity.’42 It brings, as he said earlier, the human intuition closer to the 
categorical imperative.  
Good as this may be, there is a danger for Kant in that, if we were to take either 
the notion of persons or our feeling of respect for persons to be both basic to and the 
motivation for action, we fall prey to sentimentality. It will lead us to judge moral 
actions in terms of how they make us feel and this is a moral weakness. Moreover, 
taking account of any feelings or ends of any kind when building the basis for moral 
judgment condemns the judgment to be prudential and heteronomous.43 What is clear 
and non-negotiable for Sullivan’s reading of Kant is that ‘the ontological and 
epistemological foundation of morality is always and only the Law of Autonomy, 
appearing to us as a categorical imperative. [As Kant writes:] “The ground for every 
enactment of practical law lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality 
(according to our first principle),” and it is only that rule that identifies which ends are 
morally obligatory and so provides the ultimate ground for holding in the second 
formula that persons are such ends […] That is why the principle that “rational nature 
exists as an end in itself” can only be a restatement of the first formula.’44 
 
                                                                
42 ‘It has a majesty that can so fire the moral sensibilities of his readers that whatever 
problems there may be in using it as a norm, Kant’s second formula seems obviously the 
right view to most people’ writes Sullivan (1989, 195). 
43 See Sullivan 1989, 357 n 3, who refers the reader to Anthr 236; CPrR 38, 44-45, 83-85, 
109-110. 
44 Sullivan 1989, 357 n 3. Kant quoted from G 431. See also CPrR 16 and G 428-29 to 
which he refers.  
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4. Persons and things 
 
 
‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end.’45 Thus, according to Sullivan, reads the best-known version of the second 
formula. 
Behind this lies a profound and radical distinction between persons and things. 
Things belong to the realm of nature; they are natural objects or products of our own 
handiwork. As such they have conditional, extrinsic and subjective value. Their relative 
goodness lies in their value that is determined by the degree of their desirability with 
regard to their use. In this sense they have a price determined by what one is willing to 
give in exchange for them, thus determining their equivalent value. In this sense 
something external (like money) becomes the standard of value and worth. All in all 
then, such ‘things’ have no unique, absolute intrinsic value or worth. 
Man, as a rational being, on the contrary, ‘exists as an end in himself’ and is also 
‘necessarily an end for everyone.’46 In itself this is neither a scientific nor a theoretical 
description of man. Sullivan is also clear that Kant’s claim for the dignity of persons is 
not a scientific claim and cannot be taken as such. Any grounds as to proofs for it are 
barred, be they based on empirical information or even anthropological data with 
regard to human desires or inclination. In fact it ‘admits of no proof’ and is purely ‘an 
                                                                
45 Sullivan 1989, 195 taken from G 429. 
46 Sullivan 1989, 195. See G 428, 429. Also HH 114; CPrR 87; MM 383, 394-95, 410, 447. 
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evaluative claim.’47 For Sullivan the concept or ‘Idea’ of persons is ‘a pure practical Idea 
of reason, already an enunciation of ordinary moral consciousness.’48 
The intuition of man as an end in himself is historically informed by the ethical 
ideals present in the Stoics and Plotinus, and to a greater degree in Christianity. Kant 
could not use the theological surroundings associated with this idea so he invented a 
new language in which to express this intuition rationally. Hence the lop-sided 
terminology of ‘person as an end in himself’ and ‘an object of free choice.’ Both ‘end’ 
and ‘object’ are related and used for goals we aim to achieve through the use of reason 
or whatever is in our control. Quoting from the Metaphysics of Morals Sullivan writes in 
support: ‘An end [Zweck] is an object [Gegenstand] of the power of choice (of a rational 
being), through the thought of which choice is determined to an action to produce this 
object.’49  
This however does not relate to persons as objects or ends. With regard to 
persons he writes: ‘Persons are “self-existent” (selbständig), having intrinsic and 
                                                                
47 Sullivan 1989, 195-96. See also G 430-31 and MM 395. 
48 Sullivan 1989, 196. I take this to be very important and that Sullivan in effect takes the 
notion of personhood as Idea, similar to the regulative Ideas, that has no scientific 
evidence but yet is of practical importance to such a degree that without it practice (i.e., 
practical morality) would not be possible. Hence it becomes a condition of possibility as 
such. It is furthermore significant in that he sees it as an enunciation of our moral 
consciousness. The question is whether it is our moral consciousness that posits or puts 
this Idea forward or whether this idea leads to the formation of moral consciousness. 
My own reading of Sullivan tends to be the former. 
49 Quoted from MM 381, see Sullivan 1989, 321 n 10. Sullivan continues to show how 
the apparent conceptual confusion that surrounds the loose use of these terms is the 
result of Kant’s failure to ‘begin with a reasonably developed philosophy of action.’ 
Analysing other instances of Kant’s use of these terms bears this out. In the end 
however he states that Kant’s ethical theory is coherently related to these concepts, but 
in order to avoid confusion one needs a careful reading that pays close attention to the 
context of each use of each concept. See Sullivan 1989, 321-22 n 10. 
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objective worth simply by the fact that they exist, apart from any and all subjective 
prudential considerations.’50 This is an important if not loaded description, and just to 
leave us in no doubt Sullivan repeats that, if things and animals may be ‘contingently 
desired (or feared)’ and thus ‘possibly valued (or given a negative value)’ by someone, it 
is different in the case of persons. ‘By contrast, just by their existence, persons 
necessarily, always, and universally should be regarded as having objective, absolute, 
and intrinsic worth, whether or not they also happen to be desired because they 
contribute in some way to anyone’s happiness.’51 One cannot get more absolutistic 
language than this. 
Sullivan does acknowledge our ability to use ourselves and others as instruments 
towards achieving a purpose and in this sense to have utilitarian value. In itself this is 
not all bad as it is part of living life as human beings. In many ways this is part of the 
political process required for creating life together. This reflects our dependent reality.52 
And according to Sullivan Kant does not regard this as morally wrong. What he does 
hold as wrong, however, is ‘thinking of our ability to set our own ends only in terms of 
greater utilitarian advantages’ as this implies that we ‘[regard] ourselves only as having 
extrinsic value.’53  
                                                                
50 Sullivan 1989, 196. 
51 Sullivan 1989, 196. 
52 Sullivan 1989, 196. In support of his position Sullivan refers to CPrR 76-77; CJ 172; G 
416n, 435; MM 434; Anthr 292 and Collins 343. 
53 Sullivan 1989, 196. ‘What the second formula stipulates is that we may not treat 
others or allow ourselves to be treated only as instrumentally valuable, merely as a 
means to satisfy someone else’s desires, merely as a source of pleasure that is in other 
respects morally permissible.’ See Sullivan 1989, 196-97; with references to CPrR 83; 
MM 434-35, 450, 462-64. 
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In contrast to things, which are essentially valuable as instruments, persons have 
a status that Kant identifies with our ‘humanity.’ And humanity is tied to and defined in 
terms of (our) moral personality.54 Moral personality is distinguished from psychological 
or empirical personality. As the concept indicates, the latter is something we might 
access empirically, that is, psychologically. According to Kant this refers to the ‘power to 
become self-conscious of our self-identity.’55 This process happens in conjunction with 
temporal and other changes. Moral personality again indicates the sphere of morality, 
which in Kantian terms implies the moral agent as rational agent in his ability to act 
freely, i.e., independent of the empirical mechanisms of nature where there is no 
freedom –only mechanistic determinism, which seems to be a condition for the 
possibility of the laws of nature. These agents are ‘persons’ because they are rational. 
As we have seen, inherent to rationality is the ability, and therefore obligation,56 to set 
ends or goals. This process requires, furthermore, the recognition of ‘the existence of 
objective ends’ and the ability to make genuine choices towards these ends. Genuine 
choices imply freedom. All of this unites in the ability to ‘enact and act on genuinely 
universal laws of conduct for themselves and all others.’57 
                                                                
54 Sullivan 1989, 197. Sullivan refers to CPrR 85, 162 as well as CPR A 365. 
55 Sullivan 1989, 197. 
56 According to Sullivan ‘Kant is usually interpreted as holding that “should” (sollen) 
implies “can” (können). Although he nowhere makes this claim in so many words, this is 
clearly his doctrine’ (Sullivan 1989, 320 n 6). This is seen in numerous passages 
throughout his writing. Sullivan lists a few, among them the following ‘since reason 
commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take 
place’ (CPR A 807 / B 835) and again ‘for reason will not command the impossible’ 
(Anthr 148).  
57 Sullivan 1989, 197. Sullivan refers to G 434, 435, 437-39; CPrR 28-30, 67-68; CJ 434; 
Rel 22-23, 27-28; MM 223, 441, 464. 
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This brings Sullivan to dignity: ‘It is because of being under the moral law,’ he 
says, ‘that each and every person has an intrinsic, inalienable, unconditional, objective 
worth or dignity (Würde) as a person. […] By virtue of that law we are elevated above 
being merely part of the natural world. […] We have an absolute and irreplaceable 
worth, for our value is not dependent on our usefulness or desirability.’58 In fact, 
quoting Kant, he writes, ‘[i]t has no price or no equivalent for which the object of 
esteem could be exchanged.’59 
The corollary of this for Sullivan is the required respect that comes as command 
and therefore as right: ‘We may never renounce our right to respect, and we ought 
never act in such a way as to reduce either ourselves or others to the status of mere 
things.’60 Kant’s entire moral project can, for Sullivan, be described as a protest against 
distinctions—whether religious, political, economic or social. His ethics is an ‘ethics of 
the people, of moral egalitarianism.’61 This is shown forth in the second formula that 
epitomises ‘respect,’ and which is different from ‘honor,’ in that the latter is based on 
societal roles and distinctions. Respect is defined by Sullivan as ‘an attitude due equally 
to every person, simply because each is a person, a rational being capable of moral self-
determination, regardless of social position, occupational role, learning, wealth, or any 
other special qualities or talents he or she may or may not possess.’62 The one thing 
every person does possess is moral reason and therefore the ability to achieve the 
                                                                
58 Sullivan 1989, 197. See also G 435-36; Anthr 292; CPrR 86-87; CJ 442-43. 
59 Sullivan 1989, 197. Quoted from MM 462. See also MM 434; G 428, 435-36. 
60 Sullivan 1989, 197. 
61 Sullivan 1989, 197. 
62 Sullivan 1989, 197. See also Collins 407-12; HH 114; CPrR 76-77; MM 434-35; Collins 
349, 461-63. 
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‘highest achievable good, a good will.’ He adds: ‘To be “a man of principle,” that is, an 
autonomous agent, is possible to a person with “the most ordinary human reason” and 
is of greater worth than having the greatest talent.’ Sullivan concludes by drawing the 
conclusion that ‘consequently, everyone should respect everyone else’ and this he 
elucidates by saying ‘everyone should “value himself on a footage of equality with” 
everyone else.’63 
Dignity, in other words, is tied to respect, which is defined in terms of one’s 
worth. One may thus say that dignity (here defined in terms of one’s worth) and respect 
live in a necessarily reciprocal, symbiotic relationship with each other. Implied in this is 
also the radical equality without reference to the political and religious worlds and what 
they represent. 
 
5. Respect for Persons 
 
 
If the first formula as the Law of Freedom and Autonomy addresses itself to the 
nature (and possibility) of morality, which requires that moral agents be free and 
autonomous, the second formula addresses itself to ‘the self-awareness of moral 
agents.’64 In addressing self-awareness one enters the phenomenal realm, where we are 
limited to the world given in and through our experience. It is thus not for nothing that 
Sullivan feels the need to refer to the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and 
                                                                
63 Sullivan 1989, 197. He quotes from MM 435 and refers also to CPrR 81n.  
64 Sullivan 1989, 198. 
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noumenal worlds. We have already referred to this doctrine in the Interlude above. In 
the phenomenal world of experience we are under the laws that govern this 
(mechanical) world.65 In such a world it is impossible to find (empirically) that freedom 
which is a necessary requirement for morality. As he says, ‘when we think practically, 
we must regard ourselves as noumenal agents, free from the domination of causal laws, 
both able and obligated to act autonomously, on the basis of our own reason.’66 As 
noumenal agents we assume certain things about ourselves (like our freedom) even 
though we have no direct evidence for it in our experiential world. The evidence is 
provided, however, by our reason. 
Referring to a paragraph in The Metaphysics of Morals67 Sullivan states: ‘The 
second formula therefore requires each of us to regard ourselves and every other 
                                                                
65 Contemporary physics holds that there are areas of indeterminacy in the world thus 
altering the perceived threats to the possibility of morality, which Kant thought was 
implied by the Newtonian world-view. This has implications for Kantian moral 
philosophers too. See Sullivan 1989, 307 n 37. 
66 Sullivan 1989, 198. Sullivan refers to MM 434-35. 
67 Sullivan refers to the two introductory passages (paragraphs 37 and 38), but without 
providing any exegesis or analysis, from a section in The Metaphysics of Morals (Section 
II) entitled, ‘On duties of virtue toward other human beings arising from the respect due 
them.’ There in the wider context of modesty as the restriction of self-love for the sake 
of others, Kant introduces dignity in the more immediate context of (and more 
pointedly: relationship to) respect; he says: ‘The respect that I have for others or that 
another can require from me (observantia aliis praestanda) is therefore recognition of a 
dignity (dignitas) in other human beings, that is, of a worth that has no price, no 
equivalent for which the object evaluated (aestimii) could be exchanged.’ Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:462. Pivotal in this whole paragraph (according to my 
understanding) is the notion of a recognition that exhibits a mirror-effect in that it 
allows a dynamic through which I ‘project’ some process within me onto another, 
expecting the other to suffer the same process and mirror-like recognition. Kant first 
discusses one’s self-love, which if healthy, will allow for self-restriction ‘in view of the 
self-love of others’ (and this is called modesty). ‘Lack of such moderation (lack of 
modesty)’ says Kant, ‘as regards one’s worthiness to be loved by others is called egotism 
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person as having a dignity that provides the ground for self-esteem or self-respect 
(Selbstschätzung)68 as well as the moral right to respect (Achtung) from all others.’69 In 
other words the Formula for Respect of Persons legislates and thus requires from us to 
think of (literally regard) ourselves and others in a specific way, namely as owning or 
‘having a dignity’ that most importantly becomes the reason or ground for self-respect 
and esteem and furthermore is the reason to claim the moral right to respect from 
others.  
One could say that Sullivan says here that dignity is something within, on the 
basis of which I am owed respect. And this respect that is due to me becomes a (i.e., my) 
moral right. However, if we take seriously his use of the word ‘regard,’ which moreover, 
occurs in the same context where he stated that the second formula ‘appeals to the self-
awareness of moral agents;’70 we cannot but conclude that this formulation suggests 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(philautia).’ This sentence is important for two reasons because it reveals the 
mechanism or dynamic of love (self-love), namely worthiness to be loved, and it is, 
furthermore, a worth based on and requiring a judgment. Although Kant does not use 
the notion of judgment in this sentence, the last sentence of this paragraph reads: 
‘Judging something to be worthless is contempt.’ Kant’s reference to judgment 
(especially in the same context of worthiness) highlights what is actually implied 
throughout. My question is therefore: do all of these loci confirm that we have to do 
with a ‘mental operation’ when we talk of dignity or the dynamic of dignity? 
68 Sullivan deliberately quotes this word (Selbstschätzung). Schätzung means among 
others to guess, estimate, appraise, evaluate, to appreciate, reckon, assess, to treasure 
and even to value. All of these bespeak a ‘mental’ action involving both reason and 
judgment. I argue that this takes place in the context of consciousness, and indeed 
therefore self-consciousness. 
69 Sullivan 1989, 198. The reference is to MM 462. 
70 In the first paragraph of this section Sullivan talks about the second formula’s appeal 
to self-awareness. The very first sentence of the next paragraph is the one under 
discussion and starts with: ‘The second formula therefore requires us to regard…’ 
‘Therefore’ is a concluding concept that links with whatever precedes it. See Sullivan 
1989, 198. 
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that dignity is not the ontologically given-within that grounds respect, but is rather an 
attitude of (or perhaps, due to) thinking. This attitude of thinking says three things: one, 
it is a matter of perspective; and two, it is a thought-based attitude present in me, that 
is, in the one (agent) showing respect; and three, it grounds, in character with the 
dynamic of self-awareness, respect toward myself, first as shown by me toward myself 
and second in my expectation that others therefore show respect toward me too. In 
other words self-awareness (of my dignity) in the context of the second formula 
unleashes a dynamic of respect, which in terms of a dynamic of reciprocity would lead 
ultimately to the cultivation of an internal attitude of respect for others. Here I would 
then respect others because I grant them the respect that I demand from them. 
Important here are the ideas of reciprocity and of the self-awareness of having dignity 
that grounds self-respect, which in turn grants me moral entitlement to respect from 
others as my (moral) right. This ‘reciprocity’ is grounded in reason. Sullivan notes that 
this is so because (quoting Kant) ‘the way in which every other rational being conceives 
his existence on the same rational ground which is valid for me.’71  
Respect is defined by Sullivan as an ‘emotional attitude’ that we are obliged to 
render to all persons and to express in ‘courteous conduct.’ Sullivan stresses that 
morality can be based only on reason, but admits that ‘respect or reverence is a special 
kind of moral feeling that arises irresistibly within us upon recognition of the existence, 
the nature, and the demands of the moral law.’72 For Sullivan this means that in 
                                                                
71 Quoted from G 429. See Sullivan 1989, 198. See also G 447-48. We see something 
here of the power of the universality of reason. 
72 See Sullivan 1989, 198. He refers to G 399; MM 214. 
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addition to the duty to ‘have respect for the moral law in persons’ no one ‘can avoid 
experiencing moral respect for others as persons.’73 While our behavior can be coerced 
from the outside, respect, as internal disposition, needs cultivation and eventual 
transformation into action. This disposition or attitude cannot be enforced by an 
external authority. For Kant the interior obligation to cultivation falls under what he 
calls ‘a duty of virtue.’74 
The ‘moral duty’ of ‘respect for persons’ that is for Sullivan equivalent to ‘the 
unconditional duty to recognize the dignity of persons’ is related to the ‘moral idea of a 
person, [which] must “be conceived only negatively.”’75  By this is meant that the 
respect owed to the dignified person is “necessary,” universal and moreover 
deliberately devoid of all and any subjective feelings of attraction or aversion in me with 
regard to the person (be it friend or foe is immaterial) or any empirical data giving 
contours to the person in question. ‘All contingent facts about individuals –and our 
subjective, affective relationships with them –are completely irrelevant both to their 
inherent value and to the respect we owe them.’ 76 The moral law shows no preferences 
                                                                
73 Sullivan 1989, 198. He is clear that we have respect for the presence of the moral law 
within persons (as duty), but also adds the experiential dimension. This dimension, I 
shall argue, is related to our consciousness, which implies also self-consciousness. 
Sullivan refers to CPrR 77 and MM 399. 
74 See Sullivan 1989, 198 and also MM 383, 435. 
75 Sullivan 1989, 199. See also G 437-38.  
76 Sullivan 1989, 199. See also G 428, 436; MM 380-81, 385, 395-96, 448 and Collins 357-
60, to which Sullivan refers. We see here, at least as I interpret Sullivan,  something of 
the rational, universal and ‘pure’ nature of reason active in the practical realm. Reason 
does not refer to or seem to relate to the empirical in legislating. See also Collins’ 
presentation of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics. Kant says, ‘[t]he examples of moral men are 
standards drawn from experience; the moral law, however, is a standard set by reason’ 
(Kant, Moral Philosophy: Collins's Lecture Notes 1997, 27:357). 
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nor does it exclude anyone. Indeed as Sullivan states: ‘“Being a person” is a pure 
practical Idea of reason that is defined in a completely impersonal, formal manner, so 
that it in effect is equivalent to the requirement of universality in the first formula.’77  
Given the fact that Kant refrained from discussing how one might identify such a 
bearer of a moral personality, Sullivan writes, nonetheless, that ‘we obviously must 
apply that Idea to anyone who in our judgment has the power of pure practical 
reason.’78 Human beings are the only beings that can lay claim to having the status to be 
                                                                
77 Sullivan 1989, 199. See CPR A 365. 
78 Sullivan 1989, 199. The implication being in other words that the Idea of ‘being a 
person’ needs to be applied to someone who has the ‘power of pure practical reason.’ 
Two things need mentioning: one, it requires a power in the person to whom we apply 
it; and second, before we apply it we make a judgment as to the presence and potency 
of that power within an individual. Does dignity then rest on these two legs? And if one 
were to see someone diminished as to their practical reason (for instance, someone 
who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease) does that imply they are judged as lacking this 
power and therefore are disqualified from the right to moral behavior in accordance 
with dignity? Furthermore, does the lack of the power of practical reason or my 
judgment therefore imply the non-personhood of the individual human being in 
question? These are critical questions one may put to Kant in testing his notion of 
dignity. 
Relationships between subjects are structured. The type of structure depends on 
the factors we take into account. And so we might end up by dividing relations into 
different structural possibilities. Kant sets up a table of division in which he sets out to 
do precisely this. He identifies four structural possibilities in relations between subjects. 
What he takes for the determining factor is the relation between the (one) subject 
‘imposing obligation’ to the (another) subject placed ‘under obligation.’ This is his way 
to determine, as he also calls it, the ‘relation of right to duty.’ (Under ‘rights’ Kant 
understands the ‘capacity for putting others under obligation’; while ‘duty’ is related to 
‘the moral imperative, which is a proposition commanding duty.’ Kant, The Metaphysics 
of Morals 1996, 6:239). Kant determines a fourfold division. We might think of these as 
four sets. The point is then to see which set(s) would have members in them, in other 
words, which set or division would be one between whose members (i.e., subjects) ‘a 
relation of right to duty can be thought of (whether admissible or not)’ [emphasis mine]. 
(Ibid., 6:241). In determining these divisions and their membership Kant asks a question 
which would be something like this: what is the relation in terms of rights of human 
beings toward beings that have one, neither rights nor duties; two, that have rights as 
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called ‘persons’ and thus we owe moral duties to them only. This is on a formal level for 
we need not know anything about these individuals personally before or in order to 
show them respect. Recognition of their status suffices. Moreover, as Sullivan points 
out: ‘The respect owed persons is owed not to the individuals as such but to the 
individuals as the bearers of the moral law.’79 This insight is central because it links 
being a carrier of the moral law as being integral to being a person in the moral sense 
and this because of the power of reason that becomes practical. Sullivan talks also of 
the ‘disinterested and impersonal character of the notion of personhood’ and this 
remains central to the concept.80  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
well as duties; three, that have only duties but no rights; and fourth, towards a being 
that has only rights but no duties (God). Three of the sets (divisions) are empty. The set 
representing the relation between human beings and those who have ‘neither rights nor 
duties’ has no members because (and this pertains to our critical remarks above, which 
shows that reason is the crucial attribute) ‘these are beings lacking reason, which can 
neither bind us nor by which we can be bound’ (Ibid., 6:241). The second set (or 
‘division’) concerns the relation towards beings that have both rights and duties. This set 
is the only one that has members and signify the ‘relation of human beings to human 
beings.’ Both the third and fourth divisions are empty. The third because it concerns the 
relation in terms of rights of human beings towards beings that have only duties and no 
rights and these would be human beings ‘without personality (serfs, slaves).’ The fourth 
refers to a being that has only rights and no duties (God) and is empty because such a 
being ‘at least in philosophy […] is not an object of possible experience.’ Ibid., 6:241. See 
also MM 442-43. 
79 Sullivan 1989, 199. See also G 401n, 435; CPrR 77-78, 131-32 as suggested by Sullivan. 
‘reverence’ here means following the moral law as a duty for the sake of the moral law 
itself. 
80 He refers to CPrR (21 and 110) and states that this point can never be overemphasized 
because it lays at the ground of Kant’s ideal of a society ‘in which justice is unaffected by 
personal relationships’ leading to Kant’s doctrine being described as ‘an ethics for 
relations between strangers.’ This is a reversal of traditional Western moral philosophy 
that sees the ethical movement as emanating from relationships starting from within 
the personal and familial sphere and moving outwards towards public order. Morality’s 
primary context for Kant is within human public life. See Sullivan 1989, 199. 
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Sullivan presents next the fine line Kant walks in the application of respect on 
the grounds of dignity. On the one hand, there is the respect due to the dignity of the 
human person that is purely formal and as such related to the concept of person and 
the moral law all awakened and sustained by reason and her demands. On the other 
hand, there is the more human, anthropological and psychological dimension that 
leaves the formal, pure realm and ventures into the realm of human experience with all 
its contingencies, ambiguities and relativity. In this (realm of experience), duty to the 
moral law, i.e., the following of the moral law for the sake of the moral law (only), is 
always the sole guide by which to steer ourselves amidst the world of contingency and 
confusion, and, similarly, the only actions that have moral worth are those motivated by 
reverence for the moral law.81 On a purely human and subjective level, however, we can 
find many reasons to respect individuals who dutifully exemplify the moral law (for e.g. 
saints or people who develop their talents) just as we might lose respect for those 
whom we judge to have a morally bad character. Yet for Kant the fundamental (and 
formal) respect owed to persons has nothing to do with individual merit or any 
accomplishment, not even of moral character. For Kant says: ‘I cannot deny all respect 
to even the immoral man as man, even though by his deed he makes himself unworthy 
of his humanity.’82 This is because, as we showed above, the formal requirements of the 
second formula demand it. But Kant seems to allow here also for subjective reasons, 
which although not foundational, are still motivational. In this case he states that no 
                                                                
81 ‘We have shown,’ writes Kant ‘how neither fear nor inclination, but solely respect for 
the moral law, is the incentive which can give an action moral worth.’ Kant, Grounding 
for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 440. 
82 Quoted from MM 463, by Sullivan 1989, 199. See also MM 448 and G 401n. 
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matter how immoral a person may have become, ‘such a person still “sees himself as 
subject to the law of duty, no matter how obscure his ideas about it may be”; [and as 
such] he “can never lose all his disposition to good.”’83  
At this point in my presentation of Sullivan’s systematic exposition of Kant’s 
understanding of dignity I wish to examine a passage crucial to Sullivan’s reading of Kant 
on dignity. I want to imagine Sullivan trying to find a question whose answer points 
unambiguously to the fundamental essence of what is asked about or intended (in this 
case relating to the dynamic of human dignity). So the question needs to be asked from 
within a context, which can reveal the level of essence or necessity required in the 
answer. For instance, to ask concretely about the essential requirements for human life 
from the point of view of someone living in a third-world country rather than a first 
world country, will produce an answer that comes closer to the barest essentials. The 
circumstances can give a clue as to the intention of the question, which in turn would 
give an indication of the weight of the answer. The context I am setting for Sullivan’s 
question concerns persons who are immoral, who have lost their respect, people caught 
up in hateful vice, and, in fact, whose deeds have made them become unworthy of their 
                                                                
83 Sullivan 1989, 200. Sullivan quotes Kant from Anthr 324 and MM 464. He also refers 
to MM 379n; G 435, 454-55 and Rel 45. In these Kant writes that within a human being 
the turn from being evil to being good (i.e., into good) is as inexplicable as the fall from 
good into evil. This inexplicability is the result of freedom in which the original choice for 
evil lies. And so he writes: ‘For, in spite of that fall, the command that we ought to 
become better human beings still resounds unabated in our souls; consequently, we 
must also be capable of it, even if what we can do is of itself insufficient and, by virtue of 
it, we only make ourselves receptive to a higher assistance inscrutable to us. – Since we 
must presuppose in all this that there is still a germ of  goodness left in its entire purity, 
a germ that cannot be extirpated or corrupted.’ Kant, Religion within the boundaries of 
mere reason (1791) 1996, 6:45.  
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humanity. Given this context then, I imagine Sullivan asking the question: ‘what gives 
me hope for humanity? Wherein lies the light of hope because I feel surrounded by 
darkness?’ 
If this then is the question, its answer will give us insight into the grounds of 
hope for humanity’s worth however much evil may abound. Sulivan’s answer, found in a 
quotation from Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, presents according to my 
mind a kind of summary of Sullivan’s hope for dignity. And the answer is that regardless 
of our moral imperfections we all still possess our ‘humanity.’  
Kant calls this ‘humanity,’ as Sullivan makes explicit, ‘the “subjective ground” for 
the possibility of morality’ that is nothing other than our autonomy, which is, in other 
words, the possession of ‘the power of moral reason (Wille).’ This relates at the deepest 
level to (and also implies) our ‘consciousness of being free’ and because of this 
consciousness we have a moral personality (that is we are persons) and therefore we 
have ‘the capacity to develop a morally good will’ [Sullivan’s emphasis].84 This 
                                                                
84 See Sullivan 1989, 199-200, (esp. 200 for this last quote). Sullivan refers the reader to 
the following passages: G 431, 428, 436, 437, 440, 454-55; CPrR 77, 87, 131-32; CJ 442-
43; Rel 23; Anthr 324. In addition to this last reference he also refers to MM 464, from 
which I quote. There Kant writes: ‘[T]he censure of vice, which must never break out 
into complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human being; for on 
this supposition he could never be improved, and this not consistent with the idea of a 
human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition 
to the good.’ Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:463-64. We see here the close 
association between human being and moral being and the good, and note also the 
emphasis on improvement. It reminds one of Kant’s insistence on the effort one puts in 
to achieve virtue. In a further note Sullivan ascribes this disposition to the good in terms 
of the good will. He writes: ‘This is what Kant had to have meant [in G 445 and CJ 443] 
by the expression “a good will” (or “willing” – Willen): Man is still “subject to” and 
“under” moral laws even if he does not actually have good character.’ He refers to CJ 
448n. Sullivan 1989, 358 n 8. 
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paragraph draws together many themes and is rich in revealing what Sullivan makes of 
humanity, personality, autonomy, but also of dignity and its demands. I wish to draw the 
reader’s attention to the use of words that signify an interior dimension as well as the 
power or possibility alongside and associated with it. Words like ‘subjective ground,’ 
‘possibility of morality,’ ‘possessing the power,’ ‘Wille (will),’ ‘consciousness,’ and, 
‘capacity to develop.’ All of these signify and imply an interiority as well as a dynamic 
process that needs to be enacted in the empirical, experiential, practical realm. This is 
important to remember because it relates to Sullivan’s understanding of dignity. Just as 
he is introducing this summary Sullivan writes: ‘None of us is morally perfect but we all 
still possess the intrinsic and innate basis for respect’ [my emphasis].85 We have already 
seen that dignity is the basis for respect. Dignity for Sullivan in other words demands 
respect and grounds it as well and dignity is inherent and associated with the possibility 
for morality and the process this dynamic requires. He gets this from his reading of the 
second formula, which as he says, ‘[stresses] the objective and intrinsic worth of 
persons.’86  
The second formula has another ‘equally important’ function in emphasizing why 
we must be moral.87 And to this Sullivan answers: ‘to live up to the dignity we have by 
virtue of being rational beings, to sustain the right we and all other persons have to 
                                                                
85 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
86 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
87 Although Sullivan does not state this explicitly I see a two-fold dimension to 
motivation here: one being formal in that it provides the foundational or grounding 
reason for there being morality as such; and the second more psychologically concrete, 
in that it motivates concrete persons in concrete living to act according to the moral 
law. To my mind both are present in Sullivan’s understanding. 
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moral self-esteem.’88 As I understand this, it means that the fact (as endowment) and 
therefore presence of reason yields an inherent dignity that, in virtue of its presence, 
calls us to live worthily of it (dignity), to live in accordance with it. In my reading of the 
second part of the sentence – ‘to sustain the right we and all other persons have to 
moral self-esteem’ – Sullivan repeats what he has just said and adds to it at the same 
time so as to give it a deeper perspective. He talks of sustaining, which means to 
continue upholding that which is already there and in this case he uses ‘rights-language’ 
in saying to uphold the right for ourselves and others to have moral self-esteem. 
Although he does not spell this out here, he seems to me to imply the requirement of 
having a relationship with the self that includes a judgment of worth and respect. In 
other words this implies self-consciousness. Note again the importance that ‘regard’ or 
‘vision’ (esteem) plays. Sullivan explains that in immorally giving in and satisfying our 
inclinations ‘we violate our integrity’ because we treat both others and ourselves then 
as ‘mere means’ and thus granting ourselves and others only ‘instrumental value.’89 In 
fact, Sullivan summarizes the positive command of the second formula by quoting Kant: 
‘Live according to your nature.’90 Sullivan interprets this as meaning ‘to act out of 
respect for yourself as a moral being.’91 
                                                                
88 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
89 See Sullivan 1989, 200, who refers also to MM 420, 435, 450. 
90 Sullivan (1989, 200) refers to MM 419. Kant there states: ‘The first principle of duty to 
oneself lies in the dictum “live in conformity with nature” […], that is, preserve yourself 
in the perfection of your nature; the second, in the saying “make yourself more perfect 
than mere nature has made you” (perfice te ut finem, perfice te ut medium).’ The latter 
is translated as ‘perfect yourself as an end, perfect yourself as a means.’ See Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:419 n r. 
91 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
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To mean anything the second formula, like the first, needs concrete application. 
According to Sullivan it is applied to ‘the only persons of whom we have any knowledge 
– ourselves and our fellow human beings.’92 Knowledge is a function of reason and 
although Sullivan does not say this explicitly here, as he does later, it seems to me there 
is a dynamic of a reciprocity-within-recognition at work, insofar as moral reason extends 
what goes for me to other persons too. Moreover, moral reason recognizes that all 
human beings are agents, i.e. persons who are autonomous, initiating actions by acting 
freely and taking responsibility for these actions. Sullivan adds that moral reason 
recognizes that all human agents are also both ‘imperfectly rational agents and also 
moral-physical beings’93 and that human agents fall into two classes, the agent himself 
and all others. Kant organizes the duties we have towards persons according to this 
classification. The positive duties towards ourselves concern our moral perfection; but 
those towards others concern for the most part their happiness.94 
 
                                                                
92 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
93 Sullivan 1989, 200. As far as I can tell this is the first time he mentions the bodily 
dimension, albeit without talking about ‘the body.’ I assume, however, given the 
context, that moral-physical being refers to a person’s body and according to the 
context again it seems to me that this recognition implies that the body as well as our 
imperfect moral nature carry the idea of negativity or imperfection. He also talks also of 
‘moral beings with a physical nature’ requiring that we do not commit suicide for 
instance. See Sullivan 1989, 201. In the next section we shall see, however, that he 
brings in the body, albeit in a roundabout way, where he forbids suicide. Although, even 
there it is more because of the presence of life, which implies personality, and which, 
therefore, is the ‘carrier’ of the moral law. A quick glance through Sullivan’s subject-
index will also reveal no mention of the ‘body’ of a person or human being, as such, 
even though he mentions subjects associated with the body like sensuality, deathbed, 
impulses and animal nature of a person, animality, and even sex. See Sullivan 1989, 401-
413. 
94 Sullivan (1989, 200) refers to MM 385, 398. 
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6. Self-respect 
 
 
Sullivan introduces this section by noting that there seems to be an inherent 
contradiction in saying, as Kant does, that we are obliged to fulfil absolute duties to 
ourselves. If someone is under my (a lawmaker’s) obligation I may relieve him/her from 
that obligation, yet when it concerns my duty towards myself this is not allowed. It 
would for Kant ‘destroy all duties’ and the reason is that all duties involve by necessity 
self-constraint, and if I now relieve myself of duty (and by implication of self-constraint) 
it would thus affect all other duties as it would attack and weaken the very instrument 
or agent that perform the duty.95 Kant resolves this conceptual difficulty by saying that 
in thinking of duties to the self we have to conceive of ourselves as being supersensible 
beings, i.e., both and at the same time in the noumenal and phenomenal realms. In the 
noumenal realm we are to think of ourselves as free and in this capacity we legislate the 
Law of Autonomy with our pure rational reason. And, as natural, sensuous phenomenal 
beings, we are subject to the laws of nature and experience and also to the very law of 
Autonomy that we legislate.96 As autonomous agents we legislate in freedom from the 
noumenal realm; as phenomenal agents we obey dutifully what we legislate.  
These duties towards the self are both positive and negative. The negative duties 
forbid actions that would cause conflict with the ‘humanity in our own person’ (‘an end 
in itself’); the positive duties help us to grow in harmony with this end, in effect 
                                                                
95 Sullivan 1989, 200. See also MM 417-18. Elsewhere Sullivan describes the Categorical 
Imperative as ‘a norm of self-constraint’ (Sullivan 1989, 166). 
96 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
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becoming it through developing virtue.97 This is why we need to adopt the maxim that 
we will do what we ought from the motive of duty. The positive obligation involves 
negative duties because we are imperfect moral agents. Kant presents three violations 
that ‘are directly contrary to and violate the inherent dignity [my emphasis]98 we have 
as moral agents – what Kant calls “the dignity of humanity [Menscheit] in our own 
person.”’99 These three violations are lying, avarice, and servility. Lying and avarice (as 
greed and miserliness) lead to a harmful denial of our self-respect. Avarice and servility 
for example violate our self-respect because the value of our existence is reduced 
through them to becoming mere means either to the accumulation of wealth or to curry 
another’s favour. For Sullivan these violations disavow our self-respect and as such they 
underlie ‘every immoral action.’100 
Given the nature of our beings as a mixture between sensuality (physicality) and 
morality Kant identifies three positive morally natural ends we are obligated to fulfil: 
self-preservation, preservation of our species and the development and use of our 
abilities in order to attain our goals.101 The point of this, however, is in Sullivan’s words: 
‘Since the moral law obliges us to recognize our own absolute, intrinsic worth as rational 
                                                                
97 Sullivan 1989, 200 f. He quotes Kant who writes ‘[I]t is not enough that an action 
should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself; it 
must also harmonize with this end’ (G 430). See also MM 395, 453, 387, 446. 
98 My own emphasis; pointing again to the ‘inhering (indwelling) character’ of dignity as 
Sullivan writes about it. 
99 See Sullivan 1989, 201 who quotes from MM 429 and refers further to MM 403, 420, 
429-30. 
100 Sullivan 1989, 201. See also MM 434-47. Sullivan also points out that the prohibition 
against servility had political implications for Kant’s day. ‘“Be no man’s lackey” […] 
“Bowing and scraping to others” is beneath one’s dignity’ is Kant and Sullivan’s final 
word, it seems. See Sullivan 1989, 201 and MM 436-37. 
101 See Sullivan 1989, 201 and previous chapter 13 as well as MM 421. 
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agents, it also requires each of us to protect our life and develop our abilities, not for 
any prudential advantage this may give us but to “live up to,” “be worthy of,” and 
“promote” our being persons, our having “humanity.”’102 
This is an important sentence as it clearly reveals Sullivan’s understanding of the 
operative or dynamic workings of dignity and of its motivational power, real and 
psychological. If we put it in our own way we might say dignity originates within the 
moral law. It requires, indeed demands, from us a certain consciousness or mentality, 
which involves a recognition of our own absolute (i.e., not comparable to anything 
calculable in terms of a market value), intrinsic (i.e., belonging to our very own nature 
and coinciding with an interiority that links to consciousness) worth, or value as rational 
agents. In other words this worth is directly related to and identifiable with the reason 
we as human beings are endowed with. However, it is not just reason solely by and in 
itself (as we might say a computer’s artificial intelligence is ‘rational’), but reason within 
a context (we might even say rationally ‘embodied’103) and this is reason that goes with 
agency, i.e., with maxims acting in relation to reason. In this sense reason just by itself 
means and accomplishes nothing. Of necessity it is associated with and requires agency. 
In other words reason becomes practical. Agents imply, moreover, also acting on behalf 
of something, and in this case we act on behalf of reason – a maxim that gives us the 
                                                                
102 Sullivan 1989, 201 with references to MM 387, 391-92, 444-45 and G 430. 
103 This would however not be Sullivan’s phrase of choice. I get the phrase from Susan 
Shell’s book The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 
(1996). If we were to insist on this phrase to make the point clear that here there is 
something more than just reason in and by itself, we might talk of a rational 
embodiment. This is because when reason becomes practical it necessarily implies 
agency. 
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moral law. So, in effect we are agents of the moral law, i.e., our dignity lies in the fact 
that we are agents of the moral law. Because of all this, it (i.e., this dignity) requires 
from us that we protect our lives and develop our abilities. But Sullivan presents the 
motivation – not because of the intelligent advantage this may hold for us but because 
of a two-fold obligation. First, it is our duty and secondly, it is the vehicle through which 
we answer to our dignity. In other words in order to become worthy agents of the moral 
law, which would be to answer to our calling, we need to harken to these preparatory 
obligations as they set the conditions for living and for expressing our dignity. Dignity 
becomes then the motivation and end. We see here how dignity itself becomes an 
ethical motivation, something like the law that puts us under obligation to ourselves but 
for its own purposes, namely to safeguard its own realization. The motivation requires 
us to engage in this process, which has a dynamic that seems never-ending, insofar as it 
is not something we can accomplish once for all. We strive towards it but it remains 
ahead of us. To my mind this seems to be the meaning of the phrases like: ‘to live up to,’ 
or to ‘be worthy of,’ and to ‘promote’ our dignity. Finally, Sullivan describes dignity here 
in terms of the notions it is most closely associated with, namely our ‘being persons’ and 
our ‘having humanity.’ 
The positive obligations entail negative ones and regard our physical nature. 
Although Sullivan treats here of suicide and of unnatural sexual activity, the reasons are 
related to self-respect and us not treating ourselves as means but always as ends in 
ourselves. Committing suicide to avoid pain would be an example of treating ourselves 
merely as a means, as would gratuitous sexual pleasure. The point is to safeguard ‘the 
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ability to be an end-in-oneself,’ and so ‘to act rationally and morally.’104 Kant’s concern 
is to conserve the conditions that would allow for ‘conduct […] “compatible with the 
maintenance [emphasis mine] of humanity as an end in itself,” [and] “with the 
promotion of this end.”’105 Both suicide and sexual activity relate to the body, even 
though, as we said before, it seems Sullivan does not name it thus explicitly. He talks 
about our physical nature and this could refer to our body, but also to our being subject 
to the natural laws of physics in the phenomenal realm. But, as I mentioned above, all of 
this assumes the presence of the body. Sullivan actually quotes Kant in saying: ‘Man 
cannot [i.e., may not] renounce his personality as long as he is a subject of duty, hence 
as long as he lives,’ and then he adds relating to suicide ‘even […] to avoid the madness 
at the time inevitably caused by rabies.’106 We have here the duty to preserve the body 
since life and body coincide. In this quote personality is related to being a subject of 
duty (which relates to the moral law). So, as long as we are subject to duty we have to 
preserve our bodily integrity. Dignity and duty seem here to be related to each other 
although again Sullivan does not say this explicitly here. We might ask here, and in the 
sections to follow, what have these ethical duties and discussions to do with dignity? 
The point is, however, to see that for Sullivan they are inherently connected to dignity.  
 
 
                                                                
104 See Sullivan 1989, 201. See also G 429; MM 420, 423, 427-28; Collins 342-44. 
105 Sullivan 1989, 202. For Kant’s quotes see G 430. 
106 Sullivan 1989, 202. Quoted from MM 422; see also 423. 
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7. Our own happiness 
 
 
We have the right to pursue pleasure and happiness as long as these do not 
conflict with the moral law. In fact, we cannot avoid the concern for our own wellbeing. 
According to Kant’s third formula happiness is our highest natural good and forms an 
essential part of ‘our total final good.’107 This does not mean, however, that we are to 
pursue our happiness as our end as a ‘direct duty.’ ‘Duty’ for Kant involves the effort of 
a real struggle against our selves to rein in these very selves with their wayward desires, 
so something like happiness, so attuned to our natural selves, cannot be called or 
identified with duty. ‘What we will inevitably and spontaneously does not come under 
the concept of duty, which is necessitation to an end we adopt reluctantly,’ says Kant.108 
All the same, we do have an indirect duty to nurse our own happiness.109 Kant 
provides four conditions: if it makes the task of the good will easier;110 if it removes the 
obstacles that would tempt us into not performing our duties (like poverty for 
example);111 if we are convinced we deserve happiness that we do not have;112 and 
lastly, if our state in life becomes unhappy to such a degree that even self-love does not 
                                                                
107 Sullivan 1989, 202. 
108 As quoted by Sullivan 1989, 203 from MM 386; see also MM 387, 451; G 399; CPrR 
37 and Rel 6. Sullivan adds elsewhere another reason. The Formula of Autonomy 
‘requires the exclusion of any determining influence from outside of our own reason,’ 
including happiness or what makes us feel good or bad, ‘the only kind of restraint 
consistent with our freedom is self-constraint, self-control imposed by our own 
reasoning.’ See Sullivan 1989, 166. 
109 See Sullivan 1989, 203.  
110 Sullivan refers to G 393. 
111 Sullivan refers to MM 388; see also CPrR 93. For a positive formulation see MM 452 
and 216. 
112 Sullivan refers to CPrR 110-11. 
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motivate us anymore (to care for our health, for instance) then we are to search for an 
increase in happiness as a prudent step.113 
The key and rule remains nonetheless that ‘it is not my happiness but the 
preservation of my moral integrity that is my end and also my duty’ and again ‘the end is 
not the agent’s happiness but his morality.’114 Our direct obligation requires us to do 
our duty but to fulfil our obligation to achieve moral perfection we may employ all that 
would prudentially help us achieve this aim.115 
 
8. Respect for others 
 
 
Sullivan begins this section with reference to the ‘law of consistency.’ This relates 
to the Formula of Autonomy operative in the dynamic of setting maxims that determine 
the Categorical Imperative, which is a norm of self-constraint,116 an effort central to 
humanity’s moral project. This dynamic of the Formula of Autonomy requires its maxims 
to serve as objective laws analogous117 to the laws of nature. In a technical sense it does 
not matter for Kant whether these are the laws of physics (physical nature) or not. He is 
                                                                
113 Sullivan refers to MM 399. 
114 See Sullivan 1989, 203 quoting from MM 388. 
115 Sullivan warns that Kant’s notion of indirect duties should be read aginst the 
background of his doctrine on mixed motivation. See also Sullivan 1989, 359 n 12, 117-
130 esp. 112-114. 
116 See Sullivan 1989, 165-66. According to Sullivan ‘the most fundamental requirement 
of the first formula,’ that ‘supreme principle of right,’ is ‘that we act autonomously and 
respect the right and obligation of everyone else to do the same.’ Ibid., 165. 
117 Kant actually talks of ‘the form of the laws in the phenomenal world,’ meaning their 
likeness in terms of their universal validity, as ‘[a] “typic” or type or model of what any 
nature must be like.’ See Sullivan 1989, 167. 
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concerned with the nature of laws; and a law, in order to be a law, needs to be 
universal: ‘Genuine laws are all alike in that they all hold without exception. If they did 
not do so, they simply would not be laws,’ writes Sullivan.118 In addition laws must also 
be consistent with each other. If this were not the case and things did not happen with 
regularity and laws were in continual conflict with each other the world would be 
‘chaotic and self-destructive.’119 We can understand because all things are governed by 
laws. This universality, which is essential to any law’s being law, includes also necessity 
and consistency. These constitute the law-like character of laws and Kant calls it the 
form of the laws. That is why the Formula for Autonomy could also be called the 
Formula of Universal Law. This establishes the procedural norm for moral judgment, 
namely that our maxims ‘fit together coherently and with harmony (Einstimmigkeit) in a 
moral world.’120  
For Sullivan the second formula of the Categorical Imperative is a ‘practical 
version’ of the law of consistency. It is also a law of justice, and commands us to respect 
all other humans. Relating it to the law of consistency gives us pause because it 
necessitates (and if I give to Sullivan words he does not use) a certain reciprocity built 
into the moral law insofar as consistency demands that what counts for me, also counts, 
likewise and to the same degree, for others. This is easier to see when he speaks of a 
law of justice: ‘Just as we have a right to self-respect and to the respect of all others, so 
                                                                
118 Sullivan 1989, 166. 
119 Sullivan 1989, 166. One can see here the dynamic at work in Kant’s testing of maxims 
as expressed in the dynamic of the first formula: if it becomes a universal law, how 
would the world look like?   
120 See Sullivan 1989, 167. Sullivan refers among others to G 421, 424, 437; CPrR 67-70, 
43. 
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too they have an equal right to our respect.’121 He adds another reason too, namely, 
that it is simply ‘by virtue of being a person [that] every person is “equal with all 
others.”’122 
For Kant this ‘moral attitude of respect’ ought not be confused with the 
‘prudential honor and respect’ shown to the aristocracy and powerful. Quoting Kant he 
writes: ‘The concept of the respect we are obligated to show other men … is only a 
negative duty. I am not obligated … to show [others] positive high esteem. The only 
reverence to which I am naturally obligated is reverence for the law as such; and to 
reverence the law is man’s universal and unconditional duty to others, which each of 
them can demand as the respect originally due him.’123  
The Law of Autonomy thus wants us to recognize that all other persons ‘have 
objective value and that they therefore are, negatively, “the supreme limiting condition 
of all subjective ends.”’124 In another quote from the Groundwork we see how this law 
for respect acts as a limiting rein to our own relative and random ends. Here we see 
how Kant grounds this in our very nature as rational beings. Sullivan quotes Kant as 
follows: ‘A rational being, as by his very nature an end and consequently an end in 
himself, must serve for every maxim as a condition limiting all merely relative and 
                                                                
121 Sullivan 1989, 203. 
122 See Sullivan 1989, 203 and also MM 451, 468. 
123 See Sullivan 1989, 203. Quoted from MM 467-68. See also MM 449, 464-65. 
124 Sullivan 1989, 204. See also G 431. Here another dimension of objective (value) is 
presented, namely that of being a yard-stick with fixed measurements that in practise, 
i.e., in the dynamic determining the categorical imperative in accordance with the 
second formula, limits all subjective ends. It does this because it is the limiting condition 
(in that it provides the objective yard-stick). It is that ‘objectivity’ against which we 
measure, and that in fact makes measuring possible. 
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arbitrary ends.’125 The reference to rationality is important because for Sullivan it means 
we have to treat others ‘as morally responsible agents,’ meaning that their actions are 
to be understood and judged in terms of their rational choices. This places on us the 
responsibility then to respect their autonomy. Concretely it implies that in the pursuit of 
our own happiness we should restrict ourselves and never treat others as mere means 
to our ends – something that would ‘endanger or violate’ their autonomy and self-
respect.126 This includes both atttudes as well as actions: envy, ingratitude, malice, 
pride, being vengeful, slander, giving scandal, ridicule and contempt.127 Denigrating 
others by these attitudes or actions or by promoting our own interests and well-being is 
at heart a refusal to ‘recognize that they have a dignity equal to ours by virtue of the 
presence of the same Law of Autonomy in their reason as in our own.’128 Here we have 
Sullivan’s succinct statement bringing together rationality that harbors the presence of 
the (same) Moral Law within each person that grants them as for us (reciprocal and 
equal) dignity. 
In the Groundwork Kant presents four examples or test cases by means of which 
he illustrates the practical applicability of the formulas. When it comes to the second 
formula129 he shows how these moral examples, for instance, like the deception 
involved in making false promises, in effect treat others only as things and as means 
                                                                
125 Sullivan (1989, 204) quoting G 436. 
126 Sullivan 1989, 204. Sullivan here brings autonomy and self-respect into relationship 
with each other. See also G 437 and MM 424, 449. 
127 Of which Kant writes ‘that demands from others a respect which it denies them’ MM 
465, as quoted by Sullivan 1989, 359 n 13. He refers also to MM 458-61, 464-68, 474; 
Collins 435-44.   
128 Sullivan 1989, 204. 
129 G 429-30. 
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according to the deceiver’s ends and not in a way to which he himself would assent if he 
truly respected himself. This applies equally to violence and theft, etc. Sullivan notes 
that in Kant’s treatment he appeals to the second of his ‘dialectical rules’ for getting to 
the truth, including moral truth. This rule forces one to ‘think from the standpoint of 
every other person’ and more specifically as a rational person and not as a person with 
desires.130 
Some have taken this as Kant’s version of the Golden Rule.131 Sullivan is clear, 
however, that Kant never intended the Categorical Imperative to be simply an 
interpretation of the Golden Rule. In fact, he argued that, stated negatively, the Golden 
Rule contained crucial flaws. For one, since it cannot ground duties to the self, it is 
focussed solely on how to treat others; second, it cannot ground positive duties because 
it insists neither on respect due to others nor on duties of benevolence owed them; and 
                                                                
130 See Sullivan 1989, 204. These rules are simply (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think 
from a standpoint of every other person; and (3) to think consistently. These are related 
to autonomy and would have it that autonomy as ideal is both impersonal and social. 
Taken together these are nothing but a ‘restatement of the Law of Autonomy in the 
form of the Categorical Imperative.’ See Sullivan 1989, 59. As Sullivan puts it in the 
context of the discussion, it means ‘acting only on maxims that can be willed as 
universal laws in a morally good world.’ (Sullivan 1989, 204). As for dialectical rules 
Sullivan refers also to CJ 294; Logic 367/63; Anthr 228. The best place to apply these 
actively would be in an open and public forum where the debate includes the testing of 
a person, a group or even a culture’s ideas as to their truth from the standpont of others 
and especially using the Categorical Imperative. This is one way of guarding against 
cultural relativism. It is noteworthy that Kant thought that ‘thinking, even thinking for 
oneself (Selbstdenken), is virtually impossible without the ability to communicate and 
discuss one’s thinking with others.’ See Sullivan 1989, 319 n 27.  
131 Sullivan mentions Sir David Ross for instance. See Sullivan 1989, 359 n 14. 
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third, as regards negative duties to others, its very vagueness is sufficient to see it 
merely as a norm of prudential reciprocity.132 
Implicit to reason is the setting of goals and this is also reflected in Kant’s 
presentation of the positive duties we have toward others. Each human being has two 
necessary goals (ends). As a moral being each person is under obligation to pursue 
his/her own virtue (i.e., our moral well-being or perfection). Yet our physical nature 
drives us to seek our own happiness (i.e., our natural well-being). We have no positive 
obligation to take on the responsibility for another’s virtue because this is something 
each has to do for him/herself. As Sullivan puts it: ‘Only the individual person can 
respect him- or herself and adopt the end of virtue.’133 Our only negative obligation is to 
refrain from tempting others through scandalous example to act immorally.134 Sullivan, 
however, suggests that we modify Kant’s position here somewhat because the point is 
not whether we ‘can make another person virtuous’ (which we cannot), but rather 
whether we can ‘have an effect on the moral character of another,’ which we can. In 
fact this falls within the stated purpose of Kant as to why he wrote the Groundwork: in 
order to ‘help others make correct moral judgments.’135 His many other writings serve 
the same educational purposes.  
                                                                
132 Sullivan 1989, 204. 
133 Sullivan 1989, 205. Sullivan refers also to MM 393-94. Sullivan phrases this in terms 
of self-respect that grounds and motivates the adoption of pursuing the end of virtue. 
When this is understood in its relation to dignity, I take it that Sullivan sees dignity as a 
grounding and motivating factor in pursuing and living the moral life and its resulting 
perfection or virtue.  
134 See Sullivan 1989, 205 and refers also to MM 394 and 464. 
135 See Sullivan 1989, 205. Sullivan refers to G 389-90, 405, 437 and MM 477-85. 
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With regard to our other end, our search for happiness, Sullivan writes that even 
when refraining from using others for our own ends, we still have an obligation ‘of 
“inner freedom” to show positive respect for them as moral-physical beings by adopting 
their end of happiness, insofar as we can, as if it were our own.’136 Because the 
furtherance of our own happiness is inevitable, we have no duty towards ourselves in 
this regard. In addition we do not normally care for others’ happiness unless we have 
strong altruistic feelings and this can easily tempt us, in the name of our own happiness, 
to disregard others’ rightful interests and concerns. Since the maxims of the Categorical 
Imperative bespeak only universal laws, we are ‘morally entitled’ to further our own 
happiness (within the bounds of morality) only if we ‘also emphatically identify with, 
and contribute to, others’ pursuit of morally permissible happiness.’137 Sullivan adds 
that the moral obligation to contribute to others’ happiness depends on the impersonal 
Idea of personhood and not on the actual happiness of others’ being of any personal 
concern to me.138 This is summarized by Kant as the ‘law of love.’139 
This ‘law of love’ takes love to mean ‘moral love’ and not a feeling or inclination, 
for, according to Kant, one cannot ‘love someone merely on command’.140 Neither can 
one legislate sympathy (emotional empathy). The issue is that, just as duties themselves 
cannot be based on feelings, we also have no duties to have such feelings.141 Moral love, 
                                                                
136 Sullivan 1989, 205. He refers to MM 450, 488. 
137 Sullivan 1989, 205. See also CPrR 34; MM 387-89, 393, 451. 
138 Sullivan 1989, 205. He refers to G 441. 
139 Sullivan 1989, 205. 
140 See Sullivan 1989, 206; quoting CPrR 83. 
141 See Sullivan 1989, 206. He refers to MM 456; Collins 413-14; Ed 487. To illustrate the 
point I quote from the latter. ‘Morality is a matter of character. Sustine et abstine 
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like moral respect, is ‘a practical attitude of the will’ towards others through which we 
‘take pleasure in their happiness and feel pain because of their suffering.’142 This 
happens without any regard to feelings of affection. Sullivan says that although it might 
seem that moral love is an imperfect, wide version of respect, it does go further than 
the demand for ‘strict justice’ in that it ‘positively requires’ from us to develop kindness, 
which Kant defines as a ‘habit of harmony with all other men.’ This inculcates in us a 
concern for the matter of others’ will, which Sullivan defines as their wishes, desires and 
needs.143 Developing this ‘genuinely benevolent attitude’ towards all others, instead of 
indifference, will result in our taking satisfaction in their well-being and happiness. This 
requires that we take this benevolence on as a maxim. Negatively, it forbids us to 
‘refuse to wish anyone well.’ And as Sullivan points out, according to the moral 
requirement of universal law, ‘it is morally permissible for us to be benevolent toward 
ourselves only if we also are benevolent to every other human being as well.’144 
Benevolence on its own, however, is not enough. To mean anything it must be practical 
and it means ‘adopting a maxim of beneficence – of acting benevolently – not from 
inclination or affection for others but from duty.’145 Concretely this means we should 
make and accept the legitimate ends of others, ‘which can be summed up under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
[endure and sustain] is the preparation for a wise moderation. If one wants to form a 
good character, one must first clear away the passions. In regard to his inclinations the 
human being must learn to do without something when it is refused him. Sustine means 
endure and accustom yourself to enduring.’ See Kant, Lectures on Pedagogy 2007, 
9:486-87. 
142 Sullivan 1989, 206. See also G 399; MM 401, 448-50, 452, 456. 
143 See Sullivan 1989, 206. Quotation from Collins 452. See also G 399; MM 230. 
144 Sullivan 1989, 206. He refers to MM 441 and 451. 
145 Sullivan 1989, 206.  
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title of their happiness [emphasis mine],’ as our own mandatory end by fostering their 
well-being without an eye to what we may gain.146  
The ground for the moral imperative to be beneficent and benevolent lies in the 
demand given by the second formula that Sullivan formulates as follows: ‘morally 
acceptable maxims must be able to serve as laws in a moral world in which persons are 
given the respect they deserve.’147  
Sullivan looks next at Kant’s discussion in the Groundwork of the fourth 
example148 (of the maxim of not asking for, or giving, any help) in the light of the second 
formula. Admitting that such a world where this maxim would be law is conceivable, it 
nonetheless falls short of the full force implied by the maxim of benevolence and 
respect. It is very respectful to refrain from all interference in another’s pursuit of 
happiness but the other side, as we have seen (where we are obliged to go so far as to 
‘sacrifice part of our own well-being for others’), which includes our actions in order to 
promote their ends is not addressed. And as we have seen, beneficence to self is 
reciprocally dependent upon beneficence to others.149 
The right to happiness is proportionate to one’s morality (i.e., adherence to the 
Moral Law). So how do I act toward someone who seems not to be moral? Kant states 
                                                                
146 See Sullivan 1989, 206 with refernces to MM 387-88, 391-93, 401-2, 441, 449-52. 
147 Sullivan 1989, 206. 
148 In the Groundwork Kant presents four test cases which illustrate duties to oneself 
and to others. He uses these as examples illustrating how one would apply his theories. 
The examples, if one were to put them in question format, would be whether it is 
permissible (1) to commit suicide when one is in despair; (2) to make false promises out 
of dire need; (3) to neglect cultivating one's talents; and (4) to receive no help from 
anybody, nor offer anybody help. See G 421-423. 
149 See Sullivan 1989, 207. 
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that since it is only an omniscient being that could use that norm to judge, we, who 
cannot even judge our own or others’ virtue, should not let that guide us. ‘We need to 
be very careful about refusing to help others we are tempted to judge to be not morally 
worthy of our help.’150 Barring small children and the mentally ill, in appropriating the 
ends of others as our own and helping them achieve their desires, respect demands 
from us to ‘take into account what they need and want, what they count as making 
them happy.’151 But should we disagree with their judgments, we are not under 
obligation to ‘follow their wishes’ unless the demands of justice require a particular 
help.152 Helping others obliges them to gratitude, so our help should always be such as 
to allow them to keep their self-respect and it should never damage their ability (or 
duty) to be self-determining.153 
The positive obligation to benevolence is a ‘wide and imperfect duty’154 and as 
such we are to adopt and act according to ‘the maxim of practical benevolence.’ This 
does not require from us the total sacrifice of our well-being in order to advance that of 
others. Were we to sacrifice our all for the sake of helping others, we would risk falling 
prey to losing all and becoming subject to a similar need of help. That would render such 
a maxim self-contradictory. With limited ‘resources and power’ we cannot help all in 
equal fashion. Only an infinite God can do this. In the end universal benevolence does 
                                                                
150 Sullivan 1989, 207. 
151 Sullivan 1989, 207. He refers to MM 388, 393, 468. 
152 Sullivan 1989, 207. See also MM 388 and 454. 
153 Sullivan 1989, 360 n 18. He refers also to MM 448, 450 and 453-54.  
154 Sullivan 1989, 207. For a discussion of ‘wide and narrow duties’ see Sullivan 1989, 51-
54. 
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not oblige us to ‘be benevolent toward everyone equally, except by minimal well-
wishing.’155 
We may have specific duties of beneficence towards some people but these 
cannot be determined beforehand in an a priori way. Thus they are not so much 
‘principles of obligation’ as ‘rules modified according to the differences of the subjects 
to whom we apply the principle of virtue (on its formal side) in cases that arise in 
experience (the material).’156 Contrary to the demand of justice the positive duty to 
beneficence is indeterminate as it can be applied in many ways, times, and to many or 
even one person. This leads Sullivan to say that the use of this maxim cannot admit ‘to 
any a priori and universal claims’ since it ‘depends too heavily on empirical factors.’157 
Taking account of empirical factors is in this case neither bad nor prohibited. As Sullivan 
puts it: ‘Kant again shows his common sense as well as his sensitivity to ordinary moral 
convictions by holding that we can make such decisions rationally and rightly only by 
                                                                
155 Sullivan 1989, 207. Regarding duties of benevolence, Sullivan (1989, 360 n 19) states 
elsewhere that people often refer to these as the ground for rights. In a fuller treatment 
of this Sullivan (Ibid., 246 ff.) links rights to reason and to the notion of person that ‘has 
humanity,’ which in terms of the second formula is constitutive for dignity. In other 
words, the Categorical Imperative in these terms is ‘mandating us to treat everyone “in 
accordance with their dignity.”’ Ibid., 1989, 248. In terms of Kant’s liberal political 
philosophy, civil law enshrines a ‘juridical condition’ that ‘protects each each person’s 
freedom by protecting everyone’s freedom.’ Sullivan writes: ‘Just as Kant had 
championed the dignity of individual persons in the second formula by focusing on the 
impersonal moral law within them, so in his political theory he defends the rights of 
each citizen by focusing not on specific individuals and their desires but on a system of 
impersonal laws, a system of negative legislation that provides the purely formal 
juridical condition for the political social union.’ Ibid., 248. 
156 Sullivan 1989, 208, quoting from MM 468 and referring also to 393 and 452. 
157 Sullivan 1989, 208. See also MM 448, 468, 469, 393. 
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taking empirical facts and possible consequences into consideration.’158 What is called 
for is prudence in one’s judgments.  
Kant also does not give guidance as to which features of others should be taken 
into account when determining the nature of help to be given. All differences in social 
rank, age, sex, health, economic standing, education, and even personality may be 
considered. He does say however that we are generally obliged to ‘to show greater 
benevolence to those closest to us.’159 Sullivan notes that he does not define this 
closeness. Depending on the situation it might vary from kinship to friendship to those 
with whom we share similar ideas or cultures. However, since we are closest to 
ourselves we are not bound ‘literally to love others as we love ourselves; [and] ‘even 
according to duty” we are morally permitted to tend to our own needs first.’160 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
 
 
Sullivan takes the articulation of the second formula as the Formula for the 
Respect of the Dignity of Persons as the classic expression of Kant’s position on human 
dignity. In the first place it is part of the Moral Law and as such an alternative expression 
                                                                
158 Sullivan 1989, 208. 
159 Sullivan 1989, 208. See also MM 451-52. 
160 Sullivan 1989, 208. This seems somehow at odds with what we said earlier, namely 
that there is a reciprocity insofar as we cannot expect to be beneficent with ourselves 
unless we are such with others, and also that we are to sacrifice ourselves to some 
degree also for the sake of others. The point however is to see that Kant is balancing 
issues that would not be helpful to force into an either-or logic. We are to apply 
prudential judgment and that is in keeping with dignity. 
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of the Categorical Imperative. It carries within it the notion of the human person who 
has responsibility and this is related to his rationality that sets ends and in practical form 
also sets moral demands. Being a person in this context means to treat one’s 
personhood as an end and never as a means towards some other end. In this lies our 
value which cannot be measured. Reason has however more to it than my own nature: 
in fact it has a universalizing tendency and, when it enters the realm of experience, it 
also lets me see that what goes for me also goes for another. This dynamic is important. 
The formula requires respect, and involved in this is a reciprocal dynamic, which 
requires me to respect myself. This (self respect) is the foundational starting point of the 
reciprocity. Central to this attitude is the ground for this respect which is my worth as a 
person, that is my dignity. Dignity has a formal dimenion but also an emotional or 
experiential dimension and here, even though the law demands from her subjects 
obedience without reference to personal feelings, we are allowed to pursue our own 
happiness within limits. The ultimate expression of dignity treats all people with the 
respect that is their due as human persons. In this I am to make some sacrifices. And so 
my formal dignity becomes existential and I become dignified, so to speak, 
phenomenologically. Throughout, dignity is seen as an inner value, one that determines 
me and is used as an equivalent for the humanity in my person. As such it has no equal 
and it also grounds moral behavior towards myself and others. In keeping with the 
nature of reason as setting ends, humanity sets virtue as its end. This can, however, only 
be done on an individual level. Respect is expressed in treating myself and others as 
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ends-in-ourselves. Respect, however needs concrete expression, which is why, for 
Sullivan, in my relation to others it requires beneficent behavior and love.  
To be sure, Sullivan identifies ‘some serious problems’ with the second formula’s 
ability to help us clarify and organize our moral duties.161 Some of these relate to moral 
issues, and that they are treated here shows Sullivan’s mind as to the approximation 
between dignity and morality.  
Sullivan identifies problems with regard to respect (as emotion) and the danger 
of falling prey to sentimentality. The notion of the good is problematic especially if we 
need to distinguish between the moral good and the natural good. This prevents one 
from giving a clear answer when faced, for example, with a question like ‘what is the 
value of human life?’ Illustrating this complexity Sullivan says: ‘In Kant’s theory, human 
life is not automatically equivalent to personhood; and insofar as it is simply a natural 
good, it is not in itself an absolute good. In most cases, the promotion of virtue may 
require, as we have seen, the protection of one’s life and health; but in some other 
circumstances endangering and even sacrificing one’s life may be morally obligatory.’162  
There are other issues he raises both with regard to the distinctions between harm and 
moral wrong and the importance of judgment in these matters. The fact that we are not 
given clear guidelines has led to deep divisions among Kantian scholars. Technological 
advances complicate maters especially with regard to issues of birth, life and death. 
Most problematic, perhaps, is the lack of clarity as to who belongs to the ‘class of 
persons.’ As Sulllivan points out, the resolution of some moral problems requires a clear 
                                                                
161 See Sullivan 1989, 209-211. 
162 Sullivan 1989, 209. 
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answer to that question. Failing that, the moral quanderies remain. As he states it 
‘[t]here are no empirical facts that can function as identifying criteria for the purely 
rational Idea of a person.’163 To my mind this highlights a problem we identified earlier, 
namely the absence of the real body in terms of human dignity. 
In the next chapter we shall focus on Susan Shell’s account of Kant’s notion of 
dignity.
                                                                
163 Sullivan 1989, 210. 
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Chapter Two: Susan Shell on Kant and Human Dignity 
 
 
Prelude 
 
Shell’s explicitly stated approach to Kant’s works is to present a deep unity 
between the man and his thought; and insofar as his thought goes, to see the unity 
between man and nature and between Kant’s political philosophy and his philosophy as 
a whole.1 In a later work Shell talks about Kant’s insight into ‘the perplexity intrinsic to 
our awareness of ourselves as worldly or embodied beings.’2 This perplexity is 
sharpened because Kant fully engages his time, a time that gave birth to the modern 
notions of nature as well as the human subject. ‘Attention to this insight’ she writes 
‘reveals an intellectual career more unified in its fundamental concerns than has 
generally been recognized; and it makes possible a deeper understanding of Kant’s 
relation to later intellectual movements, whose insights he anticipates and in some 
important ways surpasses. Additionally, and not least, it brings to light the image of an 
                                                                
1 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 5-7. Indeed 
she writes about the basis of this unity being man himself. Anthropology is thus the tie 
that keeps all the threads united. Distinguishing her aproach from some others she 
writes: ‘It differs from several modern rights-centered theories of justice (inspired by 
Kant) in that Kant attempts, as these modern authors do not, to provide his theory with 
a metaphysical basis supported by and supportive of his understanding of human 
experience generally. Many modern authors try to keep their moral and juridical claims 
free from both “epistemology” and dependence on natural facts, as if the realms of 
nature and freedom were, as Kant implies, entirely separable. But as Kant also states, 
these two realms are joined, however mysteriously, by a common inhabitant – man.’ 
Ibid., 7. 
2 Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 1. 
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extraordinarily focussed human being, for whom philosophizing and living at its most 
mundane converged to a remarkable degree. Kant’s greatness lies, at least in part, in a 
singularity of purpose – a self-imposed attentiveness – by which, in aiming to found 
philosophy as a systematic science, he also, and not incidentally, expressed and 
fashioned his own character. […] Herder accused his former teacher of trying to give 
spiritual birth to himself. More positively and accurately assayed, Kant’s systematizing 
efforts go together with – and in a nontrivial sense constitute – a lifelong self-
experiment. To this extent, Kant’s life can be (and was, evidently, by him) regarded as a 
“masterpiece.” In overstepping, then, the usual boundaries between textual and 
biographical analysis, I claim special warrant – one justified, I hope, by the results.’3 
Shell’s special gift is her ability to bring the human Kant to the fore in a way that 
reveals his personal searching in congruity with his most profound philosophy; and she 
does this in a way that shows how it all seems to flow from a profound integrity to 
which he remained true all his life. In this she presents his whole life as an expression of 
his thought and vice versa.4 Reading Shell impresses one with a conviction that Kant’s 
whole life and purpose was to search for and (once found) to live and express his 
inherent dignity as a human person. Indeed it is the dignity of man as man, a dignity that 
is somehow a hallmark of what it means to be human. If Sullivan thought Kant dry and 
                                                                
3 Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 1-
2. 
4 As she warns elsewhere: ‘I do not mean to reduce Kant’s thought to the contingencies 
of his biography (although the necessity of such contingency is, for Kant, throughout his 
life, […] a critical issue). My aim is rather to help uncover the concerns that push him 
towards romanticism and at the same time prevent his yielding to it. Romanticism has 
been characterized as a “longing to believe.”’ See Shell, Kant as Propagator: Reflections 
on Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime 2002, 466. 
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not really a man of flesh and blood, in Shell we shall meet a Kant fully human. The lens 
through which she interprets him is anthropological. 
After the introduction we shall look at Shell’s interpretation of the early Kant as 
it bears upon the search for dignity. We look at the roots of the problematic that gives 
rise to this search and see how Kant tried to resolve it. He lays the foundation of his 
mature philosophy. We turn next to her article on human dignity and then look at 
dignity and autonomy, dignity and value, reason and end-setting, followed by the 
implications of Kant’s concept of human dignity for ethics and politics. Next we discuss 
her understanding of history as the dimension which reveals the collective worth of 
human existence and end with her evaluation and concluding remarks.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In asking the question: What does it mean to speak of ‘human dignity,’ Shell at 
the same time limits the scope of the dignity concerned here and perhaps also provides 
the measure of such dignity and its meaning. This is seen in her qualification of the 
question. She asks: ‘what does it mean to speak of “human dignity” or the dignity of 
man as man?’5 It is not obvious that dignity refers only to humanity. In the Summa 
Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, talks about the ‘dignity of God the Father’ 
vis-à-vis the ‘dignity of the Son.’6 The dignity of the species refers to the being of what 
the species is -no more and no less. Dignity stated thus is nothing else but the full 
                                                                
5 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 53. 
6 Aquinas 1947, 217-218 (Pt. 1, Q. 42, Art. 4). 
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measure of man as man. In other words, a full description of our humanity set against 
ourselves and not measured against the divine (or any other) will be equivalent to 
human dignity. It is thus assumed that mankind has dignity or is dignified in its being 
man, i.e., human. It says something of the essence of the humanity of man. This 
emphasis on the dignity of the human being in his/her concrete humanity, is to my mind 
the unique gift and contribution of Shell’s scholarship with regard not only to human 
dignity but also to Kant. If, as we heard above from Sullivan, Kant can seem to be 
dauntingly devoid of flesh and blood, we will meet within the pages of Shell, a Kant very 
human, and indeed, all too human. It is this human Kant that Shell brings to word and 
through which she presents the dignity of the human person. In this, she presents his 
doctrine almost as if flowing from his autobiography and as such dignity becomes linked 
to anthropology, and in fact in line with his whole philosophy as a sort of spiritual 
discipline.7  
It is with this methodology in mind that we should not be surprised that Shell 
then takes a special interest in the early works of Kant. In fact there she finds much that 
is present, even if as a seed, that would bloom into the mature Kant’s notion of human 
                                                                
7 Shell talks of the ‘wavering course of Kant’s ambiguous spiritual ascent.’ See Shell, The 
Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 35. This 
notion of the ‘spiritual’ is explicitly stated by Shell even in the opening paragraphs of her 
first work. She sees this as Kant’s own project. ‘Kant set himself the difficult task of 
recovering and reasserting the spiritual assurances which science seemed irrevocably to 
destroy.’ Then she adds what is very important, namely, ‘Human spiritedness is the 
vehicle of this spiritual recovery.’ This is pivotal, because for Kant process is not merely 
theoretical but in fact spiritual, i.e., anthropologically existential, involving the whole 
man in his whole being and not only in his reflections but especially in his acting and 
actions. See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's Philosophy and Politics 1980, 
3. 
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dignity. For this reason we shall take a detour into her retrieval of this notion and its 
context in the early Kant. Shell has written extensively on this subject, so our detour will 
not do her justice, but at least we hope to show how dignity came to be a core concern 
for Kant and how it remained with him throughout his career.  
 
2. Interlude I: The Roots of the Question in the Early Kant 
 
 
One of the strengths of Shell is that she incorporates the early and pre-critical 
works of Kant into her interpretation. In these she sees the precursor to the later critical 
Kant.8 Although she shows how the concept of dignity is present in these early writings 
she does not go fully into them in her article on which I base this chapter. I shall 
therefore refer very briefly to some themes she mentions in her other works. These 
themes undergo a transformation in Kant’s later critical period, but more importantly 
for us, they provide a backdrop as they form part of the imagination and vocabulary, 
implicit and explicit, associated with human dignity as perceived by the mature Kant. 
This is merely an interlude and does not claim to be a thorough treatment. Such a 
treatment with regard to dignity would of course be fascinating.9 
                                                                
8 See for instance Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 
1980, 11-32. 
9 Shell has done a lot of work in this area and it seems to me, at least, as if dignity is a 
prominent presence throughout. See for instance Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of 
Kant's philosophy and politics 1980; Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, 
Generation, and Community 1996; Shell, Kant as Propagator: Reflections on 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime 2002; Shell, Kant and the 
Limits of Autonomy 2009. 
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‘The predominating concern of Kant’s thought’ according to Shell ‘is the 
reconciliation of nature, scientifically understood, with the requirements of moral life.’10 
In fact, Kant began his career as a philosopher of nature with special regard to 
Newtonian mechanical physics. His engagement with the world of science and its 
relation to God, metaphysics, spirit and nature/matter, Leibniz, Wolff, Hume and the 
philosophy of the day laid the foundation for his later work. It provided not only the 
matter for his imagination but also the many intellectual concepts that he would later 
employ in coming to terms with the, to him, disturbing mechanical implications of 
Newtonian science. A picture emerges of a view in which man as spiritual being is 
opposed to (if not crushed by) a brutal and indifferent overpowering nature and in this 
situation he struggles to find happiness. He has reason with which he might understand 
his place and as such find solace, but in the end true reflection reveals that reason is 
limited and cannot provide him with sure and certain knowledge of God and the 
hereafter.  
We focus on one result of science: it frustrates human aims and interests and in 
short ‘devastates human self-esteem.’11 
 
 
                                                                
10 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 11. 
11 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 17, 15. 
Shell actually heads this chapter with a saying from Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (III 
25) that reads: ‘Concerning the humiliating and discrediting effect of astronomy Kant 
has left us a remarkable confession: “It annihilates my importance.”’ See Shell, The 
Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 11. 
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2.1 Searching for the Question in the face of relentless Nature 
 
 
Shell traces the ways in which Kant attempted to answer this concern. It is true 
that this concern might have been expressed differently but, as she says, it in essence 
and direction remained the same throughout his entire academic life. Moreover, at the 
heart of this question one can discern the question of the worth of a human being. And 
as we know from his later works, the worth or value of the human being is specifically 
tied to its dignity. In this sense then we can say dignity has been a concern for Kant since 
his beginning albeit perhaps in an unthematized way at first. What is of importance in 
this short presentation is that we can see not only how he tried to wrestle with this 
question but also what the contours of his solutions were and the intellectual weaponry 
he used in order to approach a solution. This reveals the context of his imagination, as it 
were, and that will help in understanding perhaps how much of his thinking changed 
and how much remained the same. 
In the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755) Kant shows 
that he has adopted the Newtonian worldview—at least its mechanical physics. Yet the 
implications of this worldview haunted him and he tried to resolve them with reference 
to the Leibnizian-Wolffian rational worldview he inherited from his Prussian university 
education. He tried to resolve the seemingly irresolvable by attempting to bring these 
two systems together. So he tried to solve the challenge that Newtonian (mechanical) 
physics posed to God as Creator by proposing that God created the fundamental 
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mechanical properties of matter and that He was also the ‘source of the lawfulness of 
nature.’12 
Of greater importance, however, is that he envisaged not a static but a dynamic 
universe, which in accordance with the fundamental laws of attraction and repulsion 
gave rise to the endless birth and destruction of entire world systems. The point here is 
twofold: first, this whole process is universal and runs (universally) in accordance with, 
i.e., in obedience to, fundamental laws; and second, with these laws an ‘economy of 
nature’ is established that even in the destruction of worlds is of ‘no loss to Nature’ 
because what she loses on the one hand is gained on the other with the formation of 
another new world. This brings Shell to say, quoting Kant, that not even man ‘who 
seems to be the masterpiece of creation [is] excepted from this law.’ And in all of this ‘it 
does not appear that nature has thereby suffered any damage.’13 As Shell puts it: ‘The 
economy of nature is indifferent to human costs. The exchanges of matter which ensure 
a balance between creation and destruction assign no special weight to human 
interests.’14 
So, in the face of nature’s cold and indifferent eyes cast toward man, how ought 
he to respond? Kant entreats him to resign himself ‘to the common ways of providence’ 
                                                                
12 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 11-12, 
esp 12 n 4. 
13 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 13. 
14 Shell remarks that Kant writes somewhat similarly about man’s impotence before the 
powers of nature in his Critique of Judgment penned forty years later. She adds, 
‘However, that theory of knowledge which, in the Critique of Judgment, enables the 
mind to transcend its dependency on nature is unavailable to Kant in his Natural History, 
in which he declares man virtually helpless against the overwhelming power of nature.’ 
See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 13. 
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and to abandon ‘the human perspective, to which nature pays no special regard, for a 
divine one.’ And she adds, ‘this divine perspective is contemplative and not active. […] 
Kant here cites Alexander Pope, whose God observes “with equal eye” the death of hero 
or sparrow, bubble or world.’15 And this contemplating of the cosmic system ‘as a 
coherent and beautiful whole’ can bring with it a certain comfort.16  
This contemplation requires reason’s understanding of the cosmic system. 
Reason is thus a two-edged sword: it gives us solace in the form of leading us to 
understanding, but it also makes us aware of our fragility. But solace is not peace and 
does not satisfy our souls. ‘The soul requires a sense of permanence,’ writes Shell ‘to 
enable it to fend off nature’s physical assault on its security and spiritual assault on its 
dignity.’17 Sadly, reason is not able to provide this happiness. Kant writes that true 
happiness requires freedom from the dependence on finite things. However, being part 
of nature means we are dependent on finite things so true happiness requires ‘the 
liberation of man from nature.’ So, since we are creatures of need and as such 
dependent on nature, our position is dismal. Even reason, ‘the sole means’ through 
which we may find relief from the insecurity and indignity of this natural state is limited 
in power. This is felt as ‘a humiliation or degradation (Erniedrigung) brought about by 
the obstruction of reason by matter.’18 For Kant, at this stage at least, we are caught as 
                                                                
15 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 14. 
16 And again, in comparison with the Critique of Judgment, the experience of beauty is 
contemplative and is accompanied with disinterestedness and indifference as regard 
one’s person and fate. See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and 
politics 1980, 14. 
17 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 14. 
18 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 15. 
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it were midway between spirit and matter, such that something like gaining knowledge 
‘entails a toilsome struggle against matter.’19 
Shell says that Kant now seeks relief from this conundrum by suggesting that one 
turn away from science and nature to ‘Revelation and the “sweet hope” of a Hereafter 
[where] the soul might enter into “a new relation with all of nature” [and] “find the 
source of its happiness in itself.”’20 Nature holds no good intentions toward us, nor is 
the purposiveness in nature directed toward us. We have no stake to claim on nature 
and have no rights against it, so the only recourse for us is to adapt ourselves to nature.  
We wrongly assume there is some justice behind or operational in nature so that we 
think we receive just punishments when we are subject to her violence or reward when 
we benefit from her good. This attitude reveals only our arrogance in that we take 
ourselves to be the measure of all things. In fact nature is indifferent to our desires and 
to our sense of justice. We cannot change her, we need to adapt to her. Shell in fact 
quotes this reminder from Kant in his essay History of the 1755 Earthquake: ‘[The] 
humiliating reminder … that man can never be anything more than a man.’21  
                                                                
19 Shell points out that this doctrine reveals the influence of Wolff rather than Newton. 
She phrases this conundrum beautifully by saying ‘Men, who are too rational not to 
aspire, are not rational enough to succeed.’ See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of 
Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 15. 
20 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 16. 
21 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 17. 
Olaf Reinhardt’s translation of this sentence reads: ‘[T]hey lead him to the humblimg 
reminder […] that he is never anything more than a human being.’ Kant, Continued 
Observations on the Earthquakes that have been Experienced for some Time 2012, 
1:472. Shell’s translation is more pointed and powerful, and reveals, moreover, 
something of the human interest that drives her. This concerns humanity, the full 
measure of man, that is, of man as man. This phrase returns in the opening question in 
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All of this points to the fact that ‘science devastates human self-esteem.’22 
Reason’s ultimate inability to withstand the opposition of nature and thus its ‘partial 
access’ to the divine, or ‘more-than-human perspective’ adds insult to injury and 
constitutes the ‘essence of man’s “humiliation.”’ This is because man has no recourse 
but to submit to nature with all the indifference to man it entails and to submit to the 
reality that we are dependent and conditioned by matter (nature). As Shell expresses it: 
‘Nature poses for man a problem whose adequate solution it precludes.’ She also notes 
that in turning to Revelation and the Hereafter to set things right implies that nature 
‘has somehow wronged us.’23  
This gives rise to the problems of theodicy (to justify God in the face of the 
injustice we suffer here) but in the end Kant’s solution is to question the very search for 
a theodicy. Nature is not made for our happiness; indeed, it prevents it. We are unable 
to do anything about it, other than accept it. However, he offers ‘an almost wistful hope 
that what may be will set things right.’24 As Shell says ‘If the purely rational in man could 
be liberated from its dependence on the material, he could view nature from the point 
of view of God. Nature, as seen from this centre would show on all sides “utter security, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
her essay on dignity: ‘What does it mean to speak of “human dignity” or the dignity of 
man as man?’ See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 53. 
22 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 17. 
23 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 17. 
24 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 19. The 
phrase ‘to set things right,’ which Shell uses here, is a phrase that we will meet again 
with regard to Rousseau’s impact on Kant. It is quite significant and, as we shall see, 
Shell translates it in two ways. Its use here gives depth to her reading and significance 
for her to the “Rousseau chapter” in Kant’s life, as we shall see further on.  
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complete adaptation.” From such a vantage point “the changeful scenes of the natural 
world” could no longer “disturb the restful happiness of [the] spirit.”’25  
As yet Kant is more concerned with personal solace and self-esteem, and his 
reflections are more speculative and theoretical. In Universal Natural History and Theory 
of the Heavens (1755) he writes beautifully about this: ‘When one has filled one’s mind 
with such considerations, the sight of a starry heaven on a serene night gives a kind of 
pleasure which only a noble soul can feel. In the general silence of nature and calm of 
the senses, the hidden knowledge-power of the immortal spirit speaks an ineffable 
language, and yields undeveloped concepts which we can experience but not express.’26  
As she says, thus far it is still only ‘for noble souls.’ But in the end we find the 
roots for his understanding of human dignity here. She writes: ‘In the radical dualism of 
his mature philosophy, Kant secures a ground for human worth, a ground which, in his 
early writings, he stubbornly sought. The distinguishing mark of his critical philosophy is 
his conviction that the moral law within us is a subject of far greater awe than nature 
can inspire. It is the recognition of this inner law as an objective guide to moral action 
which decisively establishes the priority of practical reason, of morality, over 
contemplation.’27 
 
                                                                
25 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 19. This 
notion that our happiness requires ultimate supernatural intervention is something we 
shall meet again in Kant’s later moral philosophy. Shell, in fact, states that his doctrine 
of moral freedom as ‘liberation from dependence upon nature’ has its roots in these 
earliest scientific writings. 
26 Quoted from NH 367 by Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and 
politics 1980, 19. 
27 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 20. 
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2.2 The moral turn and its implications for dignity 
 
 
Shell refers to ‘a much quoted but too little understood’ personal confession 
found on a loose-leaf note appended to Kant’s own copy of his Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. These notes became known as the Remarks on the 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, or simply as the 
Bemerkungen or Remarks.28 This quote is treated in the next section where Shell relates 
it specifically to dignity so I shall not go into it here in depth. What it does reveal, 
however, is that Kant’s intensive reading of Rousseau effected a profound conversion in 
him, which caused him to rethink and then recast all he had done up to that point. Shell 
states that this effect had a much more profound impact than Hume’s awakening of 
Kant’s dogmatic slumbers. In fact she proposes that one talk here of Kant’s sense of 
vocation being born. In any case it effected ‘a decisive turning point’ in Kant’s 
intellectual career.29 According to Shell ‘this passage charts the beginning of the priority 
of morality in Kant’s thought.’30 
                                                                
28 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 21. For 
Shell’s take on this ‘Remarks […] among the most  neglected of Kant’s early writings’ 
that in the end proves to be a ‘remarkably coherent set of reflections on the human 
condition broadly understood and on what might be done to improve our present 
situation in a manner that is both in keeping with the laws of nature and favorable to 
human freedom’ see Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 40, 83. She devotes 
an entire chapter to Remarks. Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 39-84. See 
also Beiser 1992, 36, 42 ff. 
29 Kant wrote: ‘I am by inclination an investigator [Forscher]. I feel the thirst for 
knowledge and … the deep satisfaction after each step forward. There was a time when 
I believed all this could be the honour of mankind and I despised the people, who knew 
nothing. Rousseau has set me right … I learned to honour mankind and I would be less 
worthy than the average worker if I did not believe that [philosophy] could contribute to 
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Now, instead of seeking honor in knowledge that would lead one into the God-
perspective that is, in effect, reserved for the ‘few “noble souls”,’ Kant finds honor ‘in 
the rights of mankind, the property of all.’31 Shell encapsulates this change beautifully: 
‘Heretofore knowledge absorbed itself in the self-sufficient pleasures of contemplation; 
hereafter it must justify itself; it must “contribute” and “restore.”’32 Whereas Kant, in 
line with the rationalists, regarded the presence of reason in man and in all the ‘orders 
of the universe’ as the ‘measure of perfection,’ he saw after Rousseau that the greatest 
perfection lay in ‘the subordination of everything to freedom.’33 Truth and science have 
worth only in their service of ‘the practical.’ This practical relates to the advancement of 
the rights of mankind. Shell shows how this insight is accompanied by its inherent 
implication: the fact that all people are equal. Kant taking his cue from Rousseau sees 
inequality only as a matter of opinion. Shell quotes Kant: ‘The opinion according to 
which we are unequal also makes us unequal. Only the doctrine of Herr Rousseau can 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
what really matters, restoring the rights of mankind.’ See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A 
study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 21. 
30 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 21; and 
also 24, where she writes that it reflects ‘Kant’s change of heart from a longing after 
truth to a respect for the rights of man, a respect which Rousseau awakens even against 
Kant’s own inclination.’ 
31 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 21. 
32 There is an important insight to be gleaned in Carazan’s dream that Kant relates in his 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. It tells of a dream by a very 
rich and miserly fellow, ‘who had closed his heart’ to others. The Angel of death brought 
him to judgment and he was damned to spend eternity in effect as he had lived in 
isolation and centered upon himself. This dream brings Carazan to the realization that 
the truly important and essential thing in life is not wealth or even knowledge, but 
human relationships. In terms of the turn from the priority from knowledge to morality 
(as an expression of the rule that governs human relationships) this is a telling and 
remarkable narration. See Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime and Other Writings 2011, 16 n a. 
33 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 22. 
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convince even the most learned philosopher that he should not consider himself better 
than the common man, and this without the help of religion, but solely by means of his 
own honest wit.’34  
If there is then any science necessary, it is a science that will teach man his place 
in creation so that he ‘can learn what he must do to be a man.’35 ‘Illusive seductions’ will 
tempt him in his ignorance and propel him ‘from his proper place.’ However, the true 
knowledge (of this science) ‘will lead him back to the estate of man, and then, as small 
and imperfect as he still finds himself, he will be upright and good in terms of the place 
to which he is assigned, for he will be precisely what he ought to be.’36 False knowledge 
                                                                
34 The quote is from Remarks 20:176. See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's 
philosophy and politics 1980, 22. The German reads: ‘Die Meinung von der Ungleicheit 
macht auch die Menschen ungleich. Nur die Lehre des HE. R. kann machen daß auch der 
gelehrteste Philosoph sich mit seinem Wissen aufrichtig u. ohne die Religion zu Hülfe zu 
nehmen nicht vor besser hält als den gemeinen Mann.’ 
[See http://www.korpora.org/kant/aa20/176.html]. Shell’s translation reads to me 
better than the more literal one offered in the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s texts in 
English, which reads: ‘The opinion of inequality also makes human beings unequal. Only 
the doctrine of Mr. Rousseau can bring it about that even the most learned philosopher, 
with his knowledge, earnestly regards himself, without help from religion, as no better 
than the common man.’ See Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime and Other Writings 2011, 20:176. The relation between one’s ‘own honest wit’ 
in lieu of ‘religion’ comes out clearer in her rendition. This underscores her position that 
religion is replaced with one’s own rational abilities. These, moreover, are presented 
here in moral terms (‘honest wit’), which actually reflect the German ‘aufrichtig.’ 
‘Aufrichtig’ bears relation to honesty, sincerity, and even fairness. It is my contention 
that, at least insofar as honesty goes, it provides a key to a concrete human expression 
(i.e., actualization) of dignity for Kant. Shell will develop this theme ‘without religion’ 
further. 
35 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 22. 
36 Quote from Remarks 20:45-6 see Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's 
Philosophy and Politics 1980, 23 n 1. This quote from Kant is translated by Shell and it is 
important to note how Kant’s notion of ‘being in the place one is assigned to’ is 
translated by Shell with ‘upright.’ The German reads: ‘[…] so wird er doch vor seinen 
angwiesenen Posten recht gut seyn weil er gerade das ist was er seyn soll [my 
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with its ‘illusive seductions’ lures man away from his ‘rightful place’ and has to be 
exposed. Man must know his limits and this is what critical philosophy aims to achieve. 
Kant’s science of man is thus twofold: learn your limits and learn what you ought to be. 
Speculative philosophy thus does not bring us anything positive. In all of this Kant is 
radically democratic long before the French Revolution in 1789. ‘Man asserts his dignity 
and his honour as a race, a species, a humankind,’ she writes, ‘for which the dignity of 
each is that of all, and all that of each.’37  
At the risk of putting words into Shell’s mouth one might say that Kant solved 
the problems that science posed for human dignity by effecting a type of Copernican 
revolution. With regard to truth he makes ‘truth serve right’ instead of serving science.38 
Shell finds in the confessional passage quoted above already ‘an element of self-denial 
and self-overcoming. The assertion and establishment of human right requires the 
submission and subjugation of the inclination towards truth.’39 But there is another 
reversal. The honor of mankind lies no more in knowledge, which in virtue of placing 
man on a rung higher than nature, brought him closer to ‘the perspective of a 
contemplative God.’40 Newtonian science, however, crushed all of this. Its laws are 
equally applicable (one might say universally democratic) and hence no hierarchies 
could be tolerated. Similarly, the pre-eminence with which Kant imbued reason has in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
emphasis]’. [See http://www.korpora.org/kant/aa20/046.html]. As we shall see later 
Shell translates this word in her later works as upright. To my mind it carries notions 
pertaining to dignity. We shall see at the end of this section that Shell equates ‘setting 
upright’ with ‘self-rectification.’ See Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 41. 
37 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 23. 
38 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
39 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
40 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
 92 
fact been nullified by Newtonian science since it revealed just how fragile we rational 
beings are, as we saw above. In all of this Rousseau taught Kant to, as it were, turn away 
from God, and rather ‘do for himself’ thus giving him ‘an attitude of confident self-
reliance.’41 Moreover, the equation of honour and right in this context resulted in 
further spin-offs. ‘Right pertains to the sphere of humanity, not to the relations of man 
to nature, but to the relations of men to men.’ Earlier Kant found men to be very needy 
and dependent upon nature, now he writes ‘Man is needy, but also has power over his 
needs.’42 We have the power to assert our rights and it is also in the power of others to 
respect. This softens nature’s devastating effect on us. Finally, as Shell writes, ‘[h]onour 
is not bestowed on man, either by nature or by God, but rather lies in his doing “what 
he ought to do to be a man.”’43 Kant now realizes that the feeling of ‘natural injustice,’ 
which had him search for a proper theodicy, is in fact a ‘misplaced assertion of human 
right.’ It is misplaced because he searched for the human right at the wrong place. It is 
not in nature’s power to give or to answer our quest for human rights. ‘The struggle for 
respect and dignity is properly conducted not upon the natural but upon the social 
field.’44  
                                                                
41 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
42 Quoted from Remarks 20:172, see Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's 
philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
43 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
44 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 25. As she 
writes elsewhere: ‘Rousseau did not so much moralize Kant as redirect his moral 
concern from cosmic to human community and its more satisfying economy of intrinsic 
worth or “dignity”. Kant would later discover the true “intelligible world”—or the only 
one available to us—and with it compelling support at last for man’s individual integrity 
within a larger whole. The physical economy of nature, alternately infinite and finite, 
gives way to the kingdom of ends and its moral economy of absolute worth. The dual 
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This struggle is different because unlike nature which ‘is maintained by a certain 
determined rule, […] the willfulness of man is without rule.’45 This willfulness, which is 
made possible ‘by a kind of lapse of nature,’ forms the basis of human freedom. In the 
interplay between different men’s willfulness ‘rights are properly asserted.’46 
In a section of Remarks under the title ‘On Freedom’ Kant draws a distinction 
between dependence on ‘the necessity of nature’ and dependence on ‘the will(fullness) 
of another human being.’ We have no choice but to yield to nature. ‘To submit to the 
will of another,’ however ‘is harder […] and more unnatural.’47 Shell shows how Kant 
builds on Rousseau, who employed a similar distinction in his pedagogy in Emile. For 
Rousseau we are dependent on either things or on men. Dependency on things comes 
with nature; dependency on men, with society. And whereas the former is ‘non-moral’ 
and ‘begets no vices,’ the latter is ‘out of order’ giving ‘rise to every kind of vice.’48 
Rousseau came to this insight by noticing the difference in a child’s crying when it 
suffers the ‘blows of chance’ as opposed to when it feels or recognizes the pain as 
intentional. The former is taken in stride as it were, but the latter produces crying that 
reveals a sense of being wronged and even rage. For Rousseau this experience reveals 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
points of attraction—both ground and abyss—that center Kant’s early cosmology give 
way to the moral will as itself the final ground of human purposiveness and perfection.’ 
Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 75-
76. 
45 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 25. 
46 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 25. 
47 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 25.
48 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 25. 
 94 
‘man’s innate sense of justice and injustice.’49 Before recognizing this intentionality of 
others man is non-moral. Upon recognition, however, ‘comes the possibility of vice, 
which lies in the “mutual depravity of master and slave.”’50 The slave depends on his 
master for his ‘very life’ and the master on his slave for the satisfaction of new needs 
and becomes thus ensnared. It is through moral and civic virtue that men strive to 
regain some of the former independence they had ‘in the state of nature.’ Human 
liberty and natural necessity are thus for Rousseau not at odds with each other. We 
accept natural necessities (they are inevitable); but restrictions, ‘which appear to place 
[me] at the mercy of another will call [my] own freedom into question.’51 Kant agrees. 
According to Shell, Kant comes to see that it is no longer nature that poses the greatest 
threat to our dignity and security. She points out that in the Remarks a concept of 
freedom, vis-à-vis other men, is developed, which Kant later would call external 
freedom. 
Kant echoes Rousseau in asserting that man’s self-awareness is his distinguishing 
mark. Herein lies our difference with animals. In fact Shell quotes from Remarks the 
saying ‘An animal is not yet a complete being because it is not conscious of itself.’52 We, 
on the contrary, are aware of our existence and are, moreover, ‘whole and free’ until 
                                                                
49 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 25. Anger 
is thus integral to our sense of justice and injustice. ‘[E]ven when he does not get all he 
wants; man naturally bears patiently the nature of things, but not the ill-will of another,’ 
writes Shell in quoting Rousseau’s Emile. See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of 
Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 26 n 4. 
50 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 26. 
51 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 26. 
52 Remarks 20:93 see Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and 
politics 1980, 26 n 6. 
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‘another will’ imposes itself upon our existence. This self-consciousness, which Kant 
later calls the ‘ability to reflect’ includes, as a necessary consequence, ‘an ability to 
recognize a similar self-consciousness in others.’ This means  I come to realize that 
others have, just like me, the ability to be aware of themselves as reflective (i.e., self-
reflective) beings. So they would be as aware as I am that they have the power to 
execute desires like lifting an arm, or using a tool in the service of their own purpose. As 
Shell says, Kant first distinguished between himself and outer things, then between 
things and other men; and it gradually dawned on him ‘that he too can be a tool, a mere 
thing to other men.’53 With reference to Remarks Shell describes the effect of such use 
as follows: ‘To allow oneself to be used as a tool, to become a thing in the eyes of 
another, that is the meaning of submission (Unterwürfigkeit). To yield to the will of 
another is to cancel one’s own essence, and is as such a “contradiction” which indicates 
the injustice (Unrechtmässigkeit) of the deed. “That man should need no soul of his own 
and have no will of his own, and that another soul should move his limbs, this is absurd 
[ungereimt, “unrhymed, blank] and inverted [verkehrt, “exchanged,” “turned the wrong 
way”]. Such a man is the mere tool of another.” To stand in dependence on another is 
to lose one’s standing and to be “only a possession.” The man who submits to another is 
“no longer a man.”’54 Shell notes here that Kant at this stage had not yet drawn a 
distinction between inner and outer freedom.55 
                                                                
53 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 26-27. 
54 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 27; see 
also 27 n 7. See also Remarks 20:93, 66. 
55 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 27 n 7. 
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There is now another dimension in which man is distinguished from animals and 
that is in his ‘capacity for self-contradiction.’ God makes all things good but man 
destroys himself. Quoting Kant she writes ‘All the evils on earth are caused to man by 
man.’56 It would seem then that self-contradiction is expressive of a deep flaw within 
humanity. The upshot of this, according to Shell, is that for Kant here, as later on in his 
life and thought, self-consistency becomes ‘the standard of both metaphysical and 
moral legitimacy.’57 Self-consistency is understood in this context as ‘freedom from 
dependence on the will of another [and forms] the basis of right.’ And she adds ‘this 
right is an essential constituent of his humanity; without it he would cease to be a 
man.’58 
It is clear that Kant boasts a new understanding of man accompanied with a new 
appreciation of rights. This he attributed to Rousseau, whom he called ‘the Newton of 
the moral world.’ Newton discovered order and laws in a nature many thought chaotic. 
Similarly Rousseau saw ‘beneath the varying forms human nature assumes the deeply 
concealed essence of man and the hidden law in accordance with which Providence is 
justified by his observations.’59 What Kant means then by saying that Rousseau ‘set him 
right,’ according to Shell, is ‘that the fundamental fact about man is his awareness of his 
freedom to use his own power as he will.’60 Nature and things do not challenge this 
awareness; they provide the context in which man consciously and consistently may 
                                                                
56 See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 27 n 8. 
57 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 27. 
58 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 27. 
59 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 27. 
60 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 28. 
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exercise his powers. What challenges us, however, in that it contradicts and subverts us 
in our very essence, is submission to another’s will. And this is a willful act, which means 
that it is not nature that destroys the will, but the will itself. As Shell says, Kant’s new 
theodicy boils down to the realization that ‘[i]njustice is our creation, [it is] a kind of self-
mutilation.’61 What this leaves Kant with is the important and powerful conviction that 
in the end our rights ‘are part of us; and it is we who must restore them.’62 This 
restoration then will depend on the will. 
Shell shows that Kant carried some of these ideas with him throughout his entire 
life. As such some are found even in his last published work before he died, his 
Anthropology, and the first book to be published posthumously, the Pädagogik. In this 
regard the Rousseauian distinction between dependence on things versus other wills 
deserves special attention. Both philosophers saw the discovery of other wills as imbued 
with pivotal moral significance. For Rousseau that discovery disturbs the natural balance 
in man between desire and power, opening the way to tyranny by using others in order 
to enlarge my own powers. The solution is to retard or stop the child in developing new 
desires. For Kant, on the other hand, the emphasis falls on the fact that this opens the 
possibility of submission to another will and this leads to the loss of both dignity and the 
self (self-abnegation). ‘Kant,’ writes Shell, ‘is more concerned with dignity, less with 
                                                                
61 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 28. With 
this he thought the problem of theodicy now solved. Shell mentions though that in his 
mature philosophy the entire problem of theodicy is dismissed as ‘incapable of 
theoretical solution.’ 
62 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 28. 
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happiness.’63 Furthermore, the desirable development of reason leads necessarily to 
‘new and dangerous desires.’ Even so, the real problem is not tyranny or enslavement 
but rather ‘submission and self-contradiction.’ What is needed pedagogically therefore 
is to ‘[instill] in the young child strength to “renounce” desires already present, when as 
“passions” they threaten to overwhelm him.’ If education for Rousseau was to 
‘stimulate self-sufficiency;’ it is for Kant to ‘accustom the child to opposition [and] to 
encourage self-control.’ The key word is ‘discipline.’64  
In the Anthropology Kant regards anger as the first human passion. The infant 
experiences it when he is confronted by an object or by a change in his general state, in 
fact by anything that makes him feel ‘that he is checked.’ Shell quotes from the 
Anthropology: ‘Animal young play; children quarrel very early; it is as if a certain concept 
of right (which relates to external freedom) develops at the same time as animality, 
instead of being progressively learned.’65 Shell writes then ‘Kant locates the first inkling 
of right in the child’s experience of things. The opposition of matter itself occasions a 
child’s first sense of injury and injustice, even as it calls to life the child’s sense of his 
own liberty.’66 
                                                                
63 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 29. 
64 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 29. I have 
gone into as much detail here as Shell gives in order to show that the theme of 
discipline, of overcoming opposition, is a theme that has deep roots in Kant and it is also 
essential to the expression and living of dignity, as we shall see. 
65 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 29; also 29 
n 8. Taken from Anthr 7:269 (Shell’s translation). 
66 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 29-30. This 
is important to keep in mind when we try to determine whether dignity is something 
‘inherent’ or not. 
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Shell claims Kant consistently throughout his life held that matter is ‘an obstacle 
against which man tests his liberty.’ According to its nature, matter thwarts the 
‘fulfillment of human desire’ leading Kant to conclude that the destiny of a being ‘whose 
desires are naturally insatiable’ cannot be happiness. As she says: ‘The destiny of man 
lies not in satisfaction but in work, in struggle to overcome the limitations imposed by 
matter and man’s material nature. Man should regard as his destiny not happiness but 
the struggle for freedom.’67 If I understand Shell’s juxtaposing here between ‘destiny to 
work’ and ‘destiny to struggle for freedom’ correctly, it seems that work is at heart the 
effort or struggle for freedom, and vice versa. This is an important notion to take with us 
when we look more closely at dignity. 
Shell shows that even at this stage Kant harbors some disquietude with the 
‘necessary limitations which the natural world imposes on our moral lives.’ This 
‘fundamental incongruity between the moral quality of our actions and their effects 
within the material world’ leads Kant in his ‘generally ironic’ and even ‘playful’ Dreams 
of a Spirit-Seer to project a spirit world in which the true quality of our moral actions is 
worked out.68 Access to this world is granted not through knowledge but through moral 
sentiments. ‘These impulses of duty and benevolence conflict with our selfish 
inclinations and so make us realize that “in our most secret motives, we are dependent 
                                                                
67 In virtue of this we may say that nothing that brings satisfaction, which implies a more 
passive, receptive attitude, can belong to our essential destiny. Shell quotes a few lines 
from Pädagogik: ‘Work (Arbeit) is “occupation not pleasant in itself, but undertaken for 
the end in view”’ (Ed 9:470); and, ‘It is of the utmost importance that the child learn to 
work. Man is the only creature who must work’ [translation Shell’s]. (Ed 9:471); See 
Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 30; also 30 n 
9.   
68 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 30. 
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on the rule of the will of all.”’69 Kant ‘elevates’ this will into the heavens, in effect giving 
it a power to ‘move our very wills.’ Inner conflict reveals the presence of this ‘higher 
will’ within us. Moral awareness thus comes to light when we acknowledge this conflict 
between duty and benevolence and our selfish sentiments. For Shell this inner conflict 
(in Dreams) ‘“awakens” us to the moral world, and so to recognition of physical/moral 
dualism.’70  
Let me conclude this section with Shell’s remarks on Carazan’s Dream. Kant’s 
text runs as follows. 
‘One evening, while I was drawing up my accounts and going over my profits … I 
was overcome by sleep…. The angel of death overcame me like a whirlwind and struck 
me before I could utter a terrified scream. I was struck dumb as I feared that my die was 
cast for eternity, and that all the good I had done could not be augmented nor all the 
bad taken away. I was led before him who dwells in the third heaven. The sight that 
flamed before me spoke thus: “Carazan, your divine service is rejected. You have closed 
your heart to love of man and held onto your treasure with an iron hand. You have lived 
only for yourself and thus you shall live for eternity alone and cut off from all 
community with the whole of creation.” At this moment I was grasped by an unseen 
power and thrown through the shimmering edifices of creation. I had already left 
uncountable worlds behind me. As I approached the outermost boundaries of nature, I 
observed that the shadows of limitless emptiness stretched into the depths that sank 
before me. A fearsome realm of eternal quiet, loneliness and darkness! Inexpressible 
                                                                
69 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 31. 
70 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 31. 
 101 
terror befell me at this moment. I gradually lost sight of the last stars and finally the last 
glimmering appearance of light in the outermost darkness. The death angel of despair 
grew with every moment, just as my distance from that last inhabited world increased. I 
considered with unbearable anguish of the heart that if ten thousand times a thousand 
years went by … I would still hurl forward into the immeasurable abyss of darkness 
without help or hope of return. – In this state of stupor I stretched out my hands toward 
real objects with such impetuosity that I thereby awoke. And now I have learned to 
esteem human beings highly. For in that horrifying isolation [Einöde] I would prefer to 
all the treasures of Golconda even the lowliest of those whom in my proud fortune I 
drove from my door.’71 
This profound and deeply disturbing dream seems, especially in the possibilities 
it raises, to solidify in an imaginative way the utter logical consequences of some of the 
tenets the earlier Kant seemed to have held sacred; and furthermore, its horrifically 
bleak picture of the effect of such an imagined eternity on the whole person, 
accentuates thereby what is really essential to being human. That without which makes 
existence a living hell, i.e., a living death. This acts as a mirror against which Kant’s 
earlier values are to be viewed and tested.72 For one thing, the earlier value placed upon 
                                                                
71 As quoted in Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 37; from Kant, 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings 2011, 
2:209-210n. For the particular history of Carazan and this story see Shell, Kant and the 
Limits of Autonomy 2009, 351 n 22. 
72 It is interesting to compare Kant’s confessional note regarding Rousseau’s effect on 
him with Carazan’s dream. For one thing, the man who searches for and values 
knowledge above all else, especially the God-perspective, seems to court destruction. In 
Carazan’s words ‘the angel of death’ becomes in his utmost isolation ‘the death angel of 
despair.’ It would seem the primacy of knowledge, important as it might be, is not, on 
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knowledge, with the despising of the rabble who knew nothing, is here, when drawn to 
its utmost logical and anthropological conclusion (i.e., what will it be like if I am to be 
like this for all eternity in absolute consistency and in character with all my value 
implies) shown in all its horror to be inhuman and foreign to our beings. We cannot 
attain the God-perspective as little gods. We are not made for such solitude. In other 
words the priority of the theoretical (for oneself) is a lonely and selfish affair and brings 
about utter solitude, which as Shell points out is here presented negatively as ‘a total 
absence of sensation’ and she adds ‘brings home the virtual identity for subjective 
human purposes, of “worldless” self-sufficiency as a kind of living death.’73 Carazan 
discovers he is a human being and that means he needs other people, and furthermore, 
he needs to invest his time in them: spending time, even with those he most despised, is 
better (i.e., has more worth/value) than all the wealth of the world.  
But Shell delves deeper. ‘We cannot imagine ourselves worldless,’ she writes, 
‘without cancelling in thought the possibility of inward changes of state and with it self-
consciousness as we now know it. Bereft of outer relations, the unity of the I is an 
empty shell.’74 I take Shell to mean not only the metaphysical dimension, but also that 
for (and in) humans the contemplative ideal of being the ‘self-thinking thought in itself’ 
is not anthropologically structured toward us. In other words, we are self-transcending 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
this ultimate level, the sine qua non that determines humanity and survival as human 
being. It is also interesting that both pieces end with saying: ‘[now] I have learned to 
esteem human beings [highly].’ In both, a real conversion is noted and explained. 
Ultimately it is not the mind that transforms Carazan, but his heart. 
73 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 37. 
74 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 37. Note here the importance of being 
grounded and attached to the world as an embodied being, and also of the need of the 
senses and for others. 
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beings. We need to move out of ourselves toward others. In this Shell discerns a moral 
turning in Kant. She talks about pleasant feelings of transcendence that in his earlier 
Universal Natural History intimated our ‘participation in a contemplative world of 
spirits, elevated above the fray of time and space.’ Here, however ‘those feelings have 
[an] intellectual and moral valence. Carazan, the proud miser, “awakens” with a new 
yearning to “connect” with his fellow human beings, the lowliest of whom now seems 
infinitely precious. Moral community, based on a feeling for the dignity of all human 
beings, beckons where unwarranted pride had failed. In sum […] Carazan translates 
hope for the future […] from the metaphysical to the moral plane; we are on the 
threshold of the “revolution” in Kant’s thinking that would finally lead him to the 
principle of autonomy as we now know it.’75 
The horror of Carazan’s experience set Kant, as it were, on a trajectory, which 
opened the priority of the moral realm above all else. As his confessional note made 
clear, if he did not contribute to the betterment of mankind’s moral life especially in 
terms of dignity and human rights, his life would not have much value. Kant’s journey 
led him to ask how it would be possible to effect this betterment. Rousseau opened the 
way in that he saw laws operative in the human sphere that would be analogous to the 
laws of nature. Hence his regard for Rousseau as the Newton of the human sciences.  
Taking nature as his cue, Kant found in all organic life a principle at work, which 
he called the principle of ‘return.’ This principle expressed his observation that organic 
life seemed to harbor within itself a ‘capacity for orderly growth and self-
                                                                
75 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 37-38. 
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maintenance.’76 In applying this principle to human history Kant concludes that his 
‘natural principle of “return,”’ in fact ‘limits how far social depravity can go before 
prompting a countermovement of recovery.’77 Kant’s desire is now to find a way hasten 
this counter-movement and this goal is stated in ‘Archimedean’ terms: ‘He will set his 
fulcrum upon the “state of nature” in order to “move the emotions” of human beings.’78 
Human perfection lies not in the virtue of the ancients but in the ‘moment of return.’ 
Kant sees his role then as an educator of humanity.79 Kant finds his ‘Archimedean point’ 
when he imagines the worst that can happen to a person is the loss of his freedom by 
being subjected to the tyrannical whims of another who has no law restraining him. As 
Shell puts it, ‘[t]he occasion of that terror [losing one’s freedom] was the recognition of 
lawless freedom in another and the thought thereby prompted of one’s own 
cancellation as a “complete” or free and active being. In subjecting freedom to itself, 
Kant’s pivot of “return” answers to that moment.’80 These ideas will ultimately lead to 
Kant’s mature concept of autonomy and dignity within it. 
This is still all in the pre-critical phase, but, as we can see, many themes are 
already present in this phase and they will surely be felt when we try to examine his 
doctrine of dignity. We shall now move to Shell’s understanding and presentation of 
dignity in the mature Kant. 
 
                                                                
76 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 40. 
77 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 40. 
78 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 40. 
79 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 47, 79 ff. 
80 Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 83. For a presentation of the 
development and analysis of this idea in Kant see Ibid., 39-84.  
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3. The Mature Kant on Human Dignity 
 
 
Shell discerns a two-fold dimension to the concept ‘dignity’. The Latin dignitas 
means virtue or worthiness. It can also refer to honorable office. The Latin seems to 
refer to ‘that aspect of virtue or excellence that makes one worthy of honor.’81 The 
German equivalent that Kant uses, Würde, connects etymologically with the English 
‘worth’ and ‘worthy.’ This two-fold dimension means that dignity refers ‘both to a kind 
of deserving and to something deserved.’82  
She points to another understanding of dignity operative in medieval times 
where it functioned as a comparative category that in effect divided people in terms of 
rank and authority. The king had dignity that his subjects did not share and it 
transcended the concrete particularity of the king as it passed to the next ruler when 
the king died. This was in virtue of his rank (which as she points out was seen as a 
sharing in the dignity of Christ). In this way dignity became something that was not 
shared by all and referred rather to the comparative elevation of some over others. It 
was inherently anti-democratic, or at least had different meanings attached to it. She 
points out that there was a sense here in which one could say all people shared a dignity 
‘deriving from our rank as humans.’83 
                                                                
81 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 53. She continues by saying ‘which, as Aristotle 
put it, accompanies virtue as its crown.’ This is important because it emphasises that 
dignity is more than just honor for the sake of office, but is tied essentially to virtue or 
excellence.  
82 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 53. 
83 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 53. 
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The two main sources that fed thinking on human dignity in the western world 
were the Bible and classical philosophy. The Bible presents man as a creature (with the 
implication of embodiment) created in the image of God; and thus man as creature 
derives his dignity from the status of being made in God’s image. This Shell presents as a 
matter of rank (status) and not of any ontological gift.84 But according to classical 
philosophy the dignity of people is derived from their status as rational beings. Here 
Shell sees rationality as ability; she states that it enables us to ‘contemplate nature’ and 
thereby allows us ‘to justify […] the value of human existence.’85 
It is also important to see that this rank or status is derivative and not inherent. 
The concept of ‘elevation’ is thus present and operative in the background within the 
notion of status. She explains: ‘Philosophic reason and supraphilosophic (or 
nonphilosophic) revelation were, then, the twin pillars on which man’s claim to dignity, 
or worthiness of honor and esteem, were largely set.’ Here it seems that dignity has to 
do with man’s worthiness of honor and esteem. Worthiness of honor and esteem seems 
(to me) in the first place not something possible in isolation. In other words it looks like 
something social and furthermore like something that has to be granted to me by 
others. In this way her use of the word ‘claim’ makes sense; for it is something that I 
claim for my own. In other words it implies the concept of ownership. Secondly, it is 
something that I also in this sense demand from others because honor and esteem are 
really social realities. In this sense dignity belongs to, or at least approximates, the 
                                                                
84 She also refers in the same vein to the idea of man being ‘reborn in Christ,’ which has 
‘ontological overtones’ at least from a traditional theological viewpoint. See Shell, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2003, 54. 
85 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 54. 
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discourse of human rights, insofar as rights are things we lay claim to. And this is 
something that Kant brought to the understanding of human dignity.  
The seemingly odd-man-out in this brief historical and systematic 
characterisation would be Pico della Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man. For 
Mirandola, human dignity is to be found in our freedom, but as Shell shows this 
freedom is for him a freedom guided by theoretical knowledge, the sine qua non for 
freedom as he sees it. We have here then in addition to the conception of dignity as 
something akin to rank and status and thus in essence fulfilling a social dimension in its 
relatedness to other people, also dignity considered in itself. By this is meant dignity as 
encapsulated within the individual’s own use of his freedom, whose flowering is rooted 
in theoretical knowledge.  
Shell identifies three elements taken from the two traditions – reason, freedom, 
and a kind of heroism (related to his definition of virtue as ‘spiritual courage’86) – that 
Kant integrated into an understanding of dignity (and by implication of humanity). 
She traces Kant’s use of reason in this context back to the ancients, saying that 
‘like the theologians he finds [dignity’s] deepest source in what we share as creatures 
who must choose rather than in natural endowments that lift some above others.’87 It 
                                                                
86 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 54. 
87 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 54. Shell draws a distinction between Kant’s 
notion of freedom as autonomy [self-legislation] and the Stoic concept of autarky [self-
rule]. Reason plays a role in both. Autonomy and autarky are both brought about 
through the intervention of reason. Yet, their respective difference lays in the role and 
understanding of reason and its reach. For the Stoics the universe is permeated with 
reason, which is an active principle giving us through our appropriation in theoretical 
knowledge ‘contemplative participation in an order beyond the self.’ As we saw earlier, 
Kant rejected this use of reason. Reason on his account is associated with ‘the self and 
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would seem from this that reason is understood to mean some endowment which, to 
the degree of its presence and exercise in a person, distinguishes him or her from 
others. In this sense we get the understanding that reason is something that does not 
naturally lead to a ‘democratic’ understanding or distribution of dignity. Freedom, on 
the other hand, would presumably be such an instrument that democratizes dignity.88  
With this foundation Shell can now say that for Kant, ‘[m]an is exalted […] 
neither by nature nor by God, as classical philosophy and biblical religion respectively 
insist, nor by the martial glory celebrated by the ancient poets, but by autonomy, or 
subjection to self-made law, as announced and certified by conscience.’89 
In our Interlude we referred to Shell’s treatment of an extraordinary 
autobiographical ‘confessional note’ found on one of the loose-leaf pages Kant wrote on 
and then attached to his own copy of his earlier published [1764] Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764). These have been published as the 
Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764-1765) as 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
its powers of origination (i.e., “spontaneitas”) rather than […] contemplative 
participation in an order beyond the self.’ See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 75 n 
4. It is interesting, that etymologically, ‘spontaneitas’ is associated with ‘sponte,’ which 
means: willingly, of one's own accord, unaided. See Cawley, Neumann and Neuburg 
2013. 
88 In fact Shell speaks of Kant’s ‘democratic turn of mind’ and even in the context of 
dignity as she says, ‘Man asserts his dignity and his honour as a race, a species, a 
humankind, for which the dignity of each is that of all, and all that of each. The pre-
eminence of equality in Kant’s discussion of right, undertaken in the 1760s, dispels any 
suspicion that the democratic element in Kant’s thought was primarily the result of his 
enthusiasm for French events of 1789.But what is even more interesting than this 
democratic turn of mind, twenty years before the French revolution, is Kant’s change of 
heart from a longing after truth to a respect for the rights of man, a respect which 
Rousseau awakens even against Kant’s own inclination.’ Shell, The Rights of Reason: A 
study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 24. 
89 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 54. 
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we have already pointed out.90 Shell notes the personal transformation that is reflected 
in what is written. Kant was about 40 years old when he wrote: ‘I am by nature an 
inquirer. I feel a whole thirst for knowledge and a desirous restlessness to come into 
more of it, along with the satisfaction in each acquisition. There was a time when I 
thought that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I despised the 
people [Pöbel] who knew nothing. Rousseau brought me to rights [hat mich zurecht 
gebracht]. This imaginary prejudice vanished, I learned to honor human beings 
[Menschen], and I would find myself less useful than the ordinary worker if I did not 
believe that this consideration could give value to all the others, in establishing 
[herzustellen] the rights [Rechte] of humanity [Menshheit].’91  
This passage is important and we shall look more closely at it later but here I 
simply quote this essential point made by Shell: ‘Biographically speaking, Kant’s 
                                                                
90 See Frierson 2011, vii-xlv; especially xxxviii-ix and xliii. 
91 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 54 ff. Shell here translates the phrase ‘hat mich 
zurecht gebracht’ with ‘brought me to rights.’ In later publications she translates it, 
however, with ‘[Rousseau] set me upright.’ Shell, Kant as Propagator: Reflections on 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime 2002, 456. See also Shell, 
Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 41. Other scholars follow her example in using 
this translation –with reference to her. See for instance Luftig 2011, 614. This is 
significant to me since ‘upright’ carries clear connotations of integrity and truthfulness 
that I associate with dignity. We might glean from the following quote exactly what Shell 
understands with this phrase ‘[Rousseau] hat mich zurecht gebracht’ (however she 
translates it). In The Rights of Reason she writes: ‘Rousseau sets Kant right by showing 
him that the fundamental fact about man is his awareness of his freedom to use his own 
power as he will.’ See Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and 
politics 1980, 28. Shell equates ‘setting upright’ with ‘a self-rectification.’ As to the 
background of this latter concept, see above. She writes: ‘To put matters simply: 
Through reading Rousseau, Kant appears to discover his own true calling or vocation, 
described not as a rectification by God, but as a self-rectification or “setting upright” 
that lets him assume his proper “place” within the physical and moral universe.’ Shell, 
Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 41. 
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moralized understanding of human dignity goes together with a doctrine of equal rights 
understood not as a fact of nature (as with Hobbes and Locke) but as an ideal, i.e., 
something that needs to be historically established because it ought to be. In Kant’s 
later thought, this transformation persists […] in his understanding of respect (rather 
than benevolence or love) as the primary quality of a morally good attitude.’92 
 
4. Dignity and Autonomy 
 
 
Shell begins her presentation of the mature Kant’s position with reference to 
Kant’s understanding of the concept of person. This she will link to conscience. Her 
argument goes like this: In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant distinguishes between 
‘psychological’ and ‘moral personality.’ Psychological personality is defined as ‘the 
capacity for being conscious of one’s identity in different conditions of one’s existence’93 
A ‘person’ in the moral sense, however, is ‘a subject whose actions can be imputed to 
him.’94 Imputation, which is a term of legal provenance, implies freedom.  
Shell’s starting point with the concept of moral personality places the thematic 
squarely within the sphere of the ‘Moral Law’. Within the moral law (as I read her) she 
                                                                
92 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 55. 
93 Quoted from MM 223, see Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 55, 75 n 7. 
94 The Latin word imputare combines ‘in’ (in, toward) with ‘putare’ (reckon) and it is 
often used in a legal sense where it refers to something that is being attributed or 
ascribed to someone. It could also refer to association. Although its legal context is 
important (for in a court the question of guilt and responsibility are decided) it is here 
the deeper dimension of morality itself that provides the context. To be sure it includes 
the notions of guilt and responsibility (and hence freedom) but goes beyond the legal 
sphere. 
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identifies two dimensions that form as it were one dynamic. The first relates to 
freedom. Indeed the moral law whose purport is to lead to concrete actions brings the 
law to the realm of nature, which as we know falls totally under the sway of the 
determinate laws of nature which not only predict but also necessitate the concrete 
phenomena, thus by implication cancelling out freedom. Here, however, by virtue of the 
concept of moral personality, which implies imputability and hence responsibility, Kant 
argues that such imputability must involve freedom. In other words moral personality is 
the condition of the possibility for freedom. For without freedom imputability is of no 
use. This leads Shell to quote Kant’s statement that freedom is the ratio essendi, or the 
ground and reason of the being of the moral law.95 
The second dimension is the awareness or consciousness of freedom, the ratio 
cognoscendi. It is important to note that the awareness is awareness of (and not 
knowledge of) the moral law and this awareness Shell calls conscience. In itself then this 
awareness or conscience becomes in us the reason of our recognition that we are free. 
Her statement reads: ‘Freedom, in other words, is the ground or reason without which 
there would not be a moral law, while awareness of the moral law, or conscience, is the 
ground or reason for our recognizing that we are free.’96 We should take the first 
statement as a pointer to the ‘metaphysical’ reality or givenness of freedom as being 
the condition of the possibility for the moral law and the second as a more 
psychological-epistemological process ‘within’ me (that is manifested as an awareness 
or recognition of conscience, which in itself is an awareness of the moral law) that leads 
                                                                
95 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 55. 
96 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 55. 
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to my recognizing that I am free. Thus Shell concludes that ‘“[o]ught,” in short, implies 
“can.”’97  
The stage is now set to show how Kant can argue from freedom to autonomy 
with all that it implies in relation to the moral law and the ‘categorical nature of 
morality’s demands.’98 The moral law as law [nomos] is a law that I as person both give 
to myself and am subject to obey at the same time.99 Only in such autonomy can the 
categorical nature of moral demands as both necessary and universal be reconciled with 
the freedom ‘to which the moral law […] testifies.’100 Now the moral law as practical and 
concrete enters the realm of experience and facts. Experience and facts, however, 
pertain to the empirical realm where freedom and responsibility would seem to be 
excluded. 
Kant’s solution is to tie reason to autonomy and hence to the moral law and thus 
to bring it into the empirical experiential realm. Shell quotes Kant in the Critique of Pure 
Reason where Kant ties reason to the moral law but brings it into the empirical realm by 
means of the idea (and experience) of consciousness.  
Shell calls the reader’s attention to the importance of the phrase ‘fact of reason.’ 
This phrase is important because it is here that two worlds collide and intersect. Reason 
that is not attached or subject to the world of phenomena or experience (in other words 
it is not part of the world of facts with all its contingencies) becomes here and now fact, 
                                                                
97 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 55. 
98 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
99 Shell talks of autonomy as the ‘subjection to self-made law.’ Shell, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2003, 56. 
100 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
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that is, it becomes practical and ‘incarnate’ (to borrow a phrase from theology) as it 
enters the world of facts and becomes itself fact. Reason becomes fact and in this way 
we can attain a grasp on reason as one would on another fact. It has become available 
to humanity and indeed Shell calls it ‘the only fact of this nature.’101  
Quoting Kant102 she writes, ‘Consciousness [of the moral law] may be called a 
fact of reason, since one cannot ferret it out [herausvernünfteln] from any antecedent 
data of reason, … and since it forces itself upon us as a synthetic a priori proposition. … 
In order to regard this law without any misinterpretation [Mißdeutung] as given, one 
must well note: that it is not empirical but the sole fact of reason by virtue of which 
“[reason] announces itself as originating law [ursprünglich gesetzgebend] (sic volo, sic 
jubeo).”’103 
The fact that the moral law is ‘given’ (and we have to note that whatever is given 
can only be given within the phenomenal realm, i.e., if its reception is to be a possibility) 
and yet as such also necessary and not contingent, as one would expect with all 
                                                                
101 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. See also Kant’s Introduction (Second 
Edition) to his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 1996, sections V 
and VI. (CPR A 10/B 14 – A 11/B 24). See also Beck 1960, 11: ‘Fragment 6 of the Lose 
Blätter, which I think must have been written between 1781 and 1784, shows the 
transition to the new position in asking of practical judgments the question that the 
Critique of Pure Reason raised with respect to theoretical judgments: How are synthetic 
judgments a priori possible? For he realized at this time that morality requires synthetic 
a priori judgments, that these judgments cannot be justified in exactly the same way 
that their theoretical counterparts had been justified,…’For a more detailed discussion 
see Beck’s informative essay The Writing of the “Critique of Pure Reason” in Beck 1960, 
3-18. 
102 See CPrR 31. 
103 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. The Latin phrase ‘sic volo, sic jubeo’ can be 
translated as ‘So I will, so I command’ and Shell refers the reader also to this quote from 
Juvenal which reads: ‘This is my will, this is my command; my will is reason enough’. See 
Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 75 n 8. Shell quoted CPrR 31. 
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‘empirically “given” facts,’ must therefore stem from the very nature of reason, since 
only reason gives birth to necessity. ‘All necessary propositions […] are true by virtue of 
their a priority or origin in reason, as distinguished from empirical perception.’104 This 
leads Shell then to conclude: ‘Interpreted aright, the moral law not only “forces itself” 
upon us but also “announces” its own autonomous foundation.’105 
At this point in the argument we seem to have come full circle; we have 
established that autonomy of the will, which (quoting Critique of Practical Reason106) 
Shell calls the ‘sole principle of all moral laws,’ belongs part and parcel to the concept of 
‘personhood.’ As such it belongs then to all persons, i.e., to all beings whose actions can 
have a dimension of imputability. This brings Shell to the following conclusion: ‘Dignity, 
in short, applies to any finite being who has, or can be presumed to have, a conscience. 
It is thus something that all human beings possess because we are all co-legislators of 
the moral law.’107 
This way Shell ensures that virtue  (with its inevitable grades of comparisons, 
insofar as some are more virtuous than others) is being excluded from the essence of 
‘dignity,’ insofar as everyone shares the ‘same dignity,’ or, if one were to quantify it – to 
press the point – ‘the same amount of dignity and moreover an amount that cannot be 
enlarged or decreased.108 In fact she puts in parentheses the following statement: 
‘Degree does not enter in here, since to be accountable in any way is to be free in the 
                                                                
104 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56, 76 n 9. 
105 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
106 CPrR 32, 33. 
107 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
108  Hence the phrase ‘the dignity of humanity,’ to which she refers later on in the 
paragraph; see Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
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morally decisive sense and hence infinitely raised about anything [else] in nature.’109 
Comparison, as the category that allows for measuring ‘distinction’ (as in difference) or 
‘degree’ is out of the question because it has been removed from the equation. In this 
sense dignity then belongs to humanity and in fact dignity is the humanity of humanity. 
Although Shell does not formulate it in this way, it is implied in the counter example she 
gives when making the point that Kant did not mean to include the category of virtue 
and vice (and by implication degree) under dignity. She says: ‘It is true that Kant speaks 
of certain vices (e.g. lying) as a kind of forfeiture, or “throwing away,” of one’s 
humanity. At the same time, for Kant, there is no action we can take that altogether 
destroys the possibility of moral development, now or in the future, and hence no 
annihilation of our moral personality in any absolute sense.’110 
In all of this, freedom and autonomy stand central. If this is the case, however, it 
means that dignity lies in the possibility of moral improvement and that this is 
guaranteed because of the instruments that make moral improvement possible, namely 
freedom and the autonomous will as legislating the moral law. 
Shell points out that true autonomy means that the law and its authority are 
absolutely self-grounded. She acknowledges that something within us would like to 
grant this authority to God, as source ‘outside and above us’ but this Kant sees as 
harmful in its inherent propensity to confuse us and ultimately prevent us from 
following (obeying) the moral law for its own sake and not, for instance, to achieve 
salvation or even happiness. Happiness and virtue (although not the same) belong 
                                                                
109 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
110 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 56. 
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together.111 But in our confusion (or corruption), when true virtue requires of us to 
sacrifice our happiness for the sake of duty, we can let go of our firmness of resolve to 
cling to virtue and instead hold onto happiness. The point is that we have to seek not 
current happiness but to become worthy of happiness in striving for virtue. This often 
requires that we sacrifice our happiness for the sake of virtue. True autonomy will also 
help us to keep the hope of happiness alive in those cases where we have to sacrifice 
our happiness or have lost the immediate hope of happiness.112 Ultimately Kant sees his 
task as moral philosopher to keep the voice of conscience as loud as it is clear and to 
present and preserve it true to its nature, which is pure, that is, as singularly unattached 
to anything extraneous.113 
Shell says in summary: ‘[t]he quality that gives human life its dignity is not the 
privilege of a few, as earlier philosophers (and a younger Kant) believed, but as universal 
as the awareness, however dim, that one is morally obliged and therefore morally 
accountable.’114 The phrase ‘the quality that gives human life its dignity is […] as 
universal as the awareness’ is telling. Certainly it speaks of a certain quality that is given 
to humanity universally; but the crux is that this dignity is as universal as the awareness. 
The scope of the universality lies in awareness and this in effect declares awareness to 
be a central and pivotal protagonist. And awareness is awareness of the moral law and 
                                                                
111 Shell writes: ‘The “supreme good” may be virtue, or holiness of will; the “highest” or 
“perfect good” is virtue, or “worthiness to be happy,” and happiness combined.’ Shell, 
Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 57. 
112 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 57-58. 
113 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 57. 
114 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 57. 
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by implication of moral responsibility. In essence then, I would say Shell sees dignity as 
that quality in humanity that allows for the awareness that bears conscience. 
 
5. Dignity and Value 
 
 
Shell now turns her attention to dignity and value. In order to show how dignity 
is defined in terms of value but against ‘value of a different and lesser kind’ she presents 
us with some lengthy but important quotations from Kant. I shall present these in full as 
well.115 The first quote is from the Metaphysics of Morals: 
‘In the system of nature man … is a being of slight importance and has with all 
other beasts, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value [gemeinen Werth] (pretium 
vulgare). Although man has, in his understanding, something more than they and can 
set himself ends, even this gives him only an extrinsic value for his usefulness (pretium 
usus); that is to say, it gives one man a higher value than another, that is a price as of a 
commodity in exchange with these animals as things; though he still has a lower value 
than the universal medium of exchange, money, the value of which can therefore be 
called preeminent (pretium eminens). But man regarded as a person, that is, as the 
subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted/lifted up [erhaben] above any price; for 
as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be esteemed as a mere means to the ends of 
others or even to his own ends, but rather as an end in himself, that is, as possessing a 
dignity (an absolute inner value), through which all other rational beings in the world 
                                                                
115 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 58-60, esp 58. 
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are required [abnöthigt] to have respect for him, so that he can measure himself with all 
others of this kind and esteem himself on a footing of equality with them.’116 
Based on this passage Shell identifies dignity [Würde] with ‘intrinsic value’ [inner 
Werth] and then juxtaposes the latter with ‘external value,’ which is a judgment made in 
terms of relative worth by placing things in relation to each other. In this latter sense 
‘value’ is the equivalent of ‘price’: quantifiable in terms of units one can give a value to 
and use as currency for exchange. Dignity is something not related to this ‘external 
realm’ or ‘value.’ As she says: ‘To have dignity […] is to have value of a sort that makes 
one priceless, or without equivalent.’117  
Shell then quotes a famous passage from the Groundwork118 where Kant writes: 
‘Whatever has reference to universal human inclinations and needs has a market price; 
whatever, without presupposing a need, accords with a certain taste, i.e., a delight in 
the mere unpurposive play of our forces of soul [Gemüthskräfte], has an affective price 
[Affectionspreis]; but that which alone constitutes the condition under which something 
can be an end in itself does not have a merely relative value [Werth], i.e., a price, but 
rather an inner value, i.e., a dignity [Würde].’119 
Shell comments: ‘Our estimation of virtue, and humanity insofar as it is capable 
of it, “puts it infinitely beyond all price” with which morality “cannot be brought into 
competition” without, as it were, “violating its sanctity.”’120 What we have here is Shell 
                                                                
116 The quote is from MM 6:434-35. See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 58, 76 n 10.  
117 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 59. 
118 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:434-35. 
119 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 60, 76 n 12. (Quoted from G 434-35). 
120 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 59. 
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giving words to both the value aspect (here meaning an estimation) and also to dignity 
(here being descriptive of, if not interchangeable with, virtue and humanity). As if 
wanting to confirm that we have here two realms that cannot be compared, judged, and 
even known in the same way, Shell adds in a footnote that ‘pricelessness’ can also be 
understood with reference to personality, where, as we have already seen, moral 
personality refers to freedom and responsibility.121  
Shell then introduces the concept of morality and relates it to dignity. Morality 
is, as it were, the top of the mountain, and as such it is the gateway or door to dignity as 
the expression122 of the realm123 of absolute value. She says: ‘Morality is the vehicle 
through which we participate in the economy of absolute value -an intelligible world 
whose necessitating bonds affirm our irreplaceability, and thus “reveal” a life, on our 
part, “beyond all sense”- despite the humiliating fact, to which human consciousness 
also testifies, that as beings of need we are fated to arise and perish.’124 This is a pivotal 
and very rich passage. As I have already indicated, one cannot read it without at least 
being aware of its allusion to the ‘intelligible world […] beyond all sense’, which is to say 
the ‘noumenal world.’ The fact that she talks of ‘absolute value’ that cannot be 
                                                                
121 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 76 n 13. 
122 Regarding expression: this is not Shell’s formulation. Another word that we might use 
(if it would not be too bold and open too many questions and avenues, which might be 
best left unopened!) would be to talk of presenting or representing dignity or the 
absolute value.  I hesitate to use it without qualification because it is open to certain 
metaphysical implications that might not be intended by Shell. 
123 As we shall see in the following quotation, Shell actually uses the word economy, 
which is a better choice, since realm denotes something static. Economy, on the other 
hand is a word that invites action and participation, words integral to the living and 
doing/performing nature of morality.  
124 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 59. 
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measured and determined points to the noumenal world, which by definition lies 
beyond normal cognition. This is juxtaposed with ‘a life, on our part,’ i.e., as we 
experience it in the phenomenal realm. The references to ‘humiliating fact’125 and 
‘human consciousness,’ as well as to ‘beings of need’ who rise and die, all point to the 
phenomenal connection. If we ‘arise and perish,’ we would seem to be truly 
insignificant, and our consciousness in its own way testifies to this. However, for Shell it 
does more: it also testifies to something else, which she actually calls a revelation. This 
revelation, as I see it, is two things that build on each other. In the first place it affirms 
our ‘irreplaceability.’ In light of our insignificance as beings of need that arise and die, 
we are nonetheless irreplaceable. This speaks of ‘a life’ that is unique and imbued, as it 
were, with an eternal dimension in terms of its meaning and value: literally it cannot be 
replaced. It is both unique and eternal. Life is here concrete (a life) and not generic. In 
the second place, this life is a life ‘on our part.’ To me this is tied to the revelation, which 
in effect removes it from the realm of facts and phenomena. It is to be found in a 
concrete life and refers to the value and meaning of the life but the value and meaning 
is not discernable from the realm of nature. It is beyond the senses and the knowledge 
that they bring. Hence the word ‘revelation.’ 
Before we move on, we might ask, in what does this revelation lie? Shell talks 
about ‘an intelligible world whose necessitating bonds affirm our irreplaceability.’ This 
world in which we participate is, as she makes clear, the moral world. The ‘necessitating 
                                                                
125 As we saw in the Interlude (above) the early Kant was well aware of the humiliating 
position we humans occupy in the face of a cold and indifferent nature (the realm of 
facts). This passage has thus direct reference to the search for worth and dignity. 
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bonds’ I take to refer to what we see expressed, for instance, in the categorical 
imperative, which binds us with moral demands and duties.126 It is this (morality) that is 
the vehicle through which we participate in our dignity.  
Here I would like to draw attention to two points. One, just before this passage 
Shell spoke of the concept of personhood with its priceless value and responsibility 
integral to it. This responsibility is a responsibility to the moral law. Second, Shell 
mentioned the concept here of consciousness. Even in this passage it is something that 
straddles two worlds, it ‘reveals’ and yet ‘testifies’ to the humiliating fact of our finitude. 
To summarize here, we see that Shell brings together a few notions especially of 
personality, the intersection between phenomenal and noumenal, value, and also 
human consciousness. But in all of this, morality is the main protagonist. It is morality 
with its imperatives that inaugurates absolute worth – that is, dignity.127 We have seen 
                                                                
126 Shell makes this point elsewhere by comparing ‘natural necessity’ as the ‘lawful 
relation of material bodies’ and practical necessity as ‘the lawful relation of rational 
beings’ (G 434). Practical necessity ‘binds individuals together not only externally (as 
with natural necessity) but also inwardly and essentially: “from the idea of the dignity of 
a rational being, who obeys no law other than the one it gives itself,” reason relates the 
maxim of each will, both to itself and to every other will.’ Shell, The Embodiment of 
Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 147. 
127 See for instance Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and 
Community 1996, 147 ff. ‘Dignity (Würde), which Kant identifies with absolute (or 
“inner”) value (Wert), as distinguished from value that is only relative (or, “external”), 
furnishes reason with an immediate “practical motive.” Values are inner causes of 
action.’ Shell argues then that these causes are not ‘merely springs (Triebfeder)’ but 
‘genuine motives (Bewegungsgründe).’ According to the Groundwork (G 436) all values 
are ‘determined “by the law”,’ but, asks Shell, to which law are we to yield? There are 
two possibilities: Nature is possible through laws ‘concerned with causes whose action is 
necessitated from without’; while ‘[t]he kingdom of ends is possible only through … self-
imposed rules’ (G 438). If man were to be unworthy to be a member of the kingdom of 
ends he would be considered subject ‘merely to the law of nature—the law of his own 
needs’ (G 439). It is this need that makes us replaceable, and indeed, in terms of nature 
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how all of these dimensions are actively involved in the dynamic of dignity. This dynamic 
is as much the dynamic of autonomy in determining (legislating) the moral law, as it is in 
the dynamic of personhood in taking the responsibility for (obeying) the law as it is in 
what Shell now brings to the fore: human consciousness. 
Shell quotes this (arguably confessional) remark of Kant’s from the conclusion of 
his Critique of Practical Reason and I quote the entire paragraph in Shell’s translation. 
Two things fill the mind [Gemüth] with ever new and increasing admiration 
[Bewunderung] and awe [Ehrfurcht] the oftener and more steadily we occupy 
ourselves with reflecting on them: the starry heaven above me and the moral 
law within me. Both I do not merely conjecture as obscured in darkness or in the 
transcendent [Überschwenglichen] exceeding my circle of vision; I see them 
before me and they connect immediately with consciousness of my existence. 
The former begins at the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and it 
extends the connection in which I stand into an unbounded [unabsehlich] 
magnitude of world beyond worlds … into the limitless times of their periodic 
motion, their beginning and their continuance. The latter begins at my invisible 
self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world that has true infinity, but which is 
traceable only by the understanding – and a world with which I recognize myself 
in a connection that is not merely contingent but universal and necessary. The 
former view of countless multitudes of worlds annihilates, so to speak, my 
importance, as an animal creature that must give back to the planet (a mere 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘exchangeable for an equivalent.’ So, our choice is between the ‘external law of nature, 
which can only establish values that are relative;’ or, ‘the moral law, which establishes a 
value that is absolute.’ And the crux for Shell is this: ‘Since “all values are determined by 
the law,” law-giving itself must have an “unconditioned, incomparable worth,” and 
autonomy is thus the ground of worth (Grund der Würde) for every rational being [G 
436]. In choosing between heteronomy and autonomy, we insert ourselves in one or 
another of two radically different sorts of communal economy. […] Dignity is the 
practical analogue of absolute essence, a self-subsistent (selbständig) value that, unlike 
substance(s) of Kant’s early speculative efforts, requires no extrinsic ontological 
grounding. It is therefore not God as Creator whom Kant here invokes but God as 
Judge.’ This means that the possibility of the intellligible world is built on moral and not 
ontological grounds. This means its reality depends not on God, but on ‘the collective 
will of all finite rational beings, who constitute the world’s (potential) members.’ The 
kingdom of ends ‘would actually “come into existence” if the categorical imperative 
“were universally followed.”’ (G 84). Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, 
Generation, and Community 1996, 147-149. 
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speck in the universe [Weltall]) the matter from which it came, the matter that is 
for a little time provided (we know not how) with vital force. The latter, on the 
contrary, lifts up [erhebt] my value [Werth] as an intelligence by my personality, 
in which the moral law reveals [offenbart] a life independent of animality, and 
even of the entire sensible world – at least insofar as it allows itself to be 
assumed from the purposive determination of my existence [Dasein] through 
this law, which is not bounded by the conditions and limits of this life, but goes 
[on] into the infinite.128 
 
This passage alone is so rich and profound it would warrant a thorough exegesis, 
but it is not the purpose of this chapter to do that, and neither does Shell do it here. 
However, the themes which we have discussed above are all present here and one may 
safely say that it is not for nothing that Shell quoted this long passage as it presents in 
Kant’s own words in a quasi-biographical (or at least confessional) tone his own 
experience expressed within the framework of his philosophical thinking. Shell’s 
translation reveals how she understands Kant and has appropriated him. Of special note 
is the importance throughout given to the concept of consciousness. 
Shell goes on to make the following statement about Kant and dignity: ‘Dignity, 
for Kant’ she says ‘is, then, connected with a kind of immortality beyond temporal 
calculation in an everyday sense. Human consciousness testifies both to our location in a 
world informed by space and time […] and to a status that transcends it.’129  
Dignity is related to a world beyond, to a transcendent (or the transcendent) 
beyond the realm of nature, science and senses, that somehow implies or involves ‘a 
                                                                
128 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 59-60. See also Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 
1996, 5:161 ff. 
129 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 60. 
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kind of immortality.’130 This seems to be something that happens within us or to us (an 
‘event,’ by which I want to say it is not something theoretical or imaginative). It, 
furthermore, involves our consciousness in that through consciousness we become 
aware of our place in this finite world and of our ‘status’ that transcends it.131 This 
transcendence happens when we overcome the natural world, (as we saw even in the 
early Kant). It is a moral transcendence. 
Shell admits the pivotal role played by consciousness. She discusses a two-fold 
dimension in consciousness. One is being spectator (of the starry sky) and the other of 
being participant (in the moral law within as legislator). Both of these have 
corresponding worlds -the world of nature ‘informed by space and time,’ of ‘temporal 
calculation’ and of  ‘everyday sense’ and the world beyond, the world that ‘transcends’ 
this everyday sensual world and that is ‘connected with a kind of immortality’ but 
always beyond the world we have (sensual) access to. In the former we have virtually 
‘zero value,’ in the latter ‘priceless value.’ The former world is accessible to us through 
the senses and we can have knowledge of it, but the latter is hidden and in the realm of 
‘practical necessity’ or regulative ideas, but the proviso is that none of this can be 
determined with scientific precision or even fall under theoretical knowledge. It is 
                                                                
130 With this notion of immortality we find evidence of two worlds (noumenal and 
phenomenal) drawing upon each other. On the notion of immortality and Kant’s early 
interest in it, as well as its relation to a community (albeit of the spirit-world) see Shell, 
The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 75, 111, 
117, 126. 
131 What this status is is not spelled out in greater detail, but it would involve the 
participation of this transcendental world where we are legislators. Shell does not use 
this concept but it seems to me not foreign, insofar as transcendence lies in 
transcendence of our nature through the moral law. 
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human consciousness that ‘testifies’ to our ‘location’ within this former world and at the 
same time to ‘a status’ that transcends this world. Consciousness makes us aware of 
these two worlds, but in a deeper sense consciousness itself is also always and at the 
same time in virtue of its nature an actor (as participant) and a spectator. One can 
similarly identify a passive and active dimension to consciousness. It is these together 
that give us awareness and self-awareness. It is within this dynamic that we experience 
‘this subjective feeling of “being lifted up”,’ and it is herein that Shell sees human 
dignity. It is interesting to note that ‘being lifted up’ is actually a passive event in the 
case of the one being lifted up. It reminds one of being graced with a gift (in the sense of 
being gifted). But for her there is also an ambiguity here: can we rely only on this 
feeling? On what ground does this assumption of our invaluable value rest? Is the moral 
law enough? Do we not also need other ‘worldly knowledge’ (which, according to her, 
Kant’s language suggests), which at least will also testify to our worth in this world?  
We see here the problematic of the two worlds that Kant postulates and also 
their interaction or intersection with one another (made all the more problematic since 
we are theoretically cut off from the ‘other world’) and this is the problem Shell brings 
to light. We have the ‘reality’ as given to us in the Critical philosophy and also the reality 
that consciousness seems to imply, beckoning us to something more and beyond. 
Although she does not put it this way I would venture to ask whether one could not say 
that here is the spirit of self-transcendence at play and the where-from is clear but the 
where-to remains unclear. We see the dynamic clearly enough but not where it is 
pointing to. Shell suggests that we look to history to gain a subjective appreciation of 
 126 
our worth in this world.132 It is important to note too that Shell remains focussed on this 
world and to this effect she intends to search for a subjective (because it cannot be 
other than subjective) appreciation, which is other than and different from subjective 
feeling. Appreciation involves our rational faculties as well. 
 
6. Reason and End-Setting 
 
 
There seems to be access to the intelligible world in which we participate 
(besides our participation itself). It is through the moral law that we can ‘trace the form’ 
but not the content of an intelligible world. This is familiar as Kant also draws this 
distinction in his moral philosophy between form and content of the moral law. ‘Our 
task, according to Kant,’ says Shell, is ‘to actualize the intelligible world in the here and 
now (to the extent that it is possible), and thereby bring the “two standpoints” of 
human consciousness—incommensurable and yet somehow united—into ever greater 
harmony or attunement.’133 This concretely means that freedom and law be brought 
into outward harmony (‘since inner harmony eludes our intuitive grasp’) and thus the 
lawful ways in which we might affect others is conditioned through the structure or 
dynamic of ‘consent.’134 Shell does not specify the meaning of ‘consent’ and whether it 
                                                                
132 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 60. 
133 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
134 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
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refers to an individual act or whether consent is more of a communal event.135 On a 
personal level it could refer to obedience (to consent to oneself, i.e., one’s reason)136 
and is in that sense related to Kant’s concept of duty. 
Shell introduces next Kant’s famous ‘Formula of Humanity’.137 This formula 
dictates that one should ‘treat humanity, whether in one’s own person, or the person of 
another, not only as a means but also as an end [or, “end in itself”].’138 In providing a 
definition of ‘humanity’ she turns to Kant’s Lectures on Ethics (as transcribed by 
Vigilantius) where Kant said: ‘To make a rule for oneself presupposes that we set our 
intelligible self, i.e., humanity in our own person, over against our sensible being, i.e., 
man in our own person, and thus contrast man as the agent with the law-giving party. … 
Humanity is the aforementioned noumenon, and thus thought of as pure intelligence in 
regard to the capacity for freedom and accountability implanted in man. Man, on the 
other hand, is humanity in appearance, and thus subordinated to humanity as genus.’139  
                                                                
135 She talks later of ‘the collective nature of the end of moral legislation’ and even a 
view of mankind as collective, which makes one assume that consent has a communal 
dimension. See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63, 73. 
136 In this way outward harmony is achieved in that we are both the lawgiver and 
subject (i.e., consenting) to the law. It would also include honesty toward oneself. This is 
one of the primary duties one has toward oneself. See for instance Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:429. 
137 Or: Formula for the Respect of the Dignity of Persons, as Sullivan names it. 
138 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. This is a quote from Kant, Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 4:429 – see Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 76 n 17. 
Shell actually speaks of the ‘formula of humans’ see Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 
62. 
139 The emphasis is added by Shell who adds, ‘man, for Kant, is, in this particular sense, a 
species being.’ See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 76 n 16. Quoted from Kant, Kant 
on the Metaphysics of Morals: Vigilantius's Lecture Notes 1997, 27:579. 
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Thus within the dynamic process of self-legislation we make a distinction within 
ourselves, setting, as it were, one part against the other. And here Kant talks of our 
‘intelligible self’ (which he defines as humanity in our own person) as opposed to our 
‘sensible being’ (which Kant calls man in our own person).140 Both of these distinctions 
can be traced to a difference within the concept of the ‘person’. It might be that we 
have here an example of the two different concepts of person Kant describes in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, i.e., moral and psychological personality.141 He also makes a 
similar distinction when considering one’s duties toward oneself. These correspond to 
duties that relate to our animality (the natural man) and those pertaining to us only as 
moral beings.142 Humanity is then related to morality (the law-giving dimension within), 
which is at odds with our lower nature. Lastly the fact that humanity is relegated to the 
realm of the noumenal and ‘man’ only ‘humanity in appearance’ (in the phenomenal 
realm), with the explicit implication that ‘man’ is thus ‘subordinated to humanity as 
genus,’ means that our essential selves remain hidden from us. This affirms what Shell 
                                                                
140 And one ought to recall that person is that dimension where something can be 
imputed to a man, presupposing that he is both free and responsible. (See above). 
141 Kant writes: ‘A person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him. Moral 
personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral 
laws (whereas psychological personality is merely the ability to be conscious of one’s 
identity in different conditions of one’s existence). From this it follows that a person is 
subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along 
with others).’ Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:223.  
142 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:420. Kant here makes an important 
statement regarding dignity, personality and humanity. ‘But,’ he says, ‘a human being’s 
duty to himself as a moral being only (without taking his animality into consideration) 
consists in what is formal in the consistency of the maxims of his will with the dignity of 
humanity in his person.’  
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referred to above when she said ‘inner harmony eludes our grasp.’143 We have, 
however, an approach to it through reason. 
With regard to the formula of humanity, we have determined that the meaning 
of humanity is tied to the concept of person, which relates to a something (literally, a 
capacity) ‘inhering in’ (literally, implanted). We need to look at the setting of ends or 
goals or (final) purposes. Shell elucidates two possibilities here: a human being could be 
an end or can ‘lawfully set or have an end.’144 To have an end is to involve both 
consciousness and reason and it is something we set for ourselves on the basis of 
reason. In this regard the formula of humanity is really a formula celebrating the 
rationality of human beings. In fact Shell states that this formula ‘requires, above all, 
that we respect man’s status as a rational being (the only one we know of)…’145 Respect 
and reason combine to enjoins us to treat others according to their status as rational 
beings. What does it mean to be a rational being? 
To better understand this, Shell takes the reader through a short presentation of 
Kant’s concept of reason.146 Contrary to his (arguably wrong) reading of Plato, Kant’s 
critique of reason deflects reason away from the theoretical field where it might act as a 
faculty, instrument or vehicle of (theoretical) knowledge to the practical field where it 
enforces upon us with necessity its ideas in such a way that they regulate our behavior 
in the ethical realm and determine our ideals in terms of the purposes we strive for – 
even when we search for theoretical knowledge. ‘Reason is less a faculty of knowledge 
                                                                
143 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
144 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
145 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
146 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61 ff. 
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than a capacity to project or originate “ideas” that possess regulative or practical 
necessity—less about what is than about what should be’147 Reason’s ideas are not to 
be taken as ‘objects of an immediate theoretical intuition of reality’ (as Kant mistakenly 
thought Plato held). According to Shell they are to be conceived of as points of focus 
(i.e., focus imaginarius) of reason’s ‘self-imposed, rule-governed demands.’ ‘Reason, in 
short,’ she writes ‘is essentially a capacity for self-necessitation, or the setting for 
oneself of binding tasks.’148 In its theoretical application, where it searches for 
knowledge of the natural (phenomenal) world, i.e., the world as it appears to us, 
reason’s demand ‘takes the form of a striving toward totality’ that is a ‘self-consistent, 
all-embracing unity.’ This reflects a deep desire and goal of perfect knowledge of the 
whole of nature and it guides and directs reason’s activities to such a degree that Kant 
talks of these as regulative ideas. The unity of knowledge and the world is one such 
‘idea.’ We do not have any direct intuition or evidence for such unity or whole. But we 
strive toward this goal as if ‘to approach what thereby serves us as a “regulative” 
goal.’149 We see here a practical dimension to reason in that it acts as regulator and task 
master and as such directs our activities, whether on the theoretical or practical (moral) 
front. Reason comes with demands and these relate to necessity, self-consistency, and 
the absence of self-contradiction; and all of these are self-imposed. That is, reason 
imposes them on itself. Reason legislates and then, under its own guidance, obeys. The 
                                                                
147 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
148 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61.  
149 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 61. 
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case in point is the striving and need to see everything in totality, i.e., the 
presupposition of the unity of the world.  
The point of reason is, however, not to remain theoretical but to become 
practical. Reason is eminently and ultimately practical.150 In its theoretical reach it is 
severely limited (in so far as what it can know), but in its practical reach it legislates truly 
universally and attains objectivity. This is due to reason’s nature as purposive, or ‘end-
setting’ and in this it legislates, even in its theoretical dimension, its ‘ideas’ which as the 
conditions of the possibility of our knowledge determine the form or face of our 
knowledge. In its practical application, as will, reason finds its true and highest task. ‘In 
making this transition from theory to practice reason embraces its proper vocation.’151 It 
is thus reason as practical and not theoretical that ultimately establishes objectivity. And 
more importantly, since the nature of practical reason is moral, so the objective reality 
is imbued through and through with moral significance. In short, Kant’s revolution 
                                                                
150 As Shell writes after enquiring about the relation between practical reason and its 
object: ‘The object of practical reason is the reality of an idea whose actualization is a 
thing in the world which reason sets before itself as a goal. The relation between reason 
and its object is dynamic, reason moving towards an actualization which, securing the 
object as a thing of nature, obliterates it as an object of desire.’ Shell, The Rights of 
Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 71. 
151 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 70-74, esp 
72. Shell presents here a thorough explanation as to the need for and way in which 
theoretical reason becomes practical. All rational activity is ultimately practical. This 
practicality is in virtue of its goal-setting capacity or its purposiveness. She writes: ‘To 
set oneself a task or purpose is to take an interest. The purposiveness of reason is itself 
a kind of self-necessitation. In theory as in practice reason accomplishes its tasks 
through rules or imperatives which reason itself generates. Imperatives are statements 
“that express a possible free action by which a certain end is to be made actual.”’ Ibid., 
73. 
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ultimately implies that we live in a moral universe. In this conscience plays a central 
role. 
In the end Shell brings this dynamic of the formula of humanity into relation with 
the dynamic of conscience. Both rely on reason –the latter as sufficiently able to ‘serve 
as its own self-judging and self-correcting tribunal.’152  
Shell ends this section by stating that the decisive winner in this entire process is 
reason, and more pointedly, reason in its autonomy. ‘Both directly and indirectly, then, 
the critique of pure reason affirms the autonomy of reason (and with the formula of 
humans as ends-in-themselves) to which conscience bears witness by a different 
route.’153 Whether reason follows the path of the formula of humanity or of conscience, 
                                                                
152 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 62. For Kant’s description of conscience as being 
‘consciousness of an internal court in the human being (“before which his thoughts 
accuse or excuse one another”)’ see Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:438. Kant 
talks of everyone as having a conscience which is not made (created) but ‘something 
incorporated in his being’ and that is also ‘the thought of duty’ and that ‘follows him like 
his shadow.’ This process is analogous to the person who is in court being faced by a 
prosecutor and judge, leading inevitably to one who thinks of a dual personality in 
himself. Kant describes this as a battle between the higher and lower faculties. He says: 
‘When the proceedings are concluded the internal judge, as a person having power, 
pronounces the sentence of happiness or misery, as the moral results of the deed. Our 
reason cannot pursue further his power (as ruler of the world) in this function; we can 
only revere his unconditional iubeo [I command] or veto [I forbid].’ In terms of the 
former Kant says the accuser and judge cannot be the same person and that in the 
process we ‘have to think of someone other than [our]selves’ and later that this ‘other 
may be an actual person or a merely ideal person that reason creates for itself. Such an 
ideal person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be a scrutinizer of hearts, since 
the court is set up within the human being.’ Kant talks then of this ‘person’ as needing 
to be able to ‘impose all obligation’ with the necessary and implied power. The 
candidate for this being ‘is called God, [and thus] conscience must be thought of as the 
subjective principle of being accountable to God for all one’s deeds.’ See Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:438-439; esp. 438n. 
153 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 62 
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it is the same ‘subject’ or ‘actor’ at play in legislating as well as obeying in its capacity as 
an autonomous being. 
 
7. Implications of Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity for Ethics and Politics 
 
 
This association of dignity with ‘our status as imputable end-setters’ – in other 
words, as rational beings – grounds Kant’s discussion of human rights and virtues. These 
inform the concrete content of the more formal ‘categorical imperative.’154 As we saw 
above the possibility and presence of reason is for Shell part of the dynamic that makes 
dignity possible and that drives the dynamic leading to its actualization. This 
actualization takes place under reason’s practical application, where it is being guided 
by ‘the Idea of the “Highest [moral] Good” or virtue.’155 The “Highest Good” as Shell 
defines it is virtue and happiness combined. And virtue is the worthiness to be happy. 
The idea of the highest good supplies us with ‘broad positive duties’ that lead us to self-
perfection and to the promotion of the happiness of others, while leaving it to ‘God 
(and, in a qualified sense, to history)’ to ensure that virtue and happiness are ultimately 
brought into a just relationship and balance.156 
Because the moral law originates in the will of the individual the collective 
nature of the final purpose of moral legislation is subordinated to the individual nature 
of the will. The individual takes precedence. As she writes: ‘The “narrow” and “perfect” 
                                                                
154 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 62. 
155 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 62. In its theoretical mode reason is guided by 
the idea of the totality of nature.  
156 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 62-63. 
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negative duty to refrain from using humanity in my own person or that of another 
merely as a means trumps the “wide” and “imperfect” positive duty to perfect myself or 
benefit others.’157 In explaining what this means Shell presents an argument that would 
allow us to claim (with reference to what we saw earlier with Sullivan) that Kant does, 
albeit in a roundabout way, allow for the notion of embodied dignity.158 
The argument goes like this. Kant’s prohibition against self-mutilation and 
suicide aims to prevent the divestment of the ‘natural’ and ‘so indirectly the moral use 
of one’s powers.’159 Failure to avoid this destruction would, in Kant’s words, ‘root out 
the existence of morality itself in the world so far as one can.’160 In other words 
destroying the body destroys the possibility for morality, i.e., the moral law, which 
resides within the body. This makes embodiment ‘an indirect’ condition for the 
possibility of dignity, albeit in a roundabout way. Kant distinguishes between perfect 
and imperfect duties. Shell writes, ‘the imperfect duty […] bows before the perfect duty 
not to abuse the organism in which my moral life, in this world at least, necessarily takes 
shape.’161 However, Kant’s position is more nuanced and Shell brings this out when she 
explains the meaning of the injunction never to use one’s humanity in one’s person as a 
mere means. She writes that this ‘implies that I may not use my own reason, or 
lawmaking and end-setting power, to serve natural inclinations that ought, properly, to 
                                                                
157 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
158 Shell speaks elsewhere also of Kant’s notion of ‘humanity’ as being ‘embodied 
rationality’. See Shell, Kant's Concept of Human Dignity as a Resource for Bioethics 2008, 
334. See also Sullivan 1989, 200 ff. 
159 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
160 MM 422-23; 219 as quoted and referred to by Shell. See Shell, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2003, 63, 76 n 18. 
161 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
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be reason’s tool’ [emphasis added].162 She continues: ‘To respect humanity in my own 
person is to acknowledge a certain naturally purposive (but nonhierarchical) order of 
the body, which supports rational activity without defining it’ [emphasis added].163  The 
body has its place and is part of our ‘organic constitution,’ as she puts it, and in this 
there are certain ‘natural limits’ in harmony with which ‘our body may properly be put.’ 
Even so, the priority of freedom over nature importantly does not mean ‘using one’s 
body in ways that conflict with its own, self-organizing tendencies’.164 Picking up on a 
central theme of her interpretation she writes that the recognition of these limits is not 
dependent on or determined by theoretical reason but ‘on an immediate awareness of 
ourselves as living beings in the world, however much that status may defy final 
empirical explanation’ [emphasis added].165 This brings her to the conclusion that there 
is ‘a robust connection between human dignity, as Kant conceives it, and the link 
between the “two standpoints of embodied rationality” [Shell’s emphasis] (from which 
we respectively reflect upon the starry heavens above and the moral law within) –a link 
that somehow unifies these vantage points without collapsing them.’166 
Shell turns next to a section of the Metaphysics of Morals where Kant discusses 
duties we need to observe toward ourselves in our capacity as moral beings and not in 
our animality. These duties Kant sees as the formal expression of the harmony between 
the maxims of the will on the one hand and the dignity of our humanity in our person on 
                                                                
162 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
163 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
164 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
165 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 63. 
166 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 64. 
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the other hand. These consist negatively in the prohibition against lying, avarice and 
false humility, all vices that are ‘directly contrary to “inner freedom” and hence the 
“innate dignity of man.”’167 All three of these vices according to Shell sin because in the 
case of lying we treat ourselves as ‘even less than a thing’ depriving others of our 
potential service, and in the latter two because they fail to ‘treat one’s person as a 
purposive whole (at least potentially), informed by rational ends.’168  
Quoting from the Metaphysics of Morals,169 Shell draws a distinction between 
human nature with man as homo phenomenon and animal rationale, and man 
considered as person homo noumenon. The former has a considered, that is measurable 
and external, value while the latter ‘is lifted up [erhaben] above all price; for as a person 
(homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or 
even to his own ends, but as an end in himself; that is he possesses a dignity (absolute 
inner value) by which he necessitates respect.’170  
In attempting to define the meaning of ‘humanity in one’s person,’ Shell quotes 
Kant in saying that this humanity is ‘the object of a respect that one can demand from 
every other man, but which one also must not forfeit.’171 In the previous section we saw 
how it is practical reason that actualizes ideas, that brings them into objectivity. So our 
practical reason’s object in this instance is an object demanding respect and which goes 
by the name of ‘humanity.’ In her quote Shell then describes the process of living the 
                                                                
167 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 64. See MM 420. 
168 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 64. 
169 See MM 434 ff. 
170 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 65; quoted from MM 435. 
171 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 65; as quoted from MM 435. 
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moral law in accordance with the consciousness of our dignity. ‘Since one must regard 
oneself not only as a person in general but also as a human being, i.e., as a person who 
has duties laid upon him by his own reason, one’s insignificance as a human animal 
[Thiermensch] must not do damage [Abbruch] to one’s consciousness of one’s dignity as 
a rational man [Vernunftmensch] … [hence] one should pursue one’s end, which is in 
itself a duty, not abjectly, not in a spirit of servility (animo servili) … but always with 
consciousness of the sublimity [Erhabenheit] of one’s moral predisposition (which is 
already contained in the concept of virtue).’172  
Shell relates humility with this exultation/elevation/sublimity – i.e., Erhebung. 
Proper humility comes from comparing ourselves with the moral law ‘in all its strictness, 
and thus entails exaltation (Erhebung) and the “highest self-esteem” for oneself in one’s 
capacity as moral lawgiver.’173 In this process I come to ‘discover’ and appreciate the 
object (of my humanity) within myself. The dynamic comes about when, as she says, I 
compare myself to the moral law. Comparison arises as a result of the awareness of a 
sense of difference. In this case it is an awareness of a difference within me, and the 
difference being the presence of the moral law vis-à-vis myself (i.e., the moral law to 
which I compare myself). This induces ‘proper humility,’ inclusive of one’s elevation ‘and 
this “highest self-esteem” for oneself [emphasis added],’ especially when I realize that I 
am the moral lawgiver. This respect entails that I never treat myself as a means toward 
an end, nor allow others to treat me as such. Shell shows that this has political 
                                                                
172  See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 65, 76 n 21; as quoted from Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:435. 
173 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 65. 
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implications and is directed against ‘paternalistic monarchs’ who treat their subjects 
‘like sheep rather than human beings.’174 
According to Shell, Kant’s system of ethics, ‘whose positive duties are 
benevolence and self-perfection […] presupposes a system of rights.’ This system 
‘imposes absolute negative conditions on the actions I am morally allowed to 
undertake.’ These rights are absolute even if my ends are morally ‘proscribed, 
permitted, or forbidden.’175 Kant’s liberal regime justifies itself in terms of ‘civic honor,’ 
with ‘Ulpian’s “honeste vive”—live honourably—[as] the first rule.’176 She continues by 
showing how rights have both a ‘private’ and ‘public’ dimension. In the private sense 
they describe a system of property law that maximizes (in accord with his famous 
formula) ‘the freedom of each consistent with the freedom of all the rest.’ She points 
out that ‘freedom’ here means ‘access, unobstructed by the will of others, to the use of 
objects as means.’177 Concretely this means that I will not use others or their belongings 
as means ‘except in ways that they consent to.’ Shell points to a similarity between 
Kant’s formula for civic justice and the working of an ideal marketplace where all 
outcomes are the result of ‘voluntary exchanges of property.’178 There is also a property 
in one’s own body and this relates among other things to one’s sexual rights. Shell also 
mentions the status of a citizen (‘itself a “dignity”’) and one’s right to be formally free, 
equal, and economically (materially) self-sufficient. The need for public right, or 
                                                                
174 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 65-66. 
175 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 66. 
176 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 66. 
177 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 66. 
178 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 66. 
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government arises because people are ‘ill-equipped’ to defend their rights and in the 
case of defending themselves might not be able to do so appropriately, that is without 
using violence or treating their adversaries as means and not as ends. In this sense she 
makes quite clear that for Kant republicanism is the only just form of government.179 
She ends with this warning to rulers: ‘That a ruler should […] declare his subjects 
altogether lacking in rights, so that his relation to them is one of pure benevolence (as 
with a shepherd and his sheep) is, according to Kant, both morally and prudentially 
impossible—morally so, because it reverses the relation between right and ethics on 
which genuine morality depends, and prudentially so, because a people confronted with 
paternalism in so explicit and unambiguous a form would certainly (or so Kant claims) 
revolt.’180 
 
8. History and the Collective Worth of Human Existence 
 
 
Kant’s refusal to ground dignity in religion (or more precisely, in God, as 
traditional religion does), raises the question of the importance of human progress. 
Shell quotes Kant, who says, ‘[we] can scarcely help feeling a certain distaste on 
observing [men’s] activities as enacted in the great world-drama, for we find […] 
everything as a whole is made up of folly and childish vanity, and often of childish malice 
and destructiveness. The result is that we do not know what sort of concept we should 
                                                                
179 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 66. 
180 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 67. 
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have of our species, which is so proud of its superiority.’181 She comments ‘[t]he “only 
way out for the philosopher,” is to discover a “purpose in nature” behind the seemingly 
senseless course of human events.’182 The point for Shell here is that it is only with 
additional – by which she means historical – ‘assurance,’ that we can say man’s 
collective existence on earth is purposive. This is important because despair can easily 
overtake us and bring dignity to ruin. This section thus tries to show how there are 
resources for hope in history that will protect and give impetus to lived dignity. 
Harking back to the confessional note at the end of the Critique of Practical 
Reason where the dynamic between consciousness as worldly spectator and as (moral) 
subject and agent is at play and gives birth to a tension-producing dynamic Shell points 
out that for Kant this tension is irresolvable ‘in this life’ and moreover points to our 
‘fractured nature and condition as a species.’183 
Nature is scientifically knowable but devoid of purpose, and this prompts Shell to 
ask, where do we find a purpose? Turning to the Critique of Judgment she finds an 
answer in Kant’s concept of ‘culture’ that is ‘man’s aptitude [Tauglichkeit] in general for 
setting himself purposes, and for using nature … as a means, in conformity with the 
maxims of his free purposes generally.’184 According to Shell this definition enables one 
                                                                
181 The quote is from Kant’s Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Standpoint. See Kant, Kant: Political Writings 1991, 8:18; as quoted by Shell, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2003, 68, 78 n 30. 
182 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 68. 
183 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 68. 
184  See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 69. She quotes from Kant, Critique of 
Judgment 1978, 5:431 and points to the fact that Kant himself acknowledged the affinity 
between Tauglichkeit (aptitude) and Tügend (virtue). See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 
2003, 78 n 32. 
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to see the whole of nature as purposive on condition that ‘culture’ is subordinated to 
‘man as moral subject,’ which according to Kant, is ‘the final purpose of creation 
itself.’185  
The realization of culture and its relation to nature is dependent on the 
emergence of republicanism as the system of government that best supports the play 
and development between the mutual conflicting freedoms within civil society. In the 
dynamic where these freedoms conflict, we exhibit our brokenness, or impairment 
[Abbruche], and this requires the countering balance provided by lawful authority.186 
Our ‘“asocial sociability”—[the] crooked tendency, coeval with reason itself, to 
subjugate [ourselves] and others—culminates, on such a view, in free self-government, 
allowing for the full development of all [our] faculties.’187 In this process of the ‘passage 
to republicanism’ the role of the saint/philosopher/king is essential. The role of 
consciousness returns here again, because it is only this ‘figure’ that is able to ‘arouse 
men’s awareness of their honourable, and, indeed sublime, vocation as self-legislating 
citizens.’188 This task encapsulates for Kant the philosophical vocation. In the face of 
events connected to the French revolution that saw rulers nullifying the rights of their 
subjects and causing ‘catastrophic wars,’ thus ‘forestalling the self-emancipation of 
                                                                
185 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 68. 
186  As she writes: ‘The formal condition under which nature can alone achieve [its] final 
aim is that constitution of human relations where the impairment [Abbruche] which 
results from mutual conflicting freedom is countered by lawful authority in a whole, 
called civil society.’ See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 69, 78 n 34; in quoting Kant, 
Critique of Judgment 1978, 432 ff; see also 434-36; 320; 322-23. 
187 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 69. 
188 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 69, who adds ‘a task that epitomizes the 
calling of philosophy as Kant himself conceives it.’ 
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humankind by submerging the principle of autonomy, and with it human dignity, in 
paternalistic oblivion,’189 Kant had to renew his efforts to show that mankind is making 
progress.190 Kant finds especially in the ‘sympathy’ evoked in ‘wishful spectators’ of the 
French Revolution, a response that he calls a ‘sign […] that mankind is in constant 
progress toward the better.’191 
For Shell this response relates to those ‘distinct moments of sublimity’ that the 
earlier quoted note from the Critique of Practical Reason ‘consecutively evoked’ except 
that in the case of the Revolution these ‘response signals’ are ‘representative of human 
history.’192 
She quotes from the Conflict of the Faculties regarding the constant progression 
of humankind of which the French revolution is one such instance. ‘Here, therefore, is a 
proposition that is not just well-meaning and commendable for a practical intention, 
but, despite all skeptics, maintainable for the most rigorous theory: that the human race 
                                                                
189 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 70. 
190 Shell quotes from the Conflict of the Faculties where Kant pits the possible self-
undoing of mankind against his natural insignificance thus revealing the sublimity and 
responsibility that goes with the moral order. ‘Before the omnipotence [Allgewalt] of 
nature, or even more, before its to us inaccessible highest cause, man is, in his turn, but 
a trifle [Kleinigkeit]. But for the sovereigns [Herrscher] of his own species to take and 
treat him as such, in part by burdening him bestially, as mere tool of their intentions 
[Absichten], in part by exposing him in their conflicts with one another, in order to let 
him be slaughtered—that is no trifle, but an overturning [Umkehrung] of the ultimate 
purpose [Endzweck] of creation itself.’ See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 69-70, 79 
n 38; as quoted from Conflict of the Faculties, 7:89. 
191 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 70, and 78 n 39, where she makes the point 
that sympathy is most properly related to the Stoic ideal of sympatheia, ‘that intimate 
connection between God and humans by virtue of which all the wise and virtuous are 
friends’ rather than to the sympathetic feelings of ‘pathological good-heartedness.’ See 
also Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:456-457, from which she quotes above. 
192 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 70. It seems we have here the 
‘transcendence’ moving into history or historisizing itself, that is it becomes incarnate. 
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has always been in constant progress toward the better and will continue to be 
henceforth; which, if one has regard not only for what happens to one people, but also 
to the extension [Verbreitung] [of that progress] over all peoples of the earth, who 
gradually come to participate in it, opens/inaugurates a prospect of incalculable time 
[die Aussicht in eine unabsehliche Zeit eröffnet].’ [The emphasis is Shell’s.]193 
The ‘glimpse of the eternal’ that this passage opens up is at our disposal in virtue 
of our ‘higher, moral nature.’ It is here where the ‘eternal’ breaks through; or to put it 
another way: within the realm of nature on the plain of history we find a moment of 
revelation of a glimpse of eternity (that is, literally, incalculable time).194 Even though 
the possibility of the darkening of humankind remains with rulers arising to push aside 
progress, Kant is certain that this will never be the permanent or final possibility. ‘So 
construed,’ says Shell, ‘Kant’s concern with history is no mere afterthought, but the 
outcome of a conception of human dignity that relies, for its potency, not only on the 
moral law, but also on some assurance against despair, also morally derived, as to the 
pointlessness of our collective existence – a pointlessness that may finally put human 
dignity itself in question.’195  
 
 
 
                                                                
193 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 70. 
194 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 70-71. 
195 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 71. 
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9. Evaluation and Conclusion 
 
 
In this closing section let us consider how Shell deals with some alternative 
views; and what resources she finds within Kant for answering his detractors. Looking at 
the paradox in saying that freedom is autonomy, with the implication that we are able 
to freely do the wrong, even though it is contrary to the moral law, Shell points to a 
distinction Kant makes between Wille and Willkür. The former is that facet of the soul 
that legislates while the latter expresses the actual freedom of choice. Moral law 
pertains to the former, and in its lived expression we need to bring the latter into line 
with the former. We saw, moreover, that in the phenomenon of our conscience, the 
moral self is of a ‘divided nature,’ being ‘a self both humbled and exalted.’196 The 
possibility of evil that comes with the possibility of freedom is a mystery and cannot be 
comprehended by reason; and Kant is willing to live with this ‘mystery.’ 
A source for the second criticism comes from an essay in the same collection to 
which Shell contributed her essay.197 Shell makes the point that Kant rejected all 
hierarchical forms of dignity. ‘Honor […] for Kant, is always honestas or integrity, never 
                                                                
196 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 71. 
197 Shell (Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 72) explicitly refers the reader to this essay 
by Robert Kraynak (Kraynak, "Made in the Image of God": The Christian View of Human 
Dignity and Political Order 2003, 81-118, esp., 83, 107 ff). Kraynak deliberately singles 
out Kantian dignity as it merges with contemporary Christianity to provide a basis for 
human rights and dignity grounded in freedom. Shell responds to one of his points here 
where he is critical of the modern (and by implication, Kant’s) notion of dignity as an 
absolute right ‘rather as a matter of degree in a hierarchy of perfection.’ Kraynak, 
"Made in the Image of God": The Christian View of Human Dignity and Political Order 
2003, 83. 
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honor, or distinction of a sort that lessens the honor owed to others.’198 To further her 
argument Shell refers to the Groundwork where Kant states that the only (unqualified) 
good is a good will, the point being that this good will is precisely a great equalizer and 
available to all. ‘The only unqualified good is in this sense universally accessible.’199  
Shell continues by showing how this universal ‘accessibility’ of dignity is for Kant 
‘anything but easygoing.’ Even in the early Kant, virtue is a ‘strenuous affair, requiring 
(uncommon) moral strength and fortitude. Most difficult of all, it involves a never-
ending effort to be truthful with oneself.’200 To this she adds elsewhere: ‘Greatness of 
                                                                
198 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 72. 
199 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 72 (and also 78 n 47) where she quotes from 
Leo Strauss: ‘The only thing which can be held to be unqualifiedly good is not the 
contemplation of the eternal, not the cultivation of the mind, to say nothing of good 
breeding, but a good intention, and of good intentions everyone is as capable as 
everyone else, wholly independently of education.’ 
200 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 72. She adds ‘lest one be reduced, in one’s own 
eyes, to what Kant calls a “speech machine.”’ Note that honesty here relates to personal 
integrity. It is about life lived in accordance with one’s speech. A further note: in 
describing a ‘speech machine,’ Shell writes that such a person would be ‘a mere 
“appearance” of a human being whose “determination” is so far from “purposive” as to 
be literally incapable of meaning anything.’ For a deeper discussion on this theme see 
also Ibid., 79 n 49 and her discussion of especially MM 429-30 and CJ 452-53 where she 
states that Kant held it important to ‘assume the existence of a moral author of the 
world, in order to avoid damage (Abbruch) to his own moral attitude.’ Shell discusses 
this in the context of our final purpose with regard to the moral law. If, for example, 
one, atheists take themselves to be the final purpose, then their honesty in the face of 
nature and evil will ‘[hurl] them […] back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of 
matter from which they were taken.’ For this reason one ought to assume the existence 
of God. What is noteworthy here too is that in following the moral law, Kant is very 
sensitive to our moral attitude (moralishe Gesinnung). Our moods can affect our living 
of the moral law, as we saw with regard to the danger of despair. So it is important to 
take care of our whole being, including our moods. This bespeaks a fully ‘embodied’ 
notion of human beings and their rationality.  
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soul, for Kant, is replaced by or merges with conscientious striving or willingness to 
make an effort.’201  
Shell maintains, furthermore, that for Kant we are not to judge others whose 
inner motives are not available for us to know. This does not mean he is oblivious to the 
need for civil punishment. Shell makes a statement regarding the accusation often 
levelled at the early liberals that they would be soft on moral standards (especially in 
the context of civil punishments). Referring to this she writes: ‘Kant’s affinity with earlier 
liberal notions of the imperviousness of the individual […] to public scrutiny and 
condemnation has less to do with the weakening or abandonment of moral standards 
[…] than with an internalization that boosts those standards beyond the limits of space 
and time (and, in this sense, infinitely raises them) with a concomitant devaluation of 
public, political life as the arena of a freedom that is “merely external.” And yet public 
life, as the visible phenomenon of our moral relations with one another, remains the 
theater in which man’s moral destiny, in this life, is necessarily played out – and upon 
which […] the “revelation” of our dignity, for Kant, at least partly draws.’202 
Shell herself states that the emphasis on history (or mankind as collective 
subject) is new and a road that Kant himself did not travel on – ‘in no small measure 
from his rejection, on moral grounds, of a humanity conceptualized wholly 
historically.’203 In fact were we focussing just on ourselves, we might fall into the despair 
about which Shell spoke earlier, a despair that might prevent us from realizing our own 
                                                                
201 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 72, 79 n 48. 
202 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 73. 
203 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 73. 
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dignity. The value of human life ‘both its goodness for us and our worthiness to enjoy it,’ 
was for Kant not ‘a foregone conclusion.’ In this sense Shell finds Kant rather 
melancholic: ‘“The value of life,” he once said, if it is lived for the sake of mere 
enjoyment (i.e., happiness) is easy to estimate: “it sinks below zero.”’204 In this vain Kant 
maintained that one would not want to relive a life aimed solely at enjoyment even if 
one devised this life for oneself. 
The challenge for moral philosophy would be to overcome ‘a despair grounded 
in the judgments of esteem and contempt from which the moral impulse of the soul also 
arises.’ Shell, however, does not say how this is possible. She continues, though, to say 
that Kant’s conception of dignity could be seen as a ‘translation and transformation’ of 
biblical morality ‘especially suited to liberal-democratic times.’ She acknowledges that 
Kant would probably not put matters this way. In the end, however, ‘[h]uman dignity, 
for Kant, is grounded in a combination of self-exaltation and abasement, honor, and 
humility.’ In this tension the new emphasis on history is born and develops because man 
‘in Kant’s view’ must justify creation itself – a task that earlier thinkers did not deem 
possible or necessary.’205 
Looking at the current world where Kant’s emphasis on the ‘irreplaceability of 
the deserving subject’ is in practice overwhelmingly denied, can paradoxically lead us to 
                                                                
204 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 72. See also her description on the next page (p 
73) of ‘Kant’s hopes [that] were almost outpaced by his forebodings’. 
205 See Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 73. She also adds that this new emphasis 
lead to the political disasters of the last century. 
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realize that ‘it is all that stands between us and a world in which anything can have a 
price and nothing has intrinsic value.’206 
In the end Shell asks whether this subject, this moral personality can bear the 
weight (philosophic and existential) placed upon it by Kant. And in honesty she answers 
with a ‘perhaps.’ Reasons in favor of its survival are, for one, the notion of desert which 
‘strikes a deep and powerful chord’ –especially with regard to the issue of ‘collective 
guilt,’ and, for another, Kant’s ‘prescientific sense of justice and nobility’ (perhaps not 
always appreciated by an earlier liberalism). Kant’s notion of dignity, which relates to 
the ‘capacity to have actions imputed to one’ offers ‘conceptual advantages,’ especially 
in the light of the collapse of the notion of knowledge of the good, which traditional 
philosophy and religion advocated. In the end, however, human dignity finds common 
cause among people in their immediate and ordinary experiences of moral indignation. 
These experiences are either directed ‘inward (as conscience) or outward (as punitive 
anger toward others).’207 That we have to respect the freedom of the object of our 
anger and therefore owe him respect remains, as Shell confesses, ‘one jarring note.’ In 
the final analysis she finds the democratic aspects of Kant’s account of dignity highly 
attractive. ‘Dignity, for Kant,’ she says, ‘is necessarily equal as well as measureless. We 
transcend the realm of price by virtue of our shared capacity to obey the law of which 
we are ourselves the author.’208 
 
                                                                
206 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 74. 
207 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 74. 
208 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 74. 
 149 
10. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This has been a long chapter. We have seen how the question of human value, 
present from the early stages of Kant’s career, is intrinsically related to human dignity. 
We saw how Shell in her approach took the whole of Kant into account. She 
incorporated not only his early works, to which many tend to grant a lower status, but 
also the complications arising from the two perspectives arising from the critique of 
reason, viz. the noumenal and phenomenal world. Not surprisingly these two worlds 
intersect, according to Shell, in man. Her approach here is thus in keeping with her 
methodology.  
Shell’s strength is her ability to relate Kant’s views to our ordinary experiences 
and especially in highlighting the unity of Kant’s overall project as an attempt to answer 
the question of mankind’s value. And her emphasis on Kant’s project as not merely 
intellectual but a matter of life-vocation gives one a flavor as to the embodied dignity 
that Kant spoke of. Her effort to show why the body is important is a further sign of her 
integrative anthropological reading of Kant.  
We now turn our attention to the different approach of Oliver Sensen.
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Chapter Three: Oliver Sensen on Kant and Human Dignity 
 
 
Prelude 
 
 
In studying Kant on human dignity, Oliver Sensen starts from the current 
dominance of this theme, as it appears in the latter half of the twentieth century. This is 
seen, for example, in the discourse of the founding of the United Nations where the 
inherent dignity of a person is seen as the description of an inherent value within that 
forms the ground for respect of the person and of her human rights. In support for this 
doctrine people often turned to Kant. Prominent Kantian scholars concurred with this. 
In his study of Kant, Sensen discovered, however, that Kant does not use dignity in this 
way at all. This led him to a thoroughly systematic study and analysis of all the instances 
where Kant uses this word ‘dignity’ [Würde]. The results of this brought him to a new 
interpretation of what Kant understood by dignity and put him at odds with many 
prominent Kantians. In his analysis Sensen enters into a dialogue with these Kantians as 
he explores the implications of this concept (and dignity’s ‘fellow concepts’) in Kant. In 
what follows we present Sensen’s new understanding of Kant on dignity. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In his monumental work Kant on Human Dignity, Sensen tells this story about 
Kant as reported by his trustee and later biographer Wasianski. Near the end of his life 
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Kant’s physician came to visit him. Kant stood out of respect to his physician and refused 
to sit. The very weakened Kant would only sit after his physician had sat down. Sensen 
writes that when the physician ‘reacted with disbelief, Kant took all his strength to say: 
“The sense of humaneness has not yet left me.”’1 Kant died three months later. 
This almost iconic incident encapsulates not only much of Kant’s life, but also 
especially the essence of Kant’s thought on dignity, as Sensen interprets it. The 
miniscule scale of the action and especially the effort and personal cost it took from 
Kant to remain true to his principle only magnifies its power. If it is related to dignity 
then we can see all the key words of dignity in action: respect for self and others, the 
effort of will in this, and above all the sense of humaneness. These call forth, for Sensen, 
the philosophical questions as to what is understood by ‘dignity’ and wherein lies its 
power or its motivational force. It is clear that dignity has to do with value, but what is 
the nature of this value of humanity and what is the scope of its potency? For Sensen all 
of these key concepts are essential to dignity, as they are indeed to both Sullivan and 
Shell. And yet he interprets these differently. For him dignity does not refer to a 
metaphysical property within – a property which has, moreover, absolute value and in 
virtue of which we are obliged to respect others and ourselves. This he enfolds through 
a very thorough and systematic study, showing both why the one interpretation (the 
more traditional one put forward by Kantian scholars) does not do full justice to Kant’s 
texts and secondly by providing his own interpretation of dignity as ‘elevation’ or 
                                                                
1 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 11. Wassianski was a very close friend of Kant’s 
especially towards the end of Kant’s life and acted as personal secretary. See Kuehn 
2001, 7 ff. 
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‘sublimity.’ This is developed within the context of Kant’s philosophy where these 
concepts link into each other.  
This difference is due to his specific methodology on the one hand and on the 
other his desire to bring Kant’s thought on dignity in line with the fundamental basis of 
Kant’s moral thought. Sensen’s methodology will become clear in the course of this 
presentation. I take his methodology to stand on two legs as it were. The first is that he 
follows an analytical approach and in this he is particularly focussed on the actual 
context of the passages where dignity and its related concepts appear, as well as the 
way Kant uses these concepts. In his exegesis of Kant this methodology takes 
precedence (i.e., looking for the use of a concept and the way it is used and then to 
interpret it in line with the rest of the associated themes as they appear in Kant’s 
writings). In all of this, Sensen desires to remain true to the integrity and unity of Kant’s 
system. The second leg would be his constant dialoguing not only with fellow Kantian 
scholars but also with history (as in for example his history of the concept of dignity). 
The insights he gathers here become central to his interpretation of the texts. 
Key to his interpretation is the relationship (already seen, for instance, in Shell) 
between value and dignity. The correct understanding of the nature of value or worth is 
pivotal for Sensen’s understanding of dignity and goes moreover to the heart of Kant’s 
moral philosophy. For this reason, we start this chapter with an Interlude as to these 
important themes that might at first glance not seem directly related to dignity as such. 
Yet they feed directly into dignity as they address the questions of the meaning of 
‘value’ and ‘worth’ and its relation to the requirement to respect others. This Sensen 
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explores by asking about whether value grounds and motivates the moral law and 
secondly by looking into the meaning of humanity (as this is also pertinent to the 
Second Formula). 
After this interlude I present Sensen’s understanding of Kant’s notion of dignity. 
Sensen traces the history of this concept and finds different paradigms operative. Which 
paradigm was preeminent in Kant’s day and can we find in Kant evidence that he held to 
one paradigm in particular? In order to answer these we present Sensen’s brief history 
followed by his interpretation of Kant’s use of this concept. This is the central part of the 
chapter where Sensen presents his thesis that dignity is ‘elevation’ and not some inner 
value or property, metaphysical in nature. Given Sensen’s claims and the fact that his 
theory sets itself against the prevalent interpretation of Kant on dignity, which includes 
aspects of the interpretation of scholars like Sullivan and Shell, we need to allow for a 
full – and necessarily lengthy – exploration of its key elements. For the most I follow his 
major work Kant on Human Dignity.2 
 
2. Interlude I: Critical Presuppositions  
 
 
In this Interlude I shall present some themes that are central to Sensen’s 
understanding and interpretation of Kant’s concept of dignity. These form the 
                                                                
2 See also Sensen, Kant's Treatment of Human Dignity in the Groundwork 2008; Sensen, 
Kant's Conception of Inner Value 2011; Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 
2009; Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and 
Traditional Paradigms 2011; Sensen, Dignity and the Formula of Humanity 2009. 
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presuppositions, which he acknowledges, and they provide the broader background in 
which dignity is embedded and in light of which Sensen can interpret aspects of dignity 
that would otherwise – if treated in isolation from the rest of Kant’s thinking – leave us 
with a skewed understanding. This is in part due to some ambiguities in the odd turn of 
phrase here and there in Kant that leads to differences of interpretation among 
Kantians. Sensen sees it as his task to clarify this with regard to the notion of dignity; 
and for this reason these themes are pivotal if one is to gain access to his project and 
interpretation of Kant. Indeed as we shall see it provides a guiding interpretative 
principle in the light of which he approaches his exegesis of the word ‘dignity’ itself. The 
themes addressed are for the most part related to Kant’s understanding of ‘value’: is 
value in Kant a separate metaphysical property? Can it form the foundation of the moral 
law? And what does Kant mean when he uses the phrase ‘absolute inner value’ and 
then relate it to ‘dignity’?3 Finally, we shall look at the Formula of Humanity and the 
related subthemes active there, namely, the setting of ends and the understanding of 
‘humanity.’ This is to help us understand precisely what Kant wants to be respected 
when he talks of ‘respecting the humanity in our persons,’ which he calls ‘dignity.’ 
 
 
                                                                
3 Sensen quotes four instances: In the Groundwork Kant talks of ‘inner worth, that is, 
dignity’ (G 435); and ‘dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth’ (G 436). 
And in The Metaphysics of Morals we read ‘dignity (an absolute inner worth)’ (MM 435); 
and ‘dignity […] that is, of a worth that has no price’ (MM 462). See Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 174. 
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2.1 Value as metaphysical property? 
 
 
We saw in the last chapter that, at least for the early Kant, dignity was tied to the 
question of man’s worth. Another way to phrase this question is to ask after the value of 
humanity. In Kant on Human Dignity Sensen dedicates his first chapter to the nature of 
Kant’s use of the concept of value.4 Since most of his argument is based on a specific 
understanding of value, the discussion becomes pivotal to his thesis. Determining the 
exact nature of this notion is then a necessary condition for understanding his project. 
Sensen points out that for Kant dignity is related to the command to respect 
myself and others. In fact as he says this is not true only in Kant: in our contemporary 
world dignity is understood to be the cornerstone of many constitutions of countries 
and certainly plays an important role in the United Nations’ documents such as the 
International Covenants on Human Rights (1966). There human rights derive their 
justification ‘from the inherent dignity of the human person.’5 Perhaps no other 
definition captures this close interconnection between dignity, value and respect as 
does the definition Sensen presents from the German dictionary Duden. There, Würde 
(dignity) is defined as a ‘value inherent in human beings that commands respect.’6 In 
other words because someone has ‘dignity,’ which is this value inherent in them, they 
are to be respected. Not only can they demand or require respect, but in fact respect is 
                                                                
4 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 14-52. 
5 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 1. 
6 This is Sensen’s translation of ‘Achtung gebietender Wert, der dem Menschen 
innewohnt.’ See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 1 n 1. 
 156 
their right as human beings. This right is grounded in their dignity. We have become so 
used to this idea of human dignity that we cannot think of any other way of seeing it. 
And yet another way of seeing it is precisely what Sensen came to as he turned his 
attention to Kant’s understanding of dignity. The problem is that many people turn to 
Kant for confirmation of the standard view of dignity. However, Sensen points out that 
holding this account of grounding the requirement to respect others on the value they 
possess gives rise to certain ‘puzzles’ in Kant, puzzles that would disappear if one were 
to change one’s perspective.7 
After exploring the meaning of the question of value in Kant’s system,8 Sensen 
suggests that one possibility would be to consider that the value of human beings refers 
to the fact of ‘a distinctive property [that] all human beings possess,’ and that ‘in 
addition’ to the theoretical description of humans possessing the properties of body and 
                                                                
7 Sensen names four puzzles: One, Kant says that all human beings should be respected, 
but the only thing that has absolute value is a morally good will. Yet, as he points out, 
not all people ‘have a morally good will.’ Second, he asks if value is the supposed ground 
for moral requirements, why does Kant insist that ‘no value can ground moral 
requirements’? Third, why does Kant say ‘humans beings have dignity because they 
should be respected’ (he refers to MM 462, 435) and not that ‘they should be respected 
because they have dignity?’ Fourth and last Sensen asks why does Kant not refer to 
value or dignity when he justifies moral requirements or summarizes his position? See 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 1-2. 
8 Sensen asks what exactly are we looking for when we enquire about value, which in 
Kantian literature is often presented as the ‘ground of the requirement to respect 
others.’ Do we refer to a feature in light of which humans have value (like freedom, or 
the capacity to set ends, or morality)? Does it refer to the capacity itself that has a 
certain value, or that something (that is precious) is perhaps added onto the capacity? 
Or, does it mean merely that the capacity is valued (that is, it is describing a state of 
affairs) or perhaps that this capacity should be valued? What is the nature of value? See 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 14. 
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soul (under which he places freedom and the ‘property of being a self’), ‘one would also 
possess the value property of being precious’ [my emphasis].9  
Sensen is clear that, in his reading, Kant does not employ such an understanding 
of value. To be sure, he suggests that in spite of the resurgence of this theme of value in 
recent Kant scholarship, the literature does not address the question of the nature of 
value, and that those who do, reflect according to him a position influenced by the 
thought of G.E. Moore.10 In this vein value is taken as ‘a property a thing possesses 
inherently, i.e., a property that would belong to the thing even if it were the only thing 
that existed or if it existed in total isolation from everything else. Value would then be 
“part of the fabric of the world” […] in the widest sense: a distinct property, substance, 
or an instance of a Platonic form.’ He adds then the following, ‘[t]o say that a human 
being has an absolute inner value, could refer to something inside a human being, an 
“inherent, intrinsic preciousness.”’11 
                                                                
9 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 14. 
10 See his discussion at Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 14-17, see also 15 n 14 for 
a discussion of the positions in this regard of some Kantian scholars. 
11 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 15. (In this quotation Sensen quotes 
respectively from Mackie 1977, 15 and Seifert 1997, 96.)  
Sensen explores this further, for instance if Kant says the good will is like a 
precious jewel (G 394) does he imply this conception of value? Does the interiority of 
the value imply that it need not exist ‘out there’ in the ‘form of an objective value’ and 
that it might even not exist ‘independent of the mind’? He touches upon the question of 
moral realism and how it would relate in Kant to his understanding of the good vis-à-vis 
the Categorical Imperative. We are not entering into this debate here. For a fuller 
discussion see Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 15-16. 
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Sensen is in no doubt as to Kant’s position on this point. ‘Kant did not even 
entertain such a conception,’ he writes but ‘even if he had considered it […] his 
arguments would rule it out.’12  
We shall look briefly at how Sensen argues these points.  
In the first place, Kant did not give thought to the idea that value could be a 
separate property or substance. Sensen notes that when Kant explicitly sets out to list 
‘all possible’ conceptions of the good or value, he never lists this conception. This shows 
he did not even consider this conception as a possible interpretation of value. Sensen 
states that both ‘the good’ and ‘value’ are equivalent for Kant.13 According to Sensen 
the mature Kant always presents us with the same candidates as to what the good 
might be – namely, pleasure, moral feeling, perfection, or divine command. Sometimes 
Kant includes education and civil constitution as possible bases on which to build 
morality.14 The point, however, is that this expanded list ‘includes “all previous” 
attempts to ground morality on the good, as well as – more importantly – “all possible” 
attempts to ground morality.’15 If we take Kant seriously we would have to accept that 
he does not entertain a notion of value as substance or separate property. 
There is another reason why this list would be exhaustive. Sensen shows how 
Kant forms a table with these four categories into which he classifies each ground 
                                                                
12 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 16. 
13 In this regard he refers to the beginning section of the Groundwork (G 393 ff.) where 
Kant ‘seamlessly […] switches between both expressions.’ Sensen, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2011, 16 n 16. 
14 Sensen refers here to Mrong 620; G 441 ff.; CPrR 39 ff., 64; Mrong 628; Collins 252-55; 
In terms of the addition of education and civil constitution he refers to CPrR 40; Mrong 
621; Collins 252-55.  
15 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 16. He refers to CPrR 40; G 432, 441. 
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mentioned in his list. Kant first divides the possible grounds for the good into two 
categories, those forming empirical (i.e., subjective) and those presenting rational (i.e., 
objective) grounds. Within each category a further distinction may be made, namely 
whether the grounds are external or internal. So, according to Sensen, this table will 
show that education and civil constitution form part of the empirical grounds that are 
external (with pleasure being likewise empirical, but from internal grounds/source). 
Perfection gets placed under the rational and internal field while divine command would 
be an example of external and rational grounds.16 Sensen writes that Kant ‘clearly thinks 
that these possibilities form a “table in which all possible cases are actually exhausted, 
except the one formal principle.”’17 This principle is the moral law or Categorical 
Imperative. Kant here does not consider the good as a metaphysical property and 
similarly a value. Sensen points out that in Kant’s time Werth was an economic term, 
and even ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ did not point to an ontological distinction: they were 
all economic concepts related to the market price of an object and the latter distinctions 
would refer to the price inclusive or exclusive of human labor’s price added.18 
Returning to Sensen’s second point that, if Kant had considered value as a 
metaphysical property, his arguments would have prohibited him from holding it, 
Sensen asks us now to assume Kant’s response supposing he had encountered such a 
                                                                
16 He refers to CPrR 40 and Mrong 620-29. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 17. 
17 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 17. 
18 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 17 and also n 17, where he mentions that in 
presenting his candidates for the good Kant does not include the Platonic Form of the 
Good. 
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conception of value.19 In a chapter entitled ‘On the concept of an object of pure 
practical reason’ in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant seems to deal with the 
question as to which objects a morally good reason ought to engage in. Sensen quotes 
Kant here: ‘By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the representation 
of an object as an effect possible through freedom.’20 For Sensen, Kant’s point here is 
that these ‘objects of pure practical reason follow from the principle of pure practical 
reason, the moral law or Categorical Imperative’ [my emphasis].21 This points Sensen to 
the fact that Kant reverses the order of knowledge in the first two Critiques. In the first 
Critique theoretical knowledge starts from the senses, then moves on to objects, and 
finally yields principles. In the second Critique ‘practical insight starts from a principle, 
the moral law.’ And from there practical inquiry moves to the objects and then finally 
the senses.22 In this chapter Kant presents, in his own words, his ‘method of ultimate 
moral investigation.’ Sensen asks then in this regard: ‘Is the moral law to be derived 
from a prior conception of the good, or is the good to be determined by the moral 
law?’23 
In his answer to this question Kant presents two arguments. Sensen focuses on 
the first. It states that if a good were placed anterior to the law, nothing would be 
immediately good (as opposed to good as a means). The second one claims that if a 
good were placed anterior to the law, there would be no moral law. Sensen shows how 
                                                                
19 For his response Sensen turns to CPrR 57-65. He also refers to CPrR 16. See Sensen, 
Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 17-20. 
20 Quoted from CPrR 57 by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 17. 
21 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18. 
22 Sensen refers to CPrR 16. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18. 
23 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18. The quote from Kant comes from CPrR 16. 
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both in the second Critique as well as the Groundwork, placing ‘any possible conception 
of the good […] prior to and independent of the moral law […] would yield 
heteronomy.’24 The implications of heteronomy in this context reaches further than 
infringing upon the value ‘autonomy’. According to Sensen, even if one were to include 
a divine command, or a metaphysical value property, one would still ‘have to give an 
account of how one can discern this value, and why one should be motivated to follow 
it.’25 And, for Kant, the only candidate through which one discerns and is motivated to 
follow the value discerned is a feeling of pleasure. Having said that, pleasure is 
‘contingent and subjective,’ and, as Sensen indicates for Kant these cannot qualify as a 
ground for ‘a necessary and universal moral law.’26 
 Sensen presents Kant’s argument as follows: Early in the second Critique, Kant 
stresses that the only way to relate to any external object (including any value 
properties others might possess) is by receptivity and sensibility and therefore not by 
the faculty of understanding or thought. ‘Pleasure,’ as Kant writes, ‘[insofar as] it is to be 
a determining ground of desire for this thing, is based on the receptivity of the subject, 
since it depends upon the existence of an object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling) and 
                                                                
24 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18. Sensen refers to CPrR 64; G 441. 
25 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18. The point is whether there could be a value, 
which is some good, like freedom, happiness or the dignity (preciousness) of a human 
being, that underlies the Categorical Imperative. According to Sensen some 
contemporary Kantians think this would add appeal to the Categorical Imperative by 
making it both more compelling to obey and being a motivator in obedience. See 
Sensen, Kant's Conception of Inner Value 2011, 262-63. 
26 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18. He refers to CPrR 64. 
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not to the understanding.’27 Sensen reads this in light of the first Critique, where Kant 
asserts that we do not possess an ‘intellectual intuition.’ The manner we receive an 
object, is rather, ‘via sensibility.’28 Sensen’s point is very concrete. As he puts it, if we 
assume that the good is ‘not a natural property that can be detected by one of the five 
senses (e.g. [what] one cannot see, feel, hear, touch or smell), then the only remaining 
avenue for sensibility to receive the object is a feeling of pleasure.’29 For motivation to 
pursue this good or value one would also need, as we have said above, a feeling of 
pleasure. And for Kant we are motivated by either pleasure or an a priori law.30 Sensen 
quotes Kant here saying so beautifully that ‘the will stands between its a priori principle, 
which is formal, and it’s a priori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads.’31 
Sensen draws attention to the fact that Kant reacts here against a Humean theory of 
motivation, which sees reason as the mere ‘slave of the passions,’ which are the only 
true motivators. This would render Kant’s a priori moral law powerless to enact 
anything in virtue of itself, making it rather contingent on antecedent and independent 
                                                                
27 Taken from CPrR 22. Sensen makes this point in response to his question why the 
concept of the good could only be something that promises pleasure. This was the point 
of the following passage he quoted: ‘If the concept of the good is not to be derived from 
an antecedent practical law, but, instead, is to serve as its basis, it can be only the 
concept of something whose existence promises pleasure and thus determines the 
causality of the subject, that is, the faculty of desire, to produce it’ CPrR 58. See Sensen, 
Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 18-19. 
28 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 19. He refers to CPR A 50 ff./B 74 ff. 
29 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 19. 
30 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 19. He refers to CPrR 63. 
31 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 19 n 18. Quote from G 400. 
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desires for its productiveness. For this reason Kant insists that one could ‘also be 
motivated by a law of pure reason.’32  
Given the above Sensen states that were ‘the good or a value’ anterior to the 
law, it would leave the feeling of pleasure as the only possible motivator. As he writes: 
‘If one follows Kant in this, the result is that “the concept of that which is immediately 
good would be directed only to that with which the feeling of gratification is 
immediately connected.”’33 Moreover, the common way of talking about the good 
suggests that the good is gauged by reason and Sensen adds that by reason he means 
‘concepts that can be universally communicated.’34 Hence Kant (and Sensen’s) 
conclusion: ‘if the concept of the good were the basis of the moral law, then there 
would be nothing good absolutely.’35 
The upshot of all this is that for Sensen the same argument would apply if one 
were to hold value as a distinct metaphysical property whose presence within a person 
requires or necessitates and so motivates respect.  How would we epistemologically be 
able to know it and how would it be able to motivate us? As with the good the only 
avenue open to us would be by means of the feeling of pleasure. As Sensen asserts: ‘In 
this context it is […] important to note that to human beings a metaphysical value 
property would not be known as such. The only access one would have to it is through a 
                                                                
32 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 19. He refers to CPrR 15. As Sensen adds here, 
Kant is not concerned about ‘a third alternative’ besides pleasure or the a priori law. 
This adds weight to the earlier point that value is not considered by Kant as a value 
property. 
33 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 19, with quotation from CPrR 58. 
34 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 20. 
35 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 20. Sensen refers also to CPrR 58. 
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feeling of pleasure. So even if value existed as a distinct metaphysical property, human 
beings could never know it as such; the only thing we would have is a feeling of 
pleasure. The assumption that there is a value of human beings out there therefore 
reduces itself ad absurdum. If there were this value, it would drop out of the picture. 
We could not know of its existence. This means Kant’s arguments also rule out the 
knowledge and relevance of metaphysical value properties for moral philosophy.’36 
There are two passages in the Groundwork that Sensen highlights, because they 
are often used by scholars in support of their ‘metaphysical reading of value.’ The 
clearest passage occurs near the opening section (one) of the Groundwork. Kant 
compares the good will to a jewel. In addition he here also uses the expression ‘absolute 
value’ and seems to address the nature of value. So, even if in spite of the greatest 
effort a good will achieved nothing, then still ‘like a jewel, it would shine by itself, as 
something that has its full worth in itself,’ says Kant. Is this, asks Sensen, ‘not an 
endorsement of value as a metaphysical property?’37  Sensen shows, however, this is 
not the case. This is an analogy and for Kant analogies signify similarity between 
relations and not between things.38 The emphasis in this analogy is on ‘shine’ and it 
                                                                
36 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 20. To be sure, Sensen acknowledges that some 
might regards Kant’s argument as less than ‘watertight.’ For his discussion of these 
objections and a rebuttal, see Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 20-21. 
37 Quote from G 394 and Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 21. 
38 Sensen refers to Kant’s Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics where in the context 
of considering ‘the world as if it were the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will’ he 
employs analogies like watch, ship and regiment. About these Kant says these analogies 
intend to say nothing other than that they express ‘the same relation to the 
watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer […].’ Kant, Prolegomena To Any 
Future Metaphysics 1950, 106 (4:357-358). Sensen quotes from Kant’s note regarding 
analogy: ‘analogy, which surely does not signify, as the word is usually taken, an 
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means Kant wishes to stress that even if a good will seems ineffective (and we might say 
like a jewel, which does not achieve anything), it nevertheless shines like a jewel. For 
Sensen the intention is to stress the consequential respect that is demanded in this case 
from an observer. In fact, Kant testifies to this when he writes in his own person that 
‘before a humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character […] my 
spirit bows, whether I want it or whether I do not.’39 
The second passage Sensen discusses reads: ‘The essence of things is not 
changed by their external relations: and that which, without taking account of such 
relations, alone constitutes the worth of a human being is that in terms of which he also 
must be appraised by whoever does it, even by the supreme being.’40 The issue here for 
Sensen is the fact that the sole determining influence in appraising a person’s worth 
(even from the divine perspective) is and remains the will of a person. And as he says, 
‘the essence of a good will does not change with its external relations.’41 Quoting from 
the Groundwork he writes: ‘the proper worth of an absolutely good will […] consists just 
in the principle of action being free from all influences of contingent grounds.’42 And 
again he quotes Kant who writes a few pages further: ‘That will is absolutely good which 
cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if made universal law, can never conflict with 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two 
relations in wholly dissimilar things.’ Illustrating this Sensen says that if we say ‘4 is to 2 
as 6 is to 3,’ we do not intend to say ‘4 is like 6’ but rather that the relation between the 
numbers is perfectly similar, being namely, ‘twice as much.’ Sensen, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2011, 21. 
39 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 21. Sensen takes this from CPrR 76. 
40 Quotation from G 439. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22. 
41 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22. 
42 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22. Quote taken from G 426. 
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itself.’43 This brings us into the presence of the Categorical Imperative. We become good 
only through following the Categorical Imperative for its own sake. And for Sensen the 
point of freedom from the contingent influences is exactly to follow the Categorical 
Imperative for the sake of the Categorical Imperative. This is the only way we can 
become good. Sensen encapsulates this point: ‘Kant repeatedly says that the worth of a 
human being is only the one he can give himself in being morally good.’44 Sensen points 
out that the sentence that precedes this one refers to the Categorical Imperative.45 
Sensen lastly discusses whether Kant’s description of the ‘intelligible aspect of 
oneself,’ which he calls the ‘proper self,’ does not point to the fact that we possess a 
metaphysical value property. 46 He notes, though, that the ‘ontological superiority of the 
proper self’ does not automatically imply a moral value. As he says, every object 
appearing in the phenomenal world ‘has an intelligible aspect,’ like a ‘proper table’; but 
this does not import moral value to a table. Moreover, Kant nowhere argues for the 
moral value of a proper self. Quite contrary, writes Sensen, ‘Kant […] directly argues that 
any knowledge of an intelligible self is impossible for human beings.’47 Knowledge of an 
objective value property insofar as the intelligible aspect of one’s self is concerned 
seems ruled out. Sensen indicates that talk about the ‘proper self’ serves to explain why 
                                                                
43 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22 n 21. See G 437. 
44 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22. Sensen supports this with reference to the 
following: CJ 443, 208 ff.; G 439, 449 ff., 454; CPrR 110 ff., 147 ff. 
45 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22. See G 439 (quoted by Sensen): ‘[E]ven this 
sole absolute lawgiver would […] still have to be represented as appraising the worth of 
rational beings only by their disinterested conduct, prescribed to themselves merely 
from that idea.’ 
46 Sensen refers to G 457 ff., 461. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 22-23. 
47 This is part of a point Kant is making in his Paralogisms (CPR A 341/B 399 – A 405/B 
431) to which Sensen refers. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 23. 
 167 
the moral law should be of interest to us. As Kant says: ‘the law interests because it is 
valid for us as human beings, since it arose from our will as intelligence and so from our 
proper self.’48 And as Sensen writes: ‘The law is valid because it has a genuine source 
that is not external; an external source could not ground a necessary and universal 
law.’49 
In conclusion Sensen finds that there is no good reason to believe that Kant’s 
notion of the value of human beings entertained this as a distinct metaphysical property 
possessed by all people. According to Sensen, phrases like ‘inner value’ in themselves do 
not provide sufficient reason for justifying such a conception.50 In the next section he 
elucidates Kant’s argument as to why value, conceived as a metaphysical property, 
could not serve as a foundation for morality. 
 
2.2 Value as Foundation? 
 
 
In this part of the Interlude I shall focus on Sensen’s argument as to why Kant 
rules out the possibility that a value could ground any moral requirements and 
especially the demand to respect another. The passage of the second Critique discussed 
above, does not deal with respect in the way the second Formula (the Formula of 
                                                                
48 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 23. Sensen quotes from G 461. 
49 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 23. And as he adds: ‘There is no further 
argument that an intelligible world has value.’ This seems to close the matter. 
50 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 23. 
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Humanity, as Sensen refers to it) makes it explicit, but the argument as he puts it would 
be valid for the Formula of Humanity nonetheless.51  
Sensen mentions Kant’s response to a reviewer of his Groundwork, who 
criticized him for not deriving the Categorical Imperative ‘from a prior conception of the 
good.’52 In his response, Kant felt the need to clarify his methodology for determining 
the moral law: ‘This is the place to explain the paradox of method in a Critique of 
Practical Reason, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be determined 
before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made 
the basis) but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it.’53 According to Sensen 
this shows that Kant’s focus is not about which good to pursue. He searches rather for 
the foundation and justification of the moral law. And it is not a metaphysical value – 
not even the value of human beings – however this may go against the grain of common 
thought that thinks (and expects) there should be a condition at the basis of the 
Categorical Imperative.  
Kant further argues that if one were to start with a concept of the good ‘in order 
to derive laws of the will from it,’ one would be left without an ‘a priori law of the will 
such as the Categorical Imperative.’54 We have seen this argument before. The only way 
to find out what the good is would, in that case, be through the experience pleasure. 
And feelings of pleasure, which are dependent on experience, are a posteriori and not a 
                                                                
51 As he puts it the Formula for Humanity, which ‘commands that one treat others never 
merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in itself’ is also ‘a command 
of reason and a categorical imperative.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 24. 
52 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 24. 
53 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 24. Quotation from CPrR 62 ff. 
54 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 24. He refers to CPrR 63. 
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priori as moral laws ought to be. Sensen writes: ‘If one does not begin with the moral 
law, then the good could be either pleasure or something external (e.g. God’s will, but 
also a metaphysically distinct value property).’55 This would again leave us only with 
pleasure, which cannot give the moral law, since it is ‘relative and contingent.’ The only 
signs of an a priori cognition are ‘necessity and strict universality.’56 And Kant claims 
that the moral law has to be a priori. In the beginning of the Groundwork he says: 
‘Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally […] must carry with it the 
absolute necessity; that is, for example, the command “thou shalt not lie” does not hold 
only for human beings.’57 
In evaluating Kant’s argument58 Sensen emphasizes that the point for Kant 
remains that no value ‘could ground the Categorical Imperative as the moral law: “It is 
on the contrary the moral law that first determines and makes possible the concept of 
the good, insofar as it deserves this name absolutely.”’59 
Sensen clarifies this relationship between value and the moral law with 
reference to Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution.’ This concept from Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy served as illustration for Kant to elucidate the nature of the ‘revolution in 
                                                                
55 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 25. 
56 Sensen quotes CPR B 4: ‘Necessity and strict universality are therefore secure 
indications of an a priori cognition, and also belong together inseparably.’ Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 25. 
57 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 25. He quotes from G 389, with references also 
to 412 and 425. 
58 He points out that, as in the first argument, the crucial premise is that any external 
good is known only through a feeling of pleasure. A modern-day intuitionist might, 
contrary to the first Critique, argue that we have ‘an intellectual intuition or sixth sense 
for discovering a metaphysical property.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 25. 
59 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 25 ff. He quotes from CPrR 64. 
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our way of thinking’ he thought we needed.60 We think naturally that our knowledge 
must conform to the object. And it is likewise ‘a common way to think that human laws 
must conform to something that has value or is precious.’ Kant, however, ‘reverses both 
relationships.’ In terms of our knowledge his revolution had ‘the object […] conform to a 
priori elements of human cognition.’ In his moral philosophy Kant’s revolution implied 
that ‘absolute value is dependent upon an a priori law of human reason.’61 
Sensen identifies yet a deeper way in which the theoretical thought of Kant’s 
‘Copernican Revolution’ affects his views on value. As Sensen says, taking value to be a 
‘distinct metaphysical property’ is to make it an object ‘out there’ that first needs 
discovery and in this case then ‘knowing a value property would be no different from 
knowing any object as it is in itself.’ He quotes the Critique of Pure Reason thus: ‘If we 
let outer objects count as things in themselves, then it is absolutely impossible to 
comprehend how we are to acquire cognition of their reality outside us, since we base 
this merely on the representation, which is in us.’62  
Thus, to start from a metaphysical property will keep us captive within the same 
problematic, namely, that the value, in itself, would be unknowable. What we would 
know, would be our ‘own subjective reaction to it.’ And that, as we saw above in the 
case of value, is the feeling of pleasure. And, as we also saw, that is not in accord with 
                                                                
60 For this ‘Revolution der Denkungsart’ he refers to CPR B xviii ff. See Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 26. 
61 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 26. He refers to G 435 ff.; and also to MM 435 
and 462; where we see the practical effect of this revolution: human beings are not to 
be respected because they have dignity; they have dignity because they should be 
respected (Ibid. 26 n 27). 
62 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 26. The quote  is from CPR A 378. 
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Kant’s moral thought. Treating value as a metaphysical property seems, furthermore, to 
be precluded especially in terms of the ‘Copernican Revolution’ in Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy.63 
If this is the case, how does Sensen interpret Kant’s concept of value? He 
discerns four possible understandings. One, as distinct metaphysical property, such that 
even if something existed in total isolation it would still possess this value inherently. 
Second, as relation between two things. This is understood in the way we might say 
‘food is valuable for my health.’ It is beneficial or useful, and Sensen calls this the 
‘instrumental relation.’ So to say that some behavior is fitting under these 
circumstances (e.g., etiquette) falls under this category. The third possibility is to 
understand value as subjective. Subjectivity refers to what we as subjects value, be it, 
for example, happiness or pleasure. These things are grounded as values in our desires 
and inclinations; something has value because we desire it.64 
Sensen opts for a fourth possibility. ‘[V]alue might not be a description of what a 
being values based on his desires, but it could be a prescription of what one should 
value. […] To say that human beings have value would be to say that they should be 
valued and respected.’65 This prescription could have different sources. Sensen points 
out that these could be either external or internal. An example of an external source 
                                                                
63 To be sure, Sensen raises some further objections, which he treats successfully in later 
chapters. In terms of this chapter we will not go into these. See however Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 26 ff., 26 n 27, 53 ff., 96 ff. 
64 For a more detailed treatment, including his refutation of these three possibilities, see 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 28-30. The second option Kant would judge to be 
hypothetical and not absolute and the third would be contingent. As we saw, these 
cannot ground the Moral Law. 
65 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 28. 
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would be a command from parents, society, or God. An internal source would be one’s 
rationality or the experience of conscience. As we saw above the Kantian framework 
does not permit of an external source. ‘Rather it would be,’ says Sensen, ‘a command of 
pure reason – or something a being would value if it were wholly governed by reason 
[…]. This prescription is what Kant presents as the Categorical Imperative.’66 So, in other 
words, when the faculty of reason considers (that is, judges) a maxim or an action as 
necessary, Kant would say it has moral value. As Sensen trenchantly puts it. ‘“Has value” 
[is a shorthand] for saying “should value” or “would value if he were fully rational.”’67 
For this reason it is the moral law that determines the good.68 He continues by stressing 
that, even though he regards value as a prescription, it as such could not be the 
foundation (or rationale) of the moral law. The prescription is not grounded by an 
external factor (e.g. divine command) but in terms of a principle, which for Kant is the 
Categorical Imperative.  
Sensen asks now whether his account of value could ground the Categorical 
Imperative. If, he says, it were dependent on something else one wants or desires, 
making the prescription then dependent on a condition (do ‘x’ in order to fulflll ‘y’), it 
could not in virtue of this ground an ‘unconditional and categorical imperative.’ 
However, he continues, even in the case where the prescription would be both 
necessary and unconditional, ‘in that it commands what one has to value simply,’ – even 
then it could not act as ground or justification of Kant’s imperative. And, for Sensen, 
                                                                
66 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 28. He refers to G 412 ff., 449, 453-55. 
67 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 30, (cf. 28 for the phrase ‘shorthand’). 
68 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 30. He refers to CPrR 62 ff.; G 435 ff. 
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‘[t]he simple reason is that such a prescription would have exactly the same 
characteristics as the Categorical Imperative’ [emphasis mine].69  Now a prescription 
that ‘commands necessarily,’ in other words, one that is ‘not conditioned on any ends 
one may set for oneself based on desires, can only prescribe the form of the law.’ Now, 
says Sensen, the form of the law is none other than the universalization of one’s maxim. 
And what is the universalization of one’s maxim other than the Categorical Imperative 
itself? Indeed: ‘That prescription would be the Categorical Imperative, and not a 
separate value. So in construing a prescription of what one should value, one would not 
thereby introduce a value that is prior to and independent of the moral law.’70  
In conclusion then, Sensen asserts that, while for Kant the positing of a value 
before and as ground to the moral law seems the natural way of thinking, it can never 
form the basis of morality; in fact, according to Sensen, Kant regards this as ‘the mistake 
of all previous moral systems.’71 While this seems clear now, what remains is to show 
what Kant means by ‘absolute inner value.’ 
 
 
2.3 Kant’s Conception of Absolute Inner Value 
 
                                                                
69 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 31. 
70 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 31. He refers to G 420 ff.; CPrR 29 ff. 
71 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 32. He refers to CPrR 39, where Kant writes: ‘If 
we now compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason (as that of an 
autonomy of the will) with all previous material principles of morality, we can set forth 
all the rest, […] and thus we can prove […] that it is futile to look around for any other 
principle than the one presented.’ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788) 1996, 5:39. 
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Sensen points out that Kant raises the issue of value at prominent places. The 
two striking examples are at the beginning of the Groundwork (where he famously 
states that ‘only a morally good will could be called good without limitation’72) and in 
the Second Section where he draws a distinction between ‘price and inner value.’73 
Sensen has already shown conclusively that Kant does not hold value to be a 
metaphysical property, nor a description either of what one values subjectively or of a 
relation between two entities. These latter two are based on our inclinations that 
govern what we subjectively value, and Kant judges these as having ‘relative’ value.74 
Relative value is contrasted with absolute or inner value. ‘I shall argue,’ Sensen writes, 
‘that for Kant the expression “absolute inner value” is nothing more than a prescription 
of what one should value independently of inclinations.’75 ‘Inner value’ is saying the 
same thing as ‘unconditional value.’ In other words to say x ‘has inner value’ is to say x 
‘should be valued unconditionally.’ It is ordered thus by the Categorical Imperative, 
which therefore justifies it.76 
Referring to Kant, Sensen puts it thus: ‘Value in general is what reason judges 
(independently of inclinations) to be necessary: “the will is a capacity to choose only 
that which reason independently of inclinations cognizes as practically necessary, that 
                                                                
72 G 393 ff. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 32. 
73 G 434 ff. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 32. 
74 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 32. He refers to G 428.  
75 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 32. 
76 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 33. 
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is, as good.”’77 What ‘is good’ or what ‘has value’ express the same thing, namely, that 
which ‘reason deems […] necessary’ and hence prescribes. This prescription comes in 
the form of an imperative.78 Sensen reminds us that ‘good’ in the absolute sense is 
distinguished from good in the sense of our well-being [Wohl]. The absolute good is only 
established79 by actions and the will, which carry them out. Both ‘good’ and ‘value’ are 
then dependant on reason’s judgment. Sensen introduces here Kant’s distinction 
between hypothetical and categorical commands. Kant writes: ‘Now, if an action would 
be good merely as a means to something else the imperative is hypothetical; if the 
action is represented as in itself good, hence as necessary in a will in itself conforming to 
reason, as its principle, then it is categorical.’80 Hypothetical imperatives yield relative 
values, which are dependant on and conditioned by inclinations. The value associated 
with categorical imperatives is not relative, since it is not conditioned by inclinations; it 
is good in itself.  
Considering Kant’s opening statement in the Groundwork (only a good will can 
be judged to be good absolutely), Sensen concludes that non-rational things have only 
                                                                
77 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 33. This quote is taken from G 412. 
78 Sensen quotes here from G 413: ‘All imperatives […] say that to do or to omit 
something would be good.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 33. 
79 Sensen’s term is ‘predicated.’ See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 33. He quotes 
from CPrR 60: ‘Thus good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions […], and if 
anything is to be good or evil absolutely (and in every respect and without any further 
condition), […] it would be only the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and 
consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil human being, that could be so 
called, but not a thing.’ 
80 G 414, as quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 33. Sensen mentions in his 
explication that good is defined here in terms of reason’s judgment as something 
necessary. 
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relative value.81 Likewise, when Kant talks about ‘absolute or inner value’ he refers to a 
judgment of reason and is not proposing that an ontological property of an existing 
thing has a distinct value. Sensen thus argues that Kant would use a phrase like ‘x has 
absolute inner value’ to mean that ‘reason deems x to be necessary simply and that 
reason’s judgment is not conditioned (e.g., by the consequences of x or one’s 
inclinations to x).’82 The characteristic of necessity follows from its being in accord with 
the Categorical Imperative. Sensen clarifies his interpretation by stressing that 
‘“absolute inner value” refers to how one has to judge, or to what reason deems 
necessary.’83 In support of this he quotes the opening lines of the Groundwork. The 
quote takes on special significance because of his added emphases. They give a clue as 
to his reading of this important passage. I quote in full. ‘Kant says that it is “impossible 
to think” of anything that “could be considered good without limitation except a good 
will” […]. He [Kant] goes on to say that an “impartial rational spectator can take no 
delight” in seeing happiness without a good will. Even secondary virtues lack much of 
what “would be required to declare them good without limitation,” and he notes that 
the coolness of the scoundrel makes him “more abominable in our eyes” [Sensen’s 
emphasis throughout].84  
As Sensen says, all this has to do with how we judge. Finally, ‘to say something 
has an absolute inner value expresses that reason judges an action to be necessary 
                                                                
81 This is because the will is the practical aspect of reason. 
82 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 34. 
83 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 34. 
84 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 34. Quote from G 393 ff. 
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regarded for itself.’85 Sensen takes this as being independent of inclinations, usefulness, 
functions and circumstances, and so forth. ‘Inner’ and ‘absolute’ become equivalent to 
each other. As Kant says: ‘The word absolute is now more often used merely to indicate 
that something is valid of a thing considered in itself and thus internally [innerlich].’86 
‘Inner’ and ‘absolute’ then refer to a judgment that is made in the same way, namely ‘in 
abstracting from all relations.’ It means considering the object one looks at ‘in isolation,’ 
thus making the judgment ‘unconditional.’ For Sensen this is alluded to by Kant’s 
remarks at the beginning of the Groundwork, where he asks whether one judges talents 
of mind, temperament, happiness, secondary virtues, etc. to be good ‘in every respect 
or only under the condition of a good will.’87 Ultimately the good will alone is 
unconditionally good: ‘A good will is not good because of what it effects or 
accomplishes, […] but only because of its volition, that is, […] regarded for itself, [it] is to 
be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor 
of some inclination.’88  
Sensen summarises this way ‘A judgment about absolute inner value is 
accordingly a judgment of what is to be valued irrespective of any condition 
(inclinations, consequences, etc.). This judgment is made in accordance with the 
Categorical Imperative, and therefore follows from it. Value is not the ground of it.’89 
 
                                                                
85 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 34. 
86 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 34. Quote from CPR A 324/B 381. 
87 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 35. He refers to G 393 ff. 
88 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 35. Quote taken from G 394. 
89 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 35. 
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2.4 The Formula of Humanity 
 
 
There are two themes Sensen discusses and which I shall mention briefly. They 
address Kant’s concept of humanity especially as we find it expressed in the Formula of 
Humanity90 and the subsequent theme of the ‘setting of ends.’ Sensen claims that Kant 
provides a justification for the requirement to respect others in a section of the 
Groundwork summarizing the Formula of Humanity.91 The Formula reads: ‘So act that 
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at 
the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’92 This requirement is already 
incorporated in the Formula of Universal Law or Categorical Imperative, which makes 
the two Formulas ‘at bottom the same.’93  
In line with his argument thus far Sensen holds that there is no prior or 
independent value that could form the basis for the moral law. Any such grounding 
would introduce contingency and nullify the ‘necessary and universal nature of 
morality.’94 He says, furthermore, that there is ‘no non-moral activity, such as the 
setting of ends, that commits one to valuing others.’95 Sensen points out that while we 
should value the good will, even this good will is not in itself the ground or reason to 
respect others. We naturally respect the moral law we see in others but even this 
                                                                
90 In keeping with Sensen’s way of speaking, I shall refer to the Second Formula here as 
the Formula of Humanity. 
91 See G 437 ff. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 107.  
92 G 429, as quoted by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 97. 
93 G 437. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 107. 
94 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 96. 
95 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 96. 
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feeling of respect is not to be confused with the maxim requiring us to respect others. In 
fact, this requirement, for one thing, draws no distinction between a criminal and a holy 
person, since one owes each of them equal respect. Sensen leaves no doubt that the 
one and only ground for respecting another – ever – is ‘that it is a direct command of 
reason’ which is the case because this is the ‘way reason necessarily functions.’96 And 
what this expresses is none other than the Categorical Imperative. 
Kant, however, expresses the requirement to respect others in terms of the 
Formula of Humanity. But this, Sensen argues, is for Kant ‘at bottom the same as the 
Categorical Imperative.’97 Sensen acknowledges that the claim regarding the link 
between the Categorical Imperative and the Formula of Humanity is not new; it has 
been held by prominent Kantian scholars, among whom he mentions Sullivan.98 What is 
new in his argument is that one can find within the Formula of Humanity the 
universalizing maxim to respect others. He argues that the Formula, as such, is not 
justified in terms of value but in terms of respect, which is a direct command of 
reason.99 
Sensen provides a detailed analysis that spans many pages. I shall not go into 
that here. At issue is the desire of some scholars to find an argument, which is both 
‘different from and independent of the Categorical Imperative.’100 The key question for 
                                                                
96 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 96. 
97 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 96. Sensen refers to G 436, 437. 
98 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 96 n 77. We have discussed this point 
above in Sullivan. 
99 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 96 ff. 
100 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 97. I shall call this the alternative 
interpretation. 
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him pivots on the understanding of Kant’s phrase within the passage leading up to the 
Formula: ‘The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.’101 The 
alternative interpretation takes this ‘end in itself’ to refer to a ‘special moral status,’ 
which is ‘a value one should always respect.’ Scholars tend to combine this with Kant’s 
reference to this being ‘a subjective principle,’ which is then taken to denote a 
possession of ‘moral status’ which demands respect. This is the alternative 
interpretation of the Formula of Humanity.102 
In characteristic fashion, Sensen presents us with a thorough-going analysis of 
Kant’s usage of the notion ‘end in itself.’ It occurs roughly twenty-nine times in his 
published writings103 and is contrasted with a thing in nature, which is ‘a means to 
another.’104 A human being, in contrast, is an end in itself, insofar as he is ‘not fully 
determined by causal laws.’105 ‘End in itself’ is for Sensen ‘a technical term that gets its 
meaning from its contrast to “mere means,”’ and describes a metaphysical fact that 
human beings are free.106 
Sensen writes in conclusion: ‘For Kant, then, the Categorical Imperative is a 
direct command of reason. It is an operating principle of a reason that has freedom. As 
                                                                
101 See G 428 ff. The full passage reads: ‘The ground of this principle is: rational nature 
exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in 
this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational 
being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational 
ground that also holds for me;* thus it is at the same time an objective principle from 
which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will.’ 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 97. 
102 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 97. 
103 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 103 n 79. 
104 Naturrecht Feyerabend 1321. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 102. 
105 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 103. 
106 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 103. 
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reason tries to overcome contradictions or seeks the unconditioned, so it is under the 
moral law or Categorical Imperative. The imperative does not have to be grounded in a 
normative reality (e.g., a value). Rather it is the first normative reality. One can say that 
ancient Greek philosophy insisted that the good is more fundamental for human beings 
than the right or the moral law. However, in the Judeo-Christian tradition the law was 
taken to be the first normative reality. […] The primacy of laws was maintained in the 
natural law traditions […]. For Kant too the first normative reality is a law. This he has in 
common with, for instance, divine command theories. However, Kant is quick to argue 
that this law cannot be a law that comes from an external source, e.g. from God, the 
state or other human beings.’107 Both the Categorical Imperative and the Formula of 
Humanity share for Sensen the same justification and similarly express the same 
requirement (the willing of one’s maxim as universal law). This means that one may use 
the less strict method provided for by the Formula of Humanity (rather than that of the 
Categorical Imperative) ‘to derive concrete duties.’108 These duties for Kant relate to the 
requirement of respect.109 And here too Sensen states explicitly that ‘Kant does not […] 
think that the Categorical Imperative and the requirement to respect others differ 
essentially.’ In fact they ‘can be seen as one command put in different ways.’110 
In the final section of this Interlude we look briefly at what Sensen makes of 
Kant’s usage of the term ‘humanity.’ This pertains to exactly ‘what’ ought to be 
respected or never treated as a ‘mere means.’ Sensen reports that based on a careful 
                                                                
107 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 117-18. 
108 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 118. 
109 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 118-22. 
110 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 123, 124 respectively. 
 182 
reading of The Metaphysics of Morals (The Doctrine of Virtue) and Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant may be said to have drawn distinctions between our 
animality, humanity and personality. Our animality refers to that aspect we share with 
all non-rational living beings. Our humanity denotes our reason with its capacity to set 
ends. However, we are to be mindful that reason, insofar as it is governed by our 
inclinations, is a slave to our passions. Personality, finally then refers to human beings 
under the moral law and as such is ‘a reason that can be practical by itself, i.e., one not 
conditioned by inclinations but free.’111 Sensen points out that Kant’s later distinctions 
between our animality, humanity and personality, are not to be projected back into the 
Groundwork. He argues on the contrary that this threefold distinction is not 
presupposed by the Groundwork. In the Formula of Humanity Kant envisages ‘humanity’ 
as freedom. ‘As freedom brings with it the moral law,’ he writes, ‘what should be 
respected is freedom or the capacity to be morally good.’112 Sensen points out that this 
is what Kant in his later writings would call ‘personality,’ but that he also expresses it by 
other means, using especially the distinction between homo phenomenon and homo 
noumenon.113 This is a distinction that appears in the Lectures of Ethics (Vigilantius) but 
according to Sensen’s reading also in the Groundwork and Metaphysics of Morals and 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.  
This distinction, off course, is not meant to be a metaphysical one depicting 
separate entities. Homo phenomenon ‘is “man in the state of sensibility”, that is a 
                                                                
111 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 128. He refers to MM 434; Rel 26-28. 
112 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 128. 
113 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 128. 
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human being as he experiences himself in introspection.’ Homo noumenon, on the other 
hand, is ‘merely man “as an ideal, as he ought to be and can be, merely according to 
reason.”’114 This second form presents the idea of ourselves as morally good and 
functions both as Idea and ideal.115 
Sensen quotes Kant in showing now how humanity in one’s own person is called 
‘personality.’ Thus: ‘Personhood, or humanity in my person, is […] that which 
distinguishes man in his freedom from all objects under whose jurisdiction he stands in 
his visible nature. It is thought of, therefore, as a subject that is destined to give moral 
laws to man, and to determine him: as occupant of the body, to whose jurisdiction the 
control of all man’s powers is subordinated. There is thus lodged in man an unlimited 
capacity that can be determined to operate in his nature through himself alone, and not 
through anything else in nature. This is freedom.’116 So when we say we should respect 
the humanity in another person we respect the homo noumenon and that is ‘just 
another way of saying one should respect freedom.’117  
In reference to the Doctrine of Virtue Sensen elucidates another dimension of 
what ought to be respected in others. This is their self-esteem. Each one is under the 
obligation to esteem himself. This means that others similarly fall under this obligation 
                                                                
114 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 129. Sensen quotes from Vigil 593. 
115 Sensen refers to Vigil 610. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 129. 
116 Quoted from Vigil 627 with reference to 579; in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 129. Sensen also refers to MM 239, 418; Rel 28; for evidence of this 
understanding elsewhere (Ibid., 130). 
117 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 131. For Sensen this freedom is nothing other 
than ‘the capacity for morality.’ A few sentences on we read: ‘The homo noumenon is 
freedom or the capacity for morality’ (Ibid., 131). 
 184 
toward self-esteem.118 And, all alike can achieve to moral worth (i.e., esteem). Sensen 
writes: ‘One can achieve this worth in respecting the moral law: “simply respect for the 
law is that incentive which can give actions a moral worth” […] Respecting the law is the 
same as respecting the idea of oneself as being morally good, i.e., the homo noumenon: 
“Our own will insofar as it would act only under the condition of a possible giving of 
universal law through its maxims – this will possible for us in idea – is the proper object 
of respect.”’119 In this quote Sensen ties together the notions of homo noumenon, 
freedom, self-esteem (worth) and the moral law as they pertain to respect. 
Sensen has now established that Kant did not view value as a metaphysical, 
ontological reality within a human being and that a value could neither ground the 
moral law nor motivate one’s adherence to it. Respect for humanity is furthermore the 
result of obeying the Categorical Imperative and does not ground it. These 
interpretations will form the principles that will guide him in his search to determine 
Kant’s understanding of the concept of dignity. We now turn to Sensen’s historical 
analysis of this concept. 
 
 
 
                                                                
118 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 131. Sensen refers to MM 462 and quotes 
Kant: ‘But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would conflict with his 
duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem 
of others, as human beings.’ 
119 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 132. Sensen quotes both times from G 440.  
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3. Three Paradigms of Dignity 
 
Sensen divides thinking about human dignity historically into two phases, the 
contemporary, and what he calls the traditional paradigm. Within the traditional 
paradigm he distinguishes between the origin of the traditional paradigm, the so-called 
archaic or aristocratic paradigm and the traditional one proper.120 We shall briefly 
capture the essence of each paradigm and then proceed with Sensen as he draws 
philosophical distinctions between the contemporary and traditional models of dignity.  
 
3.1 The Contemporary Paradigm 
 
 
Sensen proposes that Kant ‘uses a fundamentally Stoic conception of dignity.’121 
Sensen calls it ‘Stoic’ after Cicero, who first applied the concept ‘dignitas’ in reference to 
Stoic doctrines and, furthermore, because Kant himself in the opening section of the 
second part of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason refers approvingly to the 
Stoics’ conception of dignity. There Kant discusses the contribution of the Stoics to the 
moral life with regard to their notion of virtue.122 In order to explain exactly what this 
                                                                
120 For a list of scholars who wrote on the history and development of the idea of 
dignity, see Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 152 n 132. He makes clear that he 
does not pretend to ‘present a history of ideas’ and that it is important to bear in mind 
that he is interested in establishing patterns of thought in so far as different notions of 
dignity are concerned. Ibid., 152, 153 n 133.  
121 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 143.  
122 It is important to note that this occurs in the context of Kant’s discussion of the moral 
life as requiring constant battle with the ‘active and opposing cause of evil’ within. The 
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means and how it relates to Kant’s understanding of dignity Sensen presents what he 
calls ‘three paradigms of dignity.’ This allows him to determine not only where Kant 
stands vis-à-vis our contemporary notion of dignity but also to highlight the difference 
between the contemporary notion and his own understanding of Kant’s notion. There is 
an implicit hermeneutical question in the background: namely, to what degree is our 
understanding of Kant’s notion of dignity colored by the contemporary notion? It is 
Sensen’s belief that the standard view of ‘Kantian’ dignity takes more from the 
contemporary model than from Kant himself. 
In our previous chapter we saw that if we were to search for a question to which 
the answer would be ‘dignity,’ a possible candidate might be: What is, or, more 
precisely, wherein lay the value of human being? Thus we established a link between 
dignity and value or worth [Werth].123 For the contemporary paradigm this association is 
central. 
Sensen looks at contemporary documents in support of his understanding of the 
contemporary paradigm. In fact, he states that the contemporary model is basically a 
product of the twentieth century.124 He builds this model by looking at some documents 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
mature Kant has not diminished the early Kant’s notion of the struggle, and the effort 
required for struggle. It is in this context that Kant refers to the Stoics and in a note, to 
which Sensen refers, he writes: ‘These [Stoic] philosophers derived their universal moral 
principle from the dignity of human nature, from its freedom (as an independence from 
the power of the inclinations), and they could not have laid down a better or nobler 
principle for foundation. They then drew the moral laws directly from reason, the sole 
legislator, commanding absolutely through its laws.’ Kant, Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason (1791) 1996, 6:57n. 
123 According to Sensen Kant only uses this word Werth to express the English ‘worth’ or 
‘value.’ See Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 311 n 8. 
124 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 152. 
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stemming from the United Nations and some scholars.125 He starts, however, with the 
authoritative German dictionary Duden, which defines dignity [Würde] as ‘a “worth 
inherent in human beings that commands respect.”’126 For a full philosophical 
expression Sensen turns to Josef Seifert who writes: ‘When we speak of the dignity of 
human life, we mean an objective and intrinsic value. We speak of a value and intrinsic 
goodness greater than, and different from, a modest aesthetic value of an ornament or 
the intellectual value of a chess player […], which do not directly impose moral 
imperatives on us. Instead, when we speak of human dignity, we speak of morally 
relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a moral call and an obligation to 
respect it.’127 Sensen points out that this value is judged to be a ‘distinct metaphysical 
property,’ that, as such, is not subject to any change. Moreover, this value is again, in 
the words of Seifert, ‘incommensurably higher’ than any other value; and, it is both 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘objective.’ According to Sensen, Seifert held that we know this dignity 
                                                                
125 Scholars he refers to are Wood, Jones, Paton, and Lo, among others. For these 
Kantians dignity has ‘moral implications.’ It grounds the respect I owe others. In what 
would be an apt summary of the position Sensen has argued against, he writes: ‘In 
justifying why one should respect others, the good (here understood as an inherent 
value of the individual) is seen as prior to the right (the principle that demands respect 
for others), and the rights of those affected are seen as being prior to the duty of the 
agent.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 147, and 147 n 119, for the list of scholars. 
126 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 147. 
127 As quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 147-48. 
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intuitively (i.e., ‘by intuition as direct recognition’128), and this view of dignity as ‘an 
ontologically distinct value property’ reveals ‘a stark form of value realism.’129  
Sensen turns next to various documents of the United Nations, particularly the 
Introduction to the (founding) Charter of the United Nations (1945),130 and the 
Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), as well as the two 
Covenants on rights (adopted in 1966), namely, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
from the International Covenants on Human Rights (1967), whose preambles declare 
that human dignity is the basis for human rights.131 
                                                                
128 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 148. Sensen elaborates by quoting Seifert: ‘As 
life, and human life, this value called “dignity” is an ultimate and irreducible 
phenomenon which cannot be defined properly speaking but can only be unfolded and 
brought to evidence.’ 
129 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 148. He points out that not every proponent of 
the contemporary paradigm follows an ‘intuitionist epistemology.’ As such he shows 
how some contemporary Kantians argue for the absolute value of human beings. Sensen 
thinks of Christine Korsgaard, Allen Wood, Paul Guyer, Richard Dean and Samuel 
Kerstein, whom he discusses in an earlier chapter. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 55f, 69f, 75f, 79f, 88f, 92f, and 148. With reference to some problems regarding 
the form of value realism with distinct ontological and epistemic properties, see Ibid., 
148 n 121.  
130 ‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined […] to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, [and] in the dignity and worth of the human person.’ Listing 
dignity and worth together leads to the association of dignity with worth or value. See 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 150, 150 n 128. 
131 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 149-152. Sensen quotes the opening 
statements of both preambles and I highlight only one sentence: ‘The States Parties to 
the present Covenant, Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in 
the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world, Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person […], Agree upon the following articles: […]. [Sensen’s 
emphasis].’ (Ibid., 151). 
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Sensen summarises the contemporary paradigm of dignity very well when he 
states: ‘Today dignity is widely conceived of as an inherent value property on the basis 
of which one can claim respect from others: One is justified in making this claim because 
of one’s intrinsic and objective preciousness. In justifying moral claims, the good 
(dignity) is prior to a principle stating what is right; and one’s claims as entitlements – 
which are justified by the good – are prior to the duties of the agent.’132 
 
3.2 The Traditional Paradigm 
 
 
‘Human dignity, in the traditional conception’ writes Sensen, ‘is in the first place 
the answer to the theoretical question of the place of human beings in the universe.’133 
To determine their place human beings thought about their distinctiveness in the face of 
nature, which, according to the traditional paradigm lay with ‘certain capacities’ they 
possess, especially reason and freedom. ‘The term “dignity” is used to express this 
special position or elevation.’134 The moral significance of dignity came later as a result 
of the adoption of a ‘further moral premise,’ which articulates ‘the duty to realize fully 
one’s initial dignity.’ Sensen calls this second stage ‘realized dignity’ as opposed to the 
                                                                
132 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 148 ff. 
133 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 153. 
134 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 153. 
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first stage’s ‘initial dignity.’ This is the two-fold conception of dignity characteristic of 
the traditional paradigm.135 
 
3.2.1 The Aristocratic Paradigm: the Origin of the Traditional Paradigm 
 
 
There is a ‘third and older’ paradigm of dignity, the aristocratic or archaic 
paradigm.136 This model is the prototype of the traditional paradigm. The name 
‘aristocratic’ indicates its meaning and usage. It is related to the ancient Roman concept 
of dignitas. As such it was a political concept that gave expression to ‘the elevated 
position of the ruling class.’ Moreover, as a ‘term of distinction’ it pertained only to the 
few (Sensen names the senator and the consul) and was procured through political 
office, which itself could be obtained by merit, birth or wealth. It could also be lost and 
even regained. This office brought with it both ‘powers and privileges’ and ‘duties to 
behave appropriately to one’s rank.’137  
                                                                
135 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 153, and 153 n 133, where he 
acknowledges that not all of the thinkers holding this paradigm would necessarily 
acknowledge these ‘two separate stages.’ 
136 In an earlier work Sensen speaks of the archaic paradigm. See Sensen, Kant's 
Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 312. Archaic possibly refers to the origin. 
Aristocratic, on the other hand, which he abides by in his major work Kant on Human 
Dignity reflects the fact that dignity is essentially for the aristocratic, that is, for the few. 
See Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional 
Paradigms 2011, 75-76. 
137 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 153. Sensen points out that this notion 
would have been familiar to the ancient Greeks and could be seen, for instance, in 
Aristotle’s notion of the magnanimous person. Magnanimity, for Aristotle, had to do 
‘with great things’and the magnanimous person was one ‘who thinks himself worthy of 
great things and is really worthy of them.’ Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1985, IV, 
1123b. Sensen refers to the whole section in the Nichomachean Ethics IV, 1123b-1125a. 
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Sensen notes the multi-faceted dimensions active within the Latin notion of 
dignitas. It could at the same time refer simultaneously to all, or some, of the following: 
high office (rank) in society, worthiness of it, excellence at it, as well as one’s being 
esteemed for it.138 To be accorded dignity did not mean that all these characteristics 
necessarily and simultaneously referred to one and the same person. Some elements 
might have been missing. The later Notitia dignitatum (a list of the highest ranking 
officials), which came into use in the late Roman Empire, emphasized only the office 
that one was appointed to by the emperor. As such one became ‘a dignitary.’ The 
above-mentioned associations of esteem and excellence played no necessary or 
essential role in these cases then, and it referred to ranks and titles. Sensen concludes 
that ‘[t]he essential component is that dignity expresses a relation, an elevated standing 
of something over something else.’139  
We see here that we need not understand dignity as a ‘distinct metaphysical 
value property human beings possess’ and it does not ‘necessarily refer to a moral 
order, or an order in value.’140 It can refer merely to an elevation of rank that, 
moreover, has nothing to do with one’s worthiness of occupying the rank. This is an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 153 n 134. Even so he notes that the Greeks had 
no lingusitic equivalent to the Roman dignitas. See Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human 
Dignity 2009, 312 n 18. 
138 A look at the Oxford Latin Dictionary reveals these four groups of possible 
translations. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 154. 
139 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 154. Sensen indicates that when Kant uses 
dignity in this aristocratic sense it is used explicitly as specifying rank. He refers to MM 
328, 464 and Anthr 127. 
140 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 154. 
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important point in understanding the difference between the contemporary and 
traditional paradigm. 
 
3.2.2 Cicero and the Traditional Paradigm 
 
 
Although he doesn’t express it in these terms, my impression is that Cicero is, for 
Sensen, a bridge-figure within the traditional paradigm between the aristocratic and the 
traditional (proper) paradigm. That is, he transformed the aristocratic paradigm. To be 
sure his work reveals many examples of the aristocratic usage of the Roman dignitas, to 
which we referred above as meanings recorded in the Oxford Latin Dictionary.141 In this 
sense dignity refers to the ‘elevated place’ of human beings in the universe.142 However, 
Cicero universalized dignitas in that he brought it to bear upon all human beings. This 
dignity, ‘rank or elevated position’ is expressed foremost in terms of our ‘superiority or 
dignity’ over animals.143 This is seen in the fact that animals are ruled by their instincts 
and sensual pleasure. Humans are in possession of reason. Sensen shows how some of 
the conclusions Cicero draws from this lead to a fuller account of dignity. Cicero argues 
that our natural feelings of shamefulness when we are caught out ‘indulging in 
pleasure,’ reveal that in the light of our superiority [excellentia] we (i.e., our nature) 
                                                                
141 In fact, Sensen points out how the four usages of the word dignitas that the Oxford 
Latin Dictionary determines are all taken and illustrated with quotes from Cicero. He 
mentions that there was before Cicero only one usage in existence and found in both 
Plautus and Terence. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 155 n 136. 
142 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 155. 
143 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 155; Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical 
Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms 2011, 76. 
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deem such a life ‘unworthy.’144 Our elevated position (due to reason), ‘demand[s] a life 
in which one’s lower desires are governed in accordance with reason.’145 Nature 
equipped all of us with reason. According to Sensen, Cicero’s move to argue from the 
fact of reason to duty depends on his addition of a teleological premise to his original 
one: the first is that nature has given us reason, and the second is that we should act in 
accord with nature. Although these premises flow into each other, Sensen highlights this 
as an illustration of how fact (all beings are equipped with reason) becomes obligation 
(live a life according to reason) through the addition of this teleological principle that 
Sensen expresses as follows: ‘nature gave one the end of self-control and restraint that 
one should act this way.’146 It would be pointless to fight nature on this –she has 
endowed us with what is most fitting to our lives and our dignity. As he quotes Cicero as 
saying, ‘the fitting is what is consistent with man’s excellence in the respect in which his 
nature differs from all other living creatures.’147  
This is for Sensen a beautiful example of the traditional paradigm: we are special 
because we have the capability for reason. This bestows on us dignity. And this dignity 
                                                                
144 Sensen quotes from Cicero’s De officiis: ‘[S]ensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the 
dignity of man and […] we ought to despise it and cast it from us; […] And if we will only 
bear in mind the superiority and dignity [excellentia et dignitas] of our nature, we shall 
realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and 
voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety.’ 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 155 ff. 
145 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 156. He continues with another quote from 
Cicero: ‘We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it 
were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with 
reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality 
and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our 
duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular.’  
146 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 156. 
147 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 157. 
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(elevation) places upon us the obligation to behave in accordance with the worth that is 
bespoken by our dignity. 
 
3.2.3 Leo the Great 
 
 
Sensen turns next to St. Leo the Great, who reigned as Pope Leo I from 440 to 
461 A.D.148 He is thought to be the first Christian thinker to use the Latin concept of 
dignitas. His sermons reflect, moreover, the ‘traditional two-fold conception of dignity.’ 
Sensen quotes ‘one famous passage’ from Leo that is even quoted in the official 
Catechism of the Catholic Church: ‘Realize [agnosce], o Christian, your dignity. Once 
made a “partaker in the divine nature,” do not return to your former baseness by a life 
unworthy [of that dignity].’149 One becomes a ‘partaker in the divine nature’ in virtue of 
one’s creation in the image of God.150 
                                                                
148 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 157-59; Sensen, Human Dignity in 
Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms 2011, 78-79. 
149 As quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 157. He points out that this quote 
serves as the ‘opening sentence’ at the point where the Catechsim turns to discuss 
concrete Christian life, i.e., the ethical implcations of faith. He refers to Catechism of the 
Catholic Church 1999, § 1691. 
150 Sensen refers to two Bible passages, Genesis 1:26-28, and Psalm 8: 5-10 that bear 
upon the notion of being created in the image of God. In addition he quotes two more 
passages (from Leo) to underscore the point. Both are noteworthy in terms of the two-
fold structure characteristic of the traditional concept of dignity. The first passage reads: 
‘Wake up then, o friend, and acknowledge the dignity of your nature. Recall that you 
have been made “according to the image of God.”’ In the second passage Leo writes: 
‘People should acknowledge their own dignity, and see themselves as “made in the 
image and likeness of” their Creator.’ See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 157, 
157 n 141. Note in the first quote we have dignity but have to acknowledge it. For this 
we need to ‘wake up’ – the knowledge brings with it a certain responsibility. The two-
fold structure in the second quote is clearer: We are made in the image and likeness of 
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Sensen explains that ‘we are an image of God’ because we ‘have a soul’ and this 
leads to our elevation (i.e., dignity) above nature and animals and especially over our 
bodies and its passions. ‘[L]et the soul, which properly is constituted as ruler of the body 
under the direction of God, retain the dignity of its mastery,’ writes Leo.151 Sensen 
explains that the dignity of this mastery resides for Leo in the capability of the soul to 
‘govern itself independently of bodily desires.’152 This governance is implemented 
through reason. Reason is thus the key to a ‘well ordered leadership’ of the body in 
submissiveness to its Ruler (God).153  
Being independent from bodily desires through reason grounds our freedom and 
our elevation over nature. In this Leo follows Cicero, although Sensen points out it is 
envisaged with reference to God – we are to ‘imitate God.’154 The structure of their 
understanding of dignity is similar: we have capacities (freedom and reason) that 
distinguish us from the rest of nature and these obligate us to make proper use of them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
God. Likeness, meaning literally to be like someone, carries with it an ethical 
responsibility to imitate God and it is a lifetime’s ‘occupation.’ This reflects the two-fold 
structure beautifully. 
151 As quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 158. 
152 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 158. This ‘independence’ reveals the possibility 
(and ability) to take distance from one’s desires and passions. In other words it is the 
capacity to be free from the control or influence of in this case our bodily desires. The 
key in this dynamic is reason and here we see how freedom and reason belong and work 
together for Leo in mastering oneself.  
153 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 158. 
154 Sensen quotes: ‘If we reflect upon the beginning of our creation with faith and 
wisdom, dearly beloved, we shall come to the realization that human beings have been 
formed according to the image of God precisely with a view that they might imitate 
their Designer. Our race has this dignity of nature, so long as the figure of divine 
goodness continues to be reflected in us as in a kind of mirror.’ Sensen adds that for Leo 
the image of God in us resides also in our ability ‘to do justice and be merciful.’ See 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 158, and also 158 n 145. 
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The first would be our initial dignity and the latter the realization of our (initial) dignity. 
Sensen points out that where Cicero took recourse to teleological nature to motivate 
dignity’s realization, Leo found it in a providential God who commands us to imitate 
Him.155 
 
3.2.4 Pico della Mirandola 
 
 
Sensen moves next to the Renaissance, a period in which human dignity as a 
theme enjoyed considered attention.156 This prominence was in part the result of the 
backlash caused by a work by Cardinal Lothario dei Conti (or Segni), who would later 
become Pope Innocent III, called De Miseria Humanae Conditionis, addressing the 
misery of the human condition. Sensen focuses on Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494).157 
His work Discourse on the Dignity of Man (1486) exemplifies the traditional model of 
dignity.  
Pico attempts to appraise man’s position within the ‘universal order.’ He does 
this with reference to the ‘chain of being,’ which considers all being, from God, the 
Highest Being, to the lowest forms of existence, as being linked to each other while 
occupying a (fixed) place within a determined hierarchy – i.e., a ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ place. 
                                                                
155  He points out that for Cicero, God too created the soul and that our virtues reflect 
the likeness of God. For Leo, though, humanity lost its earlier dignity in Adam’s fall but it 
was ‘restored in Jesus’ death.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 159 n 148.  
156 See Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and 
Traditional Paradigms 2011, 79-80; Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 159-161. 
157 Besides Pico, others addressed this topic as well. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 159 n 150. 
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Pico claims that ‘the initial dignity of man consists in having no fixed place in that 
chain.’158 This is because human dignity consists in our capability to choose, or 
determine, our own place in this chain. Sensen quotes Pico’s imaginary address (of God 
to Adam) after his creation: ‘Constrained by no limits, you may determine it for yourself, 
according to your own free will, in whose hand we have placed you. […] It will be in your 
power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish; you shall have the 
power, according to your soul’s judgement, to be reborn into the higher orders, which 
are divine.’159 
Our dignity lies in the fact that we were given both freedom and reason. We are 
free to live brutishly; but with our souls, which possess reason, we are ‘able to grow 
toward the divine.’ This self-determination places upon us a duty to fully realize our 
‘initial dignity.’ Our ‘upward’ or ‘downward’ movement on this chain of being depends 
on the degree to which we have realized our dignity. According to Pico God has 
implanted in us all that we need to reach the highest orders of being. We reach these by 
cultivating reason and intellect and thus ‘become a heavenly animal’ and ultimately ‘an 
angel and a son of God.’ Neglecting this, by cultivating our lower capacities, we become 
brutish and even lower.160 
Our dignity lies in the ability of freedom to choose a way of life. This elevates us 
above nature and animality. As Sensen puts it ‘human beings are superior to animals in 
the capacities they possess, though not necessarily in how they choose to exercise these 
                                                                
158 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 159-160. 
159 Quoted from Discourse on the Dignity of Man §4.20 and 23 in Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 160. 
160 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 160. 
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capacities.’161 What is important in this dynamic though is that one should not yield to 
mediocrity but kindle ‘a holy ambition’ to ‘strive for the loftiest,’ for this is what God 
wishes from us. 162 Sensen remarks that Pico’s use of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ does not refer 
to a ‘value property,’ as it would in the contemporary paradigm, but to the ‘chain of 
being.’ He points out that while ‘higher’ can be indicative of ‘being better’ or ‘having 
more worth,’ it refers ontologically, to having ‘more being.’163  Pico’s thought 
exemplifies the traditional paradigm as well. We are elevated in terms of our capacities 
and our morality is related to our duty to do our best in developing our initial dignity. 
We shall now look at Sensen’s presentation on the differences between the 
contemporary and traditional conceptions of dignity. 
 
3.3 The Differences between the Two Conceptions 
 
 
Sensen identifies four principal differences between the two conceptions, that is, 
between the contemporary and traditional conceptions or paradigms of dignity. The 
aristocratic or archaic paradigm was treated as part of the traditional one, to which it 
was the earlier precursor. Sensen finds that in the traditional understanding dignity is 
not viewed as a distinct metaphysical, non-relational value property; it exhibits a two-
                                                                
161 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 160. 
162 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 161. 
163 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 161 n 155. 
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fold structure; it does not in itself form the ground for rights; and, it is, first and 
foremost, concerned with duties toward oneself.164 
 
3.3.1 Dignity is not a value 
 
 
In the traditional paradigm, dignity denotes the ‘elevated position of human 
beings in the universe.’ It does not refer to ‘an inherent value property.’165 Sensen talks 
also of dignity’s not being ‘a non-relational value property human beings possess.’166 In 
other words, it is not seen as a metaphysical property, intrinsically internal, which 
makes us special. It is relational, and as such, relative to whatever it is being related to. 
This means, for instance, that animals are higher than plants, and at the same time, 
lower than humans.167 We might take this to be comparative category. Sensen points 
out, however, that the notions of ‘elevated’ and ‘higher’ are not intended to signify ‘a 
hierarchy of value’ as such but on the contrary ‘a hierarchy in being’ – as we have seen 
in Pico, for instance.168 Reminding us that the origin of this traditional paradigm lies 
                                                                
164 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 161-64; Sensen, Human Dignity in 
Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms 2011, 83-85; 
Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 313-14. 
165 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 162. 
166 Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 313. He also defines non-
relational as being separate. See Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The 
Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms 2011, 83. 
167 Sensen refers among others here to Aristotle, On the Soul 1994-2009, 414a29-
415a13, where he makes the point that different kinds of beings (like plants, animals 
and humans) have different capacities (like nutrition and growth, perception and 
motion, and reason and choice). See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 162 n 157. 
168 In this regard Sensen mentions Arthur Lovejoy who drew attention to the fact that 
this view of a ‘hierarchy in being’ remained influentially present from the time of Plato 
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within the aristocratic conception of dignitas, with its understanding of and application 
to the senator, for instance, who is elevated in rank and status above others, without 
implying thereby a ‘distinct metaphysical value property,’ Sensen recalls that Cicero  
took this notion and universalized it to include all people. Our elevated status comes 
from ‘having certain capacities’ – even if these were ‘intrinsic features’ like reason and 
freedom.169 
 
3.3.2 Dignity is a two-fold notion 
 
 
According to the contemporary model, we have dignity because we possess a 
certain fixed value. This means, as Sensen puts it, ‘one either has or does not have 
dignity.’170 In the traditional model dignity exhibits a two-fold structure, meaning it 
consists of two stages, an initial dignity, which then requires completion. Failure to 
effectuate one’s dignity leads to its being wasted. Initial dignity comes with our 
capabilities – like reason and freedom – and in this sense all have initial dignity. Proper 
use of these capabilities leads to the full actualization of our dignity. In the traditional 
paradigm ‘dignity’ refers to both dimensions.171 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
up to the 19th century. Sensen points out that while this hierarchy could also be 
expressed in terms of the good, ontologically a higher level means only that it has ‘more 
being.’ See Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 313f n 24. 
169 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 162. 
170 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 162. 
171 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 162-63. 
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3.3.3 Dignity does not yield rights 
 
 
In the traditional paradigm the main focus is on duties and not on rights. Sensen 
writes aptly: ‘The thought is not that one can make claims on others because one has 
freedom and reason. Instead, having reason or freedom is said to yield the duty to make 
a proper use of one’s capacities.’172 This duty, however, does not follow automatically 
from the mere presence of these capacities: a further premise is required. In this regard 
Sensen showed how a teleological view functioned, in the dialectical move that we 
ought to use the human capabilities which nature (or God) bestowed on us. Kant will 
use a separate principle – the Categorical Imperative. The important point with regard 
to the entitlement of one’s rights is, as Sensen says, that when it comes to its 
justification ‘they are grounded on the further normative premise, not on dignity 
itself.’173  
This contrasts with the contemporary model, which grounds human rights on an 
inherent metaphysical property – one that is imbued with absolute value. Having this 
value entitles one to claim rights. 
                                                                
172 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 163. 
173 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 163. In the next paragraph Sensen says this 
‘further normative premise’ includes the duty ‘to fully realize one’s initial dignity.’ With 
regard to Kant, Sensen quotes MM 239. Kant asks: ‘But why is the doctrine of morals 
usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of rights, even though rights have 
reference to duties?’ He answers: ‘The reason is that we know our own freedom (from 
which all moral laws, and so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral 
imperative, which is a proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for 
putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of right, can afterwards be 
explicated.’ As quoted in Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The 
Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms 2011, 84. 
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Sensen notes that for the protagonists of the traditional paradigm the space 
devoted to the entitlement of one’s rights does not compare favourably with the 
protagonists of the contemporary model. He suggests that one reason might be the 
result of ‘perfectionism,’ which is commonly connected with this model. 
 
3.3.4 Perfectionism 
 
 
The fourth difference lies for Sensen in the fact that for the traditional model the 
focal point is ‘not on the dignity of others, but on the realization of one’s own dignity.’174 
Sensen points out that when the three thinkers referred to above – Cicero, Leo and Pico 
– speak of dignity, the emphasis is on the agent’s responsibility to actualize his/her own 
initial dignity. Speaking generally about dignity they are wont to speak about the 
privilege of being human, given one’s capabilities and how to use these to perfect 
oneself. As Sensen points out there is an underlying idea of perfectionism at work here, 
whose focus is on ‘how [to] perfect oneself, not how one should treat others.’175 
 
 
 
                                                                
174 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 164. 
175 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 164. See also Sensen, Human Dignity in 
Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms 2011, 84-85. 
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3.4 Kant and the Traditional Paradigm 
 
Sensen has established the typical thought-patterns of the three paradigms he 
identified in the history of Western thought. The first two (aristocratic/archaic and 
traditional) are in such a close proximity with each other, given that the second grew 
and developed from the first, that they can both be classified under the traditional 
model.176 Even so, when we speak of the traditional paradigm we need to keep in mind 
that we intend the fully developed meaning that goes far beyond the initial aristocratic 
pattern of thought. Sensen places a lot of emphasis on the differences because, as he 
points out, distinguishing between especially the traditional and contemporary model is 
important for determining Kant’s own position. It is important for a few reasons. One is, 
as we said above, the contemporary model is prevalent today and the danger is that if, 
erroneously, we were to read this model back into Kant we not only misread him but fail 
to understand what Kant meant by dignity. This could lead to various distortions of Kant. 
A second reason is that both systems require each a different set of normative 
justifications for their validity.177 This means that the different paradigms are embedded 
in different value systems and whichever one we attribute to Kant would have 
implications for the way we argue and justify our (or his) position of dignity and it would 
involve other themes of his thinking as well and once we again face the danger of 
serious distortions. For this reason we turn now with Sensen to see how Kant fits within 
the traditional paradigm. 
                                                                
176 See Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 313. 
177 Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 313. 
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Sensen proceeds to show just how Kant uses ‘dignity’ in accordance with the 
traditional paradigm. He shows this with reference to examples from Kant’s writings. In 
these we shall see how those typical thought patterns particular to the traditional 
model are all present in Kant. In this sense ‘dignity’ is applied to certain vocations. He 
shows, for instance, how Kant talks of ‘the worth of the teacher,’178 or indeed of 
‘jesuitical casuistry [which] is beneath the dignity of a ruler, just as [it is] beneath the 
dignity of his minister.’179 He even talks of the dignity of mathematics. In these loci he 
employs the notion of ‘dignity’ in use in the aristocratic sense.180 These are a few 
examples of the aristocratic paradigm. The point is to show that Kant was familiar with 
the traditional paradigm. For Sensen Kant ‘both knew and approved of […] the 
traditional paradigm of dignity.’181 
Kant’s approval of this paradigm is seen in the following quote from Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: ‘These philosophers [Stoics and others] derived 
their universal moral principle from the dignity of human nature, from its freedom (as 
an independence from the power of the inclinations), and they could not have laid down 
a better or nobler principle for foundation. They then drew the moral laws directly from 
reason, the sole legislator, commanding absolutely through its laws. And so was 
                                                                
178 Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1791) 1996, 6:162; as referred 
to in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 164. 
179 Kant, Toward a Perpetual Peace (1795) 1996, 8:344; as referred to in Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 164. 
180 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 164. 
181 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 165. 
 205 
everything quite correctly apportioned.’182 But Sensen goes further and shows how each 
of the four elements particular to the traditional model, and which we discussed above, 
is present and operative in Kant’s understanding and presentation of dignity. 
 
3.4.1 Dignity as elevation and not a value 
 
 
Sensen points out that dignity for Kant, in the first place, ‘refers to an elevation 
and not a value per se.’183 As he says, ‘for Kant dignity is not itself a value human beings 
possess; dignity is rather the sublimity or elevation (Erhabenheit) of something over 
something else.’184  Sensen shows that Kant is quite consistent in his use of dignity in 
this sense throughout his writings. Conceiving of dignity then as rank or as sublimity 
[Erhabenheit] affirms that Kant thinks in line with the Stoic conception of dignity. Sensen 
refers to writings that stretch over Kant’s entire published output. So in work as early as 
his The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God 
and his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy, both 
from 1763, to his work one year later in 1764, namely, the Observations on the Feeling 
of the Beautiful and Sublime, this concept is used in a similar way, even though the 
topics they address differ vastly from each other. Other works Sensen refers to are 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals from 1785; Critique of Practical Reason from 
                                                                
182 Quoted by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 165; from Kant, Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason (1791) 1996, 6:57 note. 
183 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 165; see also 165-68; Sensen, Kant's 
Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 316 ff. 
184 Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 316. 
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1788; both the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue, together forming the 
Metaphysics of Morals published in 1797; and the Lectures on Logic from 1800.185 
‘For Kant dignity refers to an elevation, not a value per se.’186 As Sensen puts it, 
Kant, with this concept, wishes to show ‘that something is elevated or uplifted over 
something else.’ As he explains, ‘X has dignity’ means ‘X is elevated over Y’ or ‘X is 
higher than Y.’187 This expresses the essential relationality that is involved in and 
foundational to, Sensen’s understanding of dignity as Erhabenheit. As he says: 
‘Ontologically “dignity” refers to a relational property of being elevated, not a non-
relational value property.’188 
Sensen turns next to a discussion of Kant’s notion of sublimity and its relation to 
dignity. Significant for him is Kant’s understanding of sublimity (Erhabenheit) as the 
‘highest form of elevation.’189 He writes that Erhabenheit (sublimity) in Kant means ‘that 
which is absolutely great or great without comparison,’ which can also be translated as 
‘exaltedness.’190 For example, the ‘dignity of a monarch’191 refers to the king’s ‘elevated 
                                                                
185 For a list as well as specific passages he references see Sensen, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2011, 165 n 163. 
186 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 165. 
187 Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 310. Here Sensen says: ‘“X has 
dignity” is another expression for “X is elevated over Y”’ [my emphasis]. I take this to 
mean that these two expressions are linguistically equivalent to each other. This point 
serves to draw attention to the fact that Sensen approaches this from an analytic 
perspective. See also Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166. 
188 Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 310. 
189 Sensen refers to CJ 248. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166. So, Sensen 
writes here that when we say ‘X has dignity’ (keeping the meaning of sublimity in mind), 
we say ‘X is raised above all else.’ (Ibid., 166).  
190 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166 n 164. He points out too that when 
Kant uses the adjective erhaben (as, for instance, in his work on physical geography) it is 
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position’ vis-à-vis the state. Similarly, when Kant talks of the ‘dignity of humanity’ he 
puts into words the idea that ‘human beings are elevated over the rest of nature in 
virtue of being free.’192 There are also instances where he talks of dignity in relation to 
morality.193 By this Kant indicates that ‘morality is raised above all else in that morality 
alone should be valued unconditionally.’194 
Sensen remarks that the notion of sublimity is not exhaustively explored in the 
Kant literture.195 Usually it is understood as feeling of the sublime in reference to Kant’s 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime of 1764. However, with 
support from Shell, he points out that sublimity does not always refer to a feeling. The 
following passage, which he presents, is a case in point. Kant writes in the Groundwork: 
‘[I]t is now easy to explain how it happens that, although in thinking the concept of duty 
we think of subjection to the law, yet at the same time we thereby represent a certain 
sublimity and dignity in the person who fulfils all his duties. For there is indeed no 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
not necessarily used ‘in the absolute sense as being the highest form of elevation.’ He 
refers to Kant, Physical Geography 2012, 9:169, 191, and 342. 
191 He refers to Kant, The Contest of Faculties 1970, 1991, 19:166. Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 166. 
192 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166, see also 166 n 165, for instances where 
Kant uses dignity in this way. Sensen refers to G 439, 440; CJ 273; Rel 80, 183; MM 420, 
429, 436, 449, 459, 462; and Ed 488, 489. 
193 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166 n 166. He refers to G 440, 11; CPrR 147 ff.; 
MM 464 ff., 483.  
194 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166. Sensen also writes: ‘When he talks about 
dignity in connection with morality he is saying that morality is raised above all else in 
that morality alone should be valued unconditionally. While it is indeed central to Kant’s 
moral philosophy that all human beings should be respected, “dignity” is not the term 
he uses to express that view.’ Sensen, Kant's Conception of Human Dignity 2009, 310. 
195 He does mention some authors, like Guyer, Shell, Clewis, among others, who have 
made seminal contributions to our understanding of this concept and especially in 
relation to dignity. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166, 166 nn 167-169.  
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sublimity in him insofar as he is subject to the moral law, but there certainly is insofar as 
he is at the same time lawgiving with respect to it and only for that reason subordinated 
to it […] and the dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity to give universal law, 
though with the condition of also being itself subject to this very lawgiving.’196 
This passage is a clear indication for Sensen that Kant sees dignity in terms of 
sublimity, which is contrasted with subordination. Sensen identifies two elements that 
are elevated here, the ‘morally good person’ and ‘humanity as the capacity to be 
moral.’197 
In the Critique of Judgment, Sensen finds further support for his thesis that 
sublimity is more than ‘just a feeling.’ Toward the beginning of Book Two, ‘Analytic of 
the Sublime,’ Kant starts by looking at the mathematically sublime, which is ‘the sublime 
in terms of quantity.’198 Sublimity is defined here as that which is ‘great beyond 
comparison.’ Kant introduces this section on defining sublimity by saying ‘We call 
sublime that which is absolutely great.’199 Sensen points out that Kant clarifies what he 
                                                                
196 G 4:439 ff. as quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 166-67. 
197 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 167. Sublimity in this context expresses not 
feeling but rather that ‘something (e.g., a person who fulfills all his duties) is elevated 
over something else (namely, a being which is not lawgiving) on a certain scale – 
specifically, in terms of morality.’ Two dimensions are highlighted here: the obedience 
to the law (which does not in itself carry dignity) and legislating the moral law, in which 
dignity as capacity is revealed as sublime. When one yields to the law, because one also 
legislates it, one carries dignity within. 
198 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 167. Sensen talks of ‘quantity.’ For a 
discussion as to the best possible translation of ‘eine Größe sein,’ which Guyer and 
Matthews translates by ‘magnitude’ see Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment 2000, 
5:248, esp. 131 note g.  
199 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment 2000, 5:248 as quoted in Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 167. 
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means by ‘absolutely great,’ by saying it is ‘that which is great beyond all comparison.’200 
Sublimity here then refers to infinity ‘as an idea of the mind.’ Sensen points out that in a 
parallel way ‘the dynamical sublime’ – the sublime applicable to quality – ‘the truly 
sublime […] is the power to overcome nature and sensible impulses.’201 Sublimity then is 
not feeling but elevation; and consideration of elevation can awake a feeling of the 
sublime. 
 
                                                                
200 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 167. CJ 248. Quantity is related to mathematics 
(CJ 251). It is a numerical concept and can be thus be calculated and determined. 
Determination, however, comes only as a result of a measurement that is itself 
determined through comparison (CJ 251). Kant writes: ‘Now for the mathematical 
estimation of magnitude there is, to be sure, no greatest (for the power of numbers 
goes on to infinity); but for the aesthetic estimation of magnitude there is certainly a 
greatest; and about this I say that if it is judged as an absolute measure, beyond which 
no greater is subjectively (for the judging subject) possible, it brings with it the idea of 
the sublime, and produces that emotion which no mathematical estimation of 
magnitudes by means of numbers can produce (except insofar as that aesthetic basic 
measure is vividly preserved in the imagination), since the latter always presents only 
relative magnitude through comparison with others of the same species, but the former 
presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in one intuition.’ Kant, 
Critique of the Power of Judgment 2000, 5:251.  
Here, in this context, we see that the concept of absolute (as it is related to the 
notion of the infinite) is neither determinable nor measureable, i.e., not graspable and 
knowable, in the objective sphere. Subjectively, however, we can approach it or grasp it 
intuitively only when we have literally reached the end or limit of our (subjective) 
possibility and capability to determine (or, as here, of calculating infinity in measured 
units). In this situation we confront the absolute. This is presented to us as a subjective 
experience whose content is something akin to a ‘beyond, which no greater is 
subjectively possible to judge.’ 
201 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 167. One can see the moral implications of 
overcoming one’s nature here. Sensen refers to CJ 246 in compariosn with CJ 260 ff. 
Sensen quotes Kant (CJ 264): ‘Thus sublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but 
only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within 
us and thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us).’ (Ibid., 167). 
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3.4.2 The Two Stages of Dignity 
 
 
The two-fold structure endemic to the concept of dignity was the second 
hallmark Sensen identified as characteristic of the traditional paradigm of dignity. He 
now shows how Kant’s usage reveals the same two-fold pattern. We all share dignity 
alike in virtue of our freedom and our capacity for morality (which is linked to freedom). 
This is our initial dignity and one leg of the two-fold structure. The second leg, our 
realized dignity, however, depends on how we use our freedom in actually becoming 
morally good. Quoting from one of the Reflections in Notes and Fragments, Sensen 
writes: ‘The dignity of human nature lies only in its freedom […]. But the dignity of one 
human being (worthiness) rests on the use of his freedom’ [Sensen’s translation].202 In 
the Metaphysics of Morals, freedom is regarded as ‘the innate dignity of a human being’ 
and in the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant refers to this as the ‘initial dignity [ursprüngliche 
Würde].’ But, adds Sensen, it is ‘only if one makes proper use of one’s freedom [that] 
one in fact lift[s] oneself over the rest of nature.’203 Upon this use depends the 
realization of our initial dignity. And this is dignity’s two-fold structure in operation, 
which is found throughout Kant’s oeuvre.  
Keeping this structure in mind helps one, according to Sensen, to make sense of 
some ‘puzzling features,’ which might at first glance seem to be inconsistent. Examples 
Sensen mentions are, for instance, remarks of Kant to the effect that dignity lays in 
                                                                
202 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 168, 168 n 170. He quotes from Kant, Notes 
and Fragments 2005, 19:181; (i.e., Refl 6856) and refers also to Ed 488. 
203 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 168. Sensen quotes from MM 420 and CF 73. 
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one’s ‘capacity for freedom (or morality),’ while elsewhere he asserts it is in effect 
‘being morally good’ that bears this dignity.204 Sensen refers to the passage discussed 
under the previous heading where this structure can be seen to resolve an apparent 
tension. There Kant spoke of the ‘dignity in the person who fulfills all his duties’ 
(reflecting an ‘actually morally good’ person, i.e., one with realized dignity) versus ‘the 
dignity of humanity [that] consists just in this capacity to give the universal law,’ which 
articulates one’s initial dignity that refers to one’s ‘capacity for being morally good.’205  
Two notions that are associated with dignity through the notion of freedom, 
namely, ‘being an end in itself’ and ‘having autonomy’ exhibit for Sensen a similar two-
fold structure. Both serve to emphasize ‘different aspects of freedom.’ Freedom means 
one is an end in oneself (and not ‘a means to someone else’s will’), one is autonomous 
(i.e., ‘self-governed’) and thus has dignity (one is elevated over nature).206 He shows the 
two-fold structure operative when Kant will for instance say ‘every rational being exists 
as an end in itself,’207 but the also that ‘morality is the condition under which alone a 
rational being can be an end in itself.’208 The tension between ascribing ‘an end in itself’ 
to all rational beings and then only to those who are morally good (which not all are) is 
resolved if one holds to the two-fold structure: ‘All rational beings have the capacity for 
freedom (i.e., they exist as ends in themselves), however, only if one makes (proper) use 
of one’s freedom is one actually an end in oneself (i.e., is really free: “end in itself” is 
                                                                
204 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 168. He refers to MM 420 and G 435. 
205 Sensen refers to G 339-40. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 168, cf. 166-67. 
206 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 168-69. 
207 He refers to G 428. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169. 
208 Sensen refers to G 435. 
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foremost not a normative term, but merely describes freedom.’209 This same structure is 
likewise discernable in Kant’s use of ‘autonomy.’ At times it refers to one’s ‘capacity for 
self-governance’ and other times it relates the ‘actual giving of universal law.’210 We 
next look how the third characteristic of the traditional paradigm is reflected in Kant’s 
understanding of dignity. 
 
3.4.3 Dignity, Duty and Rights 
 
 
The third element in the traditional paradigm relates for Sensen to the fact that 
dignity is for Kant not a distinctive attribute – like ‘a value’ – that ‘by itself generates 
rights.’ Rights follow rather ‘from the duties of the agent.’ 211 He backs this up with 
reference to The Doctrine of Virtue in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. There Kant writes: 
‘But why is the doctrine of morals usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of 
duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights have reference to duties? – 
The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral laws, and so all 
rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral imperative, which is a 
                                                                
209 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169. This goes together with Sensen’s reading 
that dignity does not rest on a value as metaphysical property inhering humanity, which 
is often how the Formula of Humanity (G 427-29) is approached. Sensen specifically 
reads the phrase ‘end in itself’ as being a descriptive and not a normative phrase for 
Kant. ‘It describes human beings as free, i.e., not a mere plaything of nature or the 
means to the will of another. […] Kant does hold that free beings should be treated as if 
they are free (i.e., human beings treated as an end in itself).’ Sensen, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2011, 98, see also 100-104. 
210 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169. He refers to G 446 and 435 
respectively. 
211 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169. 
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proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others under 
obligation, that is, the concept of right, can afterwards be explained.’212 
It is for Sensen clear that in Kant ‘the concept of duty’ precedes ‘the concept of 
claim rights.’ So the only way that I am able to stand on my rights and to claim them 
(not to mention enforcing them) is by ‘reminding’ others – the agents – of ‘[their] duty 
to follow the Categorical Imperative.’213 Therefore, to quote Sensen again, ‘the “innate 
right of each” is a right to freedom that can coexist with the freedom of everyone else in 
accordance with a universal law.’214 The Categorical Imperative as the universal law of 
freedom is the only restriction to be placed upon our freedom. If another violates this 
freedom one’s recourse is to the Categorical Imperative. But the nature of the 
imperative is that it legislates for oneself. Thus one can only remind them of their duty 
to obey the imperative. 
Thus the ground of dignity, according to Sensen, is our freedom. And freedom is 
concomitant with the moral law. The moral law expresses our duties, and in following 
                                                                
212 As quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169; from MM 239. 
213 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169. 
214 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 169. Sensen refers here to Kant, On the 
common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793) 
1996, 8:292 ff., where Kant writes that in terms of our abilities and possessions all 
individuals within a state are not equal to each other and there is a relative dependence 
one upon the other that is required (for example, one necessarily has to be obedient to 
another, or to serve another) but also ‘in terms of right (which, as the expression of the 
general will, can be only one and which concerns the form of what is laid down as right 
[Rechtens] not the matter or the object in which I have a right), they are nevertheless all 
equal to another as subjects.’ Kant describes this process which guarantees equal rights 
as a dynamic involving public law, through which we both ‘coerce’ others to follow suit 
(to grant us our rights) but also to resist them ‘in like measure.’ This brings Kant to say 
no-one should be denied the possibility to attain any level of rank in society of which he 
is capable. 
 214 
the moral law we actualize or effectuate our initial dignity (freedom) resulting as he says 
in ‘truly elevating oneself over the rest of nature.’ Dignity is in this way ‘connected to 
duty and only indirectly to rights.’ Sensen now proceeds to show how duty, for Kant, is 
first of all ‘a duty to oneself.’215 
 
3.4.4 Dignity and Duties toward Oneself 
 
 
The fourth feature of dignity that Sensen highlights relates to the previous point 
that duty is primordial to right and in fact grounds it. Sensen shows that like the 
traditional model duty is primarily turned toward the self. Dignity’s association with 
freedom leads Kant to this inevitable conclusion: freedom requires responsible usage. 
As Sensen says: ‘Having freedom yields a duty (in the first instance to oneself) to 
make a proper use of one’s freedom.’216 In the Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant discusses 
duties toward oneself. Sensen quotes: ‘These [duties] do not consist […] in seeking to 
satisfy his cravings and inclinations […]. But they consist in his being conscious that man 
possesses a certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that it is 
his duty so to act as not to violate in his own person this dignity of mankind.’217  
This ‘ennoblement’ (elevation) occurs in virtue of our freedom, which means 
concretely that we are ‘not necessarily being determined by [our] inclinations.’218 So the 
question becomes how one ought best to preserve and then realize one’s initial dignity 
                                                                
215 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 170. 
216 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 170. 
217 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 170; as quoted from Ed 488. 
218 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 170. 
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(i.e., freedom). For Sensen the sole guidance and justification for this is yielded by the 
Categorical Imperative. For Kant the (only) ‘primary duty is to follow the Categorical 
Imperative’ and so to obtain a good will. Sensen argues that this duty (to self) grounds 
(all) duties to others since they too are expressed by the Categorical Imperative. In 
support he quotes Kant: ‘I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only 
insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation, since the law by virtue of 
which I regard myself under obligation [the Categorical Imperative] proceeds in every 
case from my own practical reason; and in being constrained by my own reason, I am 
also the one constraining myself.’219  Sensen concludes: ‘To realize one’s initial dignity, 
to elevate oneself in following the moral law, is therefore in the first instance a duty 
towards oneself.’220 
This is also the case with regard to respect. Sensen refers to a passage that 
seems to contradict his point here but a close reading reveals that it in fact supports it. 
In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes: ‘The respect that I have for others or that 
another can require from me […] is therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other 
human beings.’221 Sensen suggests that one read this by taking the reference to dignity 
here as pointing to ‘what should be respected’ instead of why respect another. And 
what should be respected is the other’s striving to actualize his/her dignity to the full. 
This is for Sensen in line with Kant’s intention as shown in the next paragraph of this 
same text. Kant continues: ‘But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this 
                                                                
219 As quoted from MM 417. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 170-71. 
220 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 171. 
221 Quoted from MM 462 by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 171. 
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would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally 
necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to 
acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being.’222 
Consequently, if my duty is to bring my initial dignity to full fruition, I am to respect 
another human being’s self-same striving to actualize his/her dignity. 
Sensen writes that Kant ‘repeatedly uses “dignity” in this context of duties 
towards self to express that a proper moral motive is respect for the higher aspect of 
one’s person (freedom and rationality). Dignity expresses that this aspect is higher, 
ennobled or more important. Kant does not say that this aspect is more important 
because of a value property adhering to it, but because it is the seat of the moral law 
which alone expresses what duty is.’223 
According to Sensen, this usage of dignity is also expressed in the previously 
referred to (and quoted) passage from the Lectures on Pedagogy. Kant spoke there 
about our duties to the self which ‘consist in his being conscious that man possesses a 
certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that it is his duty so 
to act as not to violate in his own person this dignity of mankind.’224 Linking this way of 
speaking about dignity in the context of duty to self, related to ‘the proper moral 
motive,’ with other places in Kant’s oeuvre, has Sensen identify it (i.e., the linking of 
these notions together and thus forming a cluster of ideas belonging together) as a 
recurrent pattern of thought in Kant. Referring to The Metaphysics of Morals for 
                                                                
222 Quoted from MM 462 by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 171. 
223 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 171. With regard to this last statement he 
refers the reader to MM 225 and 393. 
224 See Ed 488 as quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 171. 
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instance, he quotes Kant on the ‘morally commanded’ as ‘real self-esteem (pride in the 
dignity of humanity in one’s own person).’ In the same work Kant writes that ‘unless the 
dignity of virtue is exalted above everything else in one’s actions, the concept of duty 
itself vanishes and dissolves […], since a human being’s consciousness of his own nobility 
then disappears.’225  Sensen quotes another passage earlier from the same work where 
Kant asserts that one should never allow the insignificance of our animality (i.e., being 
‘human animals’) to violate the consciousness of our dignity as ‘rational beings’ and one 
should not repudiate our ‘moral self-esteem.’ What one should rather do, says Sensen, 
is to ‘pursue one’s end by “not disavowing his dignity,”’ and this occurs, Kant writes, by 
‘always [living] with consciousness of his sublime moral disposition.’226 Sensen proceeds 
next to cite Kant’s remark following our just-quoted passage: ‘True humility follows 
unavoidably from our sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law […]. 
But […] from the (natural) human being’s feeling himself compelled to revere the 
(moral) human being within his own person, at the same time there comes exaltation of 
the highest self-esteem, the feeling of his inner worth (valor), in terms of which he […] 
possesses an inalienable dignity (dignitas interna), which instills in him respect for 
himself (reverentia).’227 
                                                                
225 See MM 459 and 483 respectively; as quoted in Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 
171. With reference to consciousness, Sensen addresses a subject we have discussed in 
Shell’s interpretation, where it played a pivotal role. 
226 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. Sensen quotes from MM 435. 
227 Quoted from MM 436 by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. We have quoted 
extensively here but it is important to note the close connection between dignity and 
consciousness (which includes consciousness of our dignity as rational beings), and 
rationality, the moral law, the following of which (duty) is linked with and yields self-
esteem. The presence of the moral law grounds reverence for self. 
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Commenting on this Sensen writes: ‘The proper moral motive is respect for the 
moral law or the idea of a moral human being.’228 In this quote Sensen explicitly equates 
‘the idea of a moral human being’ with ‘the moral law.’ These two dimensions are like 
two sides of a coin – they belong together in one dynamic unity, which we might name 
‘dignity.’ He writes: ‘Dignity expresses the idea that this aspect is higher or to be 
preferred (since the moral law says so, and strikes down any self-conceit opposing 
it).’229  
Although feeling does not play a primordial, foundational role in motivating one 
to follow the moral law (as we saw earlier), Kant does allow feeling its rightful place. It is 
important to see the correct order: it is only after engaging in the dynamic of following 
the moral law in accordance with the pure moral motive (to follow the law for the sake 
of the law) that we get to feel our dignity. Sensen quotes from the Critique of Practical 
Reason that ‘the pure moral motive […] teaches the human being to feel his own dignity 
[…] and the greatness of soul to which he sees that he is called.’230 However, it does not 
remain with the feeling of one’s dignity. This feeling is like an instrument of teaching – it 
reveals and makes us see the greatness of soul, the sublimity to which we are called. 
                                                                
228 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. 
229 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. He refers to CPrR 73. Although he does 
not mention this explicitly he touches upon a theme that has already been introduced in 
the quote from MM 436 above. The theme is that of honesty or truth. In the reference 
Sensen provides (CPrR 73) Kants states clearly that self-conceit is struck down by the law 
‘since all claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law are null 
and quite unwarranted because certainty of a disposition in accord with this law is the 
first condition of any worth of a person […] and any presumption prior to this is false 
and opposed to the law.’ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788) 1996, 5:73. 
230 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. He quotes CPrR 152. The legitimate place 
of feeling was also stressed by Sullivan. See Sullivan 1989, 193. 
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Reminding us that Kant uses ‘sublimity’ and ‘dignity’ sometimes interchangeably, 
Sensen quotes: ‘This is how the genuine moral incentive of pure practical reason is 
constituted; it is nothing other than the pure moral law itself insofar as it lets us 
discover the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and subjectively effects 
respect for their higher vocation in human beings.’231  
Respect, then, expresses the moral motivation and for Sensen Kant takes this to 
be respect for the ‘sublimity of the moral aspect within, i.e., the moral law.’232 Sensen 
argues that this is the same idea expressed in the Groundwork.233 Respect is related to 
self-respect and to the duty I owe myself to follow the moral law because the moral law 
will lead to my becoming a moral person. Self-respect is the feeling that results from the 
sublimity of this realization. This is not automatic but a process. 
In conclusion, Sensen takes Kant’s emphasis on dignity’s use within the context 
of duties toward oneself as a sign that he understands dignity in terms of the traditional 
paradigm. The proper moral motive for our actions toward ourselves and toward others 
is not because of our or their dignity as such but because of ‘the dignity of the moral 
law.’234 
 
                                                                
231 Quote taken from CPrR 88 by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. 
232 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. This sentiment brings Sensen very close to 
Shell’s position insofar as she takes conscience to be the elevating factor of human 
beings, as we saw above. 
233 Sensen quotes the passage he refers to (G 434) where Kant writes that ‘a morally 
good person universalizes its maxim “from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, 
who obeys no law other than that which he himself at the same time gives.”’ Sensen, 
Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. 
234 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 172. He refers in support of this point to Rel 
183 and CF 58. 
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4. The Appearance of ‘Dignity’ in Kant’s Works 
 
 
Sensen presents an overview of the word ‘dignity’ [Würde] in Kant’s published 
works and especially of the way in which he uses this concept. These he listed and 
classified according to their usage. This research establishes for Sensen the fact that 
Kant uses ‘dignity’ in line with the traditional paradigm. I present the results of his 
analysis here. 
The term ‘dignity’ appears 111 times throughout Kant’s published writings. To 
these Sensen adds four instances where Kant mentions ‘Menschenwürde’ (human 
dignity) as opposed to the more usual ‘Würde der Menschheit’ (dignity of humanity).235 
Sensen found in addition one lecture236 and two reflection notes.237 There are 
eighteen238 published works that mention dignity at least once. He ordered these works 
according to the number of times ‘dignity’ makes an appearance.239 
                                                                
235 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 177; see also 177 n 176. Sensen lists the four 
references to Menschenwürde. Three occur in the Doctrine of Virtue, to wit MM 
4:429.24, 4:436.29, 4:465.17; and one in Anthr 7:295.19. 
236 He refers to Naturrecht Feyerabend 1319-1322. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 177 n 177. 
237 He refers to Refl 6856 (19:181), 7305 (19: 307). See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 177. 178. 
238 In Sensen’s references he differentiates between the two books, the Doctrine of 
Virtue and the Doctrine of Right. These two books are known as the Metaphysics of 
Morals [MM]. I have treated and notated both of them together throughout this work. 
Here, however, I follow Sensen since his approach allows for greater specificity.  
239 These he lists as follows: the Doctrine of Virtue (twenty-one times); the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals (seventeen); Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason (eleven); the Lectures on Pedagogy (ten); Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and Sublime (ten); Critique of Pure Reason (seven); The Conflict of the Faculties 
[or: Contest of Faculties] (six); Critique of Practical Reason (five); Doctrine of Right (five); 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (five); Toward Perpetual Peace (four); 
Critique of the Powers of Judgment (three); The Only Possible Argument in Support of a 
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One trend Sensen identifies is that throughout his writings and in different 
contexts ‘Kant consistently elucidates dignity as sublimity (Erhabenheit) or […] (the 
highest form of) elevation.’240 In this regard ‘elevation’ reflects both the aristocratic and 
the traditional notion of dignity. When he talks about the dignity of the monarch, the 
regent or minister241 and again of mathematics or of the philosopher242 he reflects the 
aristocratic notion, which ‘indicate[s] some aspect of rank.’243 The sense and actual 
‘exclusivity’ implied in this use is important here – hence Sensen’s choice of the phrase 
‘the aristocratic notion.’ These often relate to political and/or authoritative structures 
that are reflected in relationships and where one person, (a dignitary for whatever 
reason, e.g. a member of a class), or a group (e.g., ‘civic dignities’), is superior. Sensen 
states, however, that ‘[this] superiority is not a moral quality, but merely the “relation of 
a commander (imperans) to those who obey.”’244 Counting thirty-nine instances of this 
‘exclusive and hierarchical’ usage points for Sensen to the aristocratic notion of dignity.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Demonstration of the Existence of God (twice); Lectures on Logic (twice); Attempt to 
Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (once); An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment? (once); On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials 
in Theodicy (once); Kraus’s Review of Ulrich’s ‘Eleutheriology’ (once). See Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 177, see also n 179. He also lists Essays Concerning the 
Philanthropin (once). (See Ibid., 180 n 184). 
240 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 178. 
241 Sensen refers respectively to CF 7:19.26; PP 8:344.06-08. Kant also speaks of ‘kingly 
dignity’ (Anthr 7:131.09). Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 178. 
242 With regard to ‘mathematics’ he refers to CPR 3:323.09. In terms of the dignity of 
‘philosophy’ he refers to CPR 3:81.22, 322.29 and 4: 203.08. Sensen mentions also that 
Kant speaks of the dignity of ‘a philosopher,’ and of ‘a teacher.’ See Ed 9:26.14 and Rel 
6:162.19 respectively. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 178. 
243 He refers to Rel 6:328.33; MM 6:468.09; and Anthr 7:127.09. Sensen points out that 
when Kant uses ‘dignity’ explicitly related to rank he uses it also in the plural (‘dignities’) 
as is seen, for e.g., in Rel 6:315 and 328. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 178. 
244 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 178. 
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In juxtaposition to this usage that emphasizes distinction and exclusivity by 
means of rank Sensen identifies a very democratic usage where Kant talks of ‘the dignity 
of all human beings, or – as he often puts it – the “dignity of humanity [Würde der 
Menschheit].”’245 The dignity of humanity is embodied in its freedom, which is defined 
as its ‘capacity to act independently of inclinations.’246 Because freedom grounds 
morality Kant presents dignity as ‘the capacity to act morally,’247 which gives humanity 
‘a prerogative […] over the rest of nature.’248 Sensen points out that in these instances 
dignity is not associated with ‘value’ or ‘worth,’ although he refers to it at times as 
‘innate’ and ‘inalienable [unverlierbar].’249 These forty-one instances Sensen calls ‘initial 
dignity [ürsprüngliche Würde].’250  
The third trend Sensen identifies sees Kant speak of dignity in relation to 
morality – not in relation to its possibility, as in its ‘initial’ stage, but rather in reference 
to an actual living out of the moral law. This evinces for Sensen the ‘realized dignity’ of 
the traditional model. Kant speaks in this regard about the ‘dignity of virtue’251 and of 
                                                                
245 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 178-79. 
246 Sensen refers among others to Rel 6:57.27, 6:138.24; MM 6:420.22; CF 7:73.03; Refl 
19:181. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
247 Sensen refers to G 4:435.08, 4:440.11; CF 7:58.20. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 179. 
248 Sensen refers to G 4:438.13; MM 6:420.17, 6:434 ff.; Ed 9:488.36. See Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
249 He refers to MM 6:420.22 and 6:436.12 respectively. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 179.  
250 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. Sensen takes this after Kant’s own use in 
CF 7:73.03. 
251 Sensen refers to Observations 2:216.29 and MM 6:483.03. Sensen, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2011, 179. 
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the ‘dignity’ of ‘the moral law,’252 or of the ‘concept of duty.’253 He also speaks of the 
‘sublimity and dignity in the person who fulfills all his duties.’254 Here the intention is to 
emphasize that ‘morality is to be valued above all else.’ Sensen notes that it is only in 
this group of passages that we find instances where Kant uses ‘dignity’ together with 
‘worth.’255 What is elevated in these passages is morality ‘because of its independence 
from inclination.’256  Sensen quotes Kant: ‘[T]he sublimity and inner dignity of the 
command in duty is all the more manifest the fewer are the subjective causes in favour 
of  it.’257 There are thirty-one passages that use dignity in this realized understanding of 
dignity (as opposed to the initial stage) and of these thirty-one only eight passages 
relate dignity with worth.258 
Using the results together with the references that Sensen provide I present the 
following schema. Starting from the book that mentions dignity most I shall present 
each reference Sensen has identified. I shall indicate by means of the font type how 
Kant uses dignity here, that is, to what trend it corresponds to (i.e., according to 
                                                                
252 He refers to CPrR 5:147.17 ff.; MM 6:464.18. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 179. 
253 He refers to Rel 6:23.23 ff. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
254 Sensen refers to G 4:440.01 ff. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
255 Sensen refers here among others to G 4:435.04 ff. and MM 6: 435.02. These passages 
will be treated in greater depth below. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
256 There is a subtle diference between initial and realized dignity. With initial dignity, 
Sensen described the ‘dignity of humanity’ as the capacity ‘to act independent of 
inclination.’ Here in realized dignity, the ‘dignity of morality’ consist in being 
independent ‘from inclinations.’ See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
257 Quoted from G 425. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 179. 
258 Sensen refers here to G 4:435.04 & 25, 4:436.03, MM 6:435.02, 6:436.10-12, 
6:462.12 ff.; Anthr 7:295.19; and CPR 3:322.29. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 179 ff., 180 n 185. With regard to ‘worth’ Sensen notes: ‘What is striking is how 
seldom “dignity” appears in conjunction with “worth.”’ (Ibid., 177). 
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Sensen’s classification). Normal script denotes the instances where dignity is associated 
with sublimity or the highest form of elevation with the sense of exclusivity associated 
with it and hence these reflect the aristocratic notion of dignity. Bold script refers to the 
initial dignity that all people possess and cursive script indicates realized dignity. There 
are only eight instances where dignity is related to worth and these I indicate by 
underlining the reference. I have arranged each subgroup also in order of its appearance 
(with the exception of CPR). 
• Doctrine of Virtue: 6:420.16 ff., 6:435.20, 6:467.26, 6:468.09, 6:420.16/17 & 22, 
6:429.16 & 24, 6:434 ff., 6:435.02 & 19, 6:436.12/16 & 29, 6:449.29, 6:459.23, 
6:462.13/21/24 & 30, 6:465.17, 6:435.02, 6:436.10-12, 6:462.12 ff., 6:467.25, 
6:474.18, 6:483.03 
• Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: 4:425.28, 4:438.13, 4:440.01, 
4:435.08, 4:438.13, 4:439.04, 4:440.11, 4:405.17, 4:411.02 & 13, 4:425.27-29, 
4:434.29/32 & 34, 4:435.04 & 25, 4:436.03 & 06, 4:440.01 ff., 4:442.29 
• Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: 6:113.26, 6:123.16, 6:162.19, 
6:165.25, 6:57.27, 6:80.18, 6:183.24, 6:23.19, 6:23.23 ff., 6:114.11 
• Lectures on Pedagogy: 9:26.14, 9:489.11, 9:488.35 & 36, 9:489.01/07/08/11 & 
34, 9:490.01 & 31, 9:493.04 
• Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime: 2:241.18, 2:212.11, 
2:217.17, 2:219.11, 2:221.29, 2:216.29, 2:227.35, 2:241.18 
• Critique of Pure Reason: 3:81.22, 4:203.08, 3:322.29, 3:323.09, 3:419.20, 3: 
549.32, 4:159.33, 3:322.29 
• The Conflict of the Faculties [or: Contest of Faculties]: 7:19.18 & 26, 7:34.10, 
7:52.22, 7:58.20, 7:73.03 & 06 
• Critique of Practical Reason: 5:25.06, 5:71.21, 5:327.14, 5:88.07, 5:152.28, 
5:147.17 ff. 
• Doctrine of Right: 6:315, 6:327.27, 6:328.33, 6:329.33 & 36, 6:363.27 
• Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: 7:127.09, 7:131.09, 7:316.05, 
7:295.19 & 22 
• Toward Perpetual Peace: 8:344.06-08, 8:365.14, 8:368.27 
• Critique of the Powers of Judgment: 5:327.14, 5:336.10, 5:273.14 
• The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of 
God: 2:117.35, 2:123.06 
• Lectures on Logic: 9:30.12, 9:30.12 
• Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy: 
198.02, 212.01, 215.20 
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• An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? : 8:42.01 
• On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy: 8:257.27 
• Kraus’s Review of Ulrich’s ‘Eleutheriology’: 454.20 
• Reflection Note: (# 6856) 19:181, (# 7305) 19:307 
• Lectures on Natural Law Feyerabend: 27:1319-1322 
• Essays Concerning the Philanthropin: 2:450.32 
 
 
One will note how some references are entered twice; this indicates those cases 
where the use coincides both with the aristocratic paradigm and with the realized 
dignity, which justifies a distinction, insofar as not all people use their initial freedom 
and dignity equally well. This schema gives us an idea of the spread of Kant’s use of the 
term ‘dignity’ in his published works. It supports Sensen’s thesis that dignity in Kant is 
used in the classical sense of the word and not according to the contemporary way of 
thinking. The question might be put that, even if Kant used dignity in the classical way, 
did his use of dignity in conjunction with value not perhaps imply a change of mind in his 
thinking at least in these cases? In order to show that this is not the case Sensen 
presents an exegesis of these passages as they occur respectively in the Groundwork 
and in the Doctrine of Virtue.  
 
5. Dignity in the Groundwork 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
Kant uses the term ‘dignity’ altogether seventeen times in the Groundwork. 
Sensen notes that if Kant had held to the contemporary paradigm one would have 
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assumed him to use the concept in conjunction with the Formula of Humanity259 and 
the respect owed to others, and in the Third Section of the Groundwork260 where Kant 
justifies his moral philosophy and especially the Categorical Imperative.261 One would 
have expected ‘a sustained treatment’ especially in the Third Section, but it is strikingly 
absent: ‘Kant neither uses the term “dignity” in the Third Section, nor does he present 
an argument for an absolute value of human beings there.’262 
Sensen lists the following loci: ‘Dignity’ appears eight times in a ‘peripheral 
addition’ to the Formula of Autonomy and of the Kingdom of Ends.263 And in the 
presentation of the synopsis of his argument with regard to these formulas it appears 
four times.264 Sensen identifies next five ‘isolated occurrences scattered throughout the 
Groundwork.’ These do not pertain to human dignity, but to morality, which enjoys an 
‘elevation […] over other forms of behavior.’265 There are three passages where ‘dignity’ 
and ‘worth’ are linked with each other and all of these appear in the addendum to the 
Formula of Autonomy. Here Kant uses the word ‘dignity’ eight times. In order to further 
                                                                
259 Sensen refers to G 426-431. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. 
260 Sensen refers to G 446-463. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. 
261 Sensen refers to G 431.32-34, 445.01 ff. He addresses two of his interlocutors here 
(Alan Wood and Paul Guyer) who adhere to the contemporary interpretation of dignity 
for Kant. Wood thinks dignity is Kant’s ‘most fundamental value,’ and Guyer sees dignity 
as ‘a value that is the foundation even of the Categorical Imperative.’ See Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 181. 
262 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181, see also 181 n 187, where Sensen points 
out that the phrase ‘inner worth’ occurs once (G 454.37) where it relates to morality 
(and is certainly not proclaimed to be a value of all people). Kant uses the phrase 
‘absolute worth’ three times in conjunction with the Formula of Humanity (G 428.04, 15 
and 30), and here it ‘receives only passing mention.’  
263 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. He refers to G 434.20-436.07. 
264 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. He refers to G 438.08-440.13. 
265 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. He refers to G 405.17, 411.02 and 13, 
425.28, 442.29. 
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prove his thesis and offset the notion that Kant might have held a contemporary notion 
of dignity (where dignity is a value property), Sensen presents an in-depth analysis of 
the entire section (i.e., the addendum to the Formula of Autonomy) in which these 
passages occur. I shall present Sensen’s analysis here, if only to give a flavor as to how 
he treats and interprets Kant’s texts. He later submits a central passage of the 
Metaphysics of Morals to a similar treatment;266 but these I shall not present in the 
same detail. 
Sensen starts by saying that the addendum passage267 considers ‘moral 
motivation in the widest sense’ and does not attempt to provide any ‘justification of 
moral requirements.’ It addresses the question why one should adhere to (i.e. observe) 
the Categorical Imperative as it is expressed in the Formula of Autonomy, especially 
given the fact that this formula actively precludes all interest when it comes to moral 
motivation.268 ‘Kant’s answer,’ Sensen claims, is that ‘one should abide by the 
Categorical Imperative because following the imperative, that is, morality, has an 
elevated worth (i.e., morality alone should be pursued unconditionally).’269 This echoes 
Kant’s ‘familiar claim’ in the Groundwork, namely, that ‘only a morally good will can 
have an unconditional worth.’270 
                                                                
266 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 191-202. Sensen discusses two passages 
that occur in the Doctrine of Virtue. 
267 G 434.20-436.07. 
268 Sensen refers to G 431.25-432.04. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. 
269 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 181. 
270 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 182. He admits one could (‘in a modest sense’) 
read ‘dignity’ as a definition of ‘unconditional worth’ as a ‘prescription’ of what ought to 
be valued. This would make it ‘inconsistent’ with the way Kant uses it elsewhere and for 
Sensen ‘lose the special meaning’ advocated here, which is: ‘“Dignity” expresses the 
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5.2 The Context of the Passage 
 
 
This passage follows Kant’s discussion of the Formula of Autonomy and the 
Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. Sensen points out that in Kant’s discussion he 
‘switches back and forth’ between these two formulas. When he introduces the Formula 
of Autonomy Kant does so by calling it ‘the idea of the will of every rational being as a 
will giving universal law.’271 The reason Kant introduces this formula, according to 
Sensen, is because he wants to leave no room for doubt as to ‘the categorical nature of 
the Categorical Imperative,’ which is, ‘to indicate in the imperative itself the 
renunciation of all interest, in volition from duty, by means of some determination the 
imperative contains.’272 Sensen points out that what makes something categorical is its 
being essentially tied into and promulgated as universal law. Something categorical is 
thus ‘not dependent upon something else one wants (by inclination).’ Moreover, a 
universal (or ‘supreme’) legislator ‘cannot be governed by inclinations.’ If dependency 
were allowed, the will would need another law ‘to limit the interest of its self-love.’ 
Sensen points out that behind this lies Kant’s notion that ‘all inclinations propel self-
love.’273 The idea of the Formula of Autonomy leads to the idea of the kingdom of ends, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
sublimity of morality, in that this worth is higher than or to be preferred over other 
worth: Morality, and not the objects of one’s inclinations, should be sought above all 
else’ (Ibid., 182). 
271 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:432.03 ff. Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 182. 
272 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 182. Quoted from Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:431.35-37. 
273 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 182 n 198. He refers to G 432.08-11 and 
CPrR 22-25. 
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which is ‘a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws.’274 If 
everyone were to act according to the Categorical Imperative this ‘ideal’ of the kingdom 
would become real.275 
In the final paragraph (just before the beginning of the ‘addendum passage’ that 
Sensen analyses), Kant concludes with a reference to the kingdom of ends and then 
immediately follows that by reformulating the requirement of the kingdom of ends as 
the requirement of the Formula of Autonomy.276 I shall quote the full passage with the 
transition. Kant writes: ‘Morality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the 
lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This lawgiving must, however, 
be found in every rational being himself and be able to arise from his will, the principle 
of which is, accordingly: to do no action on any other maxim than the one such that it 
would be consistent with it to be a universal law, and hence to act only so that the will 
could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim.’277 
Sensen points out that this is the first time Kant expresses the Formula of Autonomy in 
                                                                
274 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 182. Quoted from Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:433.17 ff. 
275 Sensen refers to G 438.29-32. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011,182. 
276 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 183. Sensen remarks that this move has 
someone like Paton classify the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends as a sub-formula of the 
Formula of Autonomy. See Ibid., 183 n 191. 
277 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:434.07-14. See Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 183. I have quoted the full passage even though Sensen did 
not. He writes though that Kant’s reformulation stems from ‘the requirement to 
universalize must be able to arise from the agent’s will without looking at the scope of 
concern of the requirement’ (Ibid., 183). This point relates to the previous one where a 
universal lawgiver cannot allow personal interests. It emphasizes a deeper aspect that 
Sensen mentioned earlier; what remains the only unconditional good for Kant is a good 
will. I see herein that Sensen expresses how Kant with this reformulation introduces 
measures that will protect the will from anything ‘outside’ and so from any 
contamination. 
 230 
this way and more importantly that it is to exactly this law that the passage about 
dignity that we are about to study refers. 
 
5.3 The Passage 
 
 
In looking then to this passage (where ‘dignity’ occurs eight times), Sensen 
reminds us of the immediate context and of his presuppositions in approaching this one-
and-a-half pages of text. The context, as we saw, is that this is an addendum to the 
Formula of Autonomy, which in effect purifies moral motives by excluding inclinations 
and that the justification of moral requirements is not immediately at issue. Sensen tells 
us this is a ‘very dense and complicated passage,’ not least because ‘four key concepts’ 
are addressed and brought into relation with each other, and, as if this were not 
enough, Kant expresses each differently over the length of the passage. These concepts 
are: ‘autonomy,’ ‘morality,’ ‘dignity,’ and ‘worth.’ For Sensen they are linked in the claim 
that ‘a morally good person is autonomous (or abides by the Formula of Autonomy) 
because morality has an elevated worth.’278 As to his approach here, Sensen shows how 
reading the respective sections in context affirms the traditional understanding of 
dignity.279 
The passage begins as follows: 
                                                                
278 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 183. 
279 Sensen puts his position in a nutshell: ‘I shall […] point out, first, that for Kant the 
good is dependent upon the right; second, that it is not humanity as such that has an 
absolute inner worth, but morality; and, third, that Kant does not conceive of worth as a 
distinct metaphysical property.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 183-84. 
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Occurrence 1: ‘The practical necessity of acting in accordance with this principle 
[…] does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, and inclinations […]. Reason […] does so 
not for the sake of any other practical motive or any future advantage but from the idea 
of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than that which he himself at 
the same time gives.’280 
Sensen points out that ‘autonomy,’ ‘morality’ and ‘dignity’ are linked here. The 
point is that a ‘morally good being’ adheres to the Formula of Autonomy solely and 
purely from ‘the idea of the dignity (or sublimity) of a morally good being,’ and not out 
of any inclination or thought of his own advantage, and this includes ‘being moved by 
any liking of himself as a morally good person or any thoughts about the advantages 
that it might yield in the eyes of others.’281 Sensen describes a ‘morally good being’ as ‘a 
being who abides by the Formula of Autonomy, or – as the last phrase puts it – “who 
obeys no law other than that which he himself at the same time gives.”’282 Reading this 
in light of Kant’s summation of his argument presented later in the Groundwork 
confirms for Sensen that Kant’s intention here is to address ‘the dignity of the agent’s 
own morally good will.’ The summary he refers to reads: ‘Our own will insofar as it 
would act only under the condition of a possible giving of universal law through its 
maxims – this will possible for us in idea – is the proper object of respect’ [Sensen’s 
                                                                
280 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:434.20-30. Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 184. Throughout this passage Sensen has highlighted the 
occurrence of ‘dignity’ by putting it in bold type. 
281 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 184. He refers to G 397.19-32. 
282 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 184. 
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emphasis].283 That ‘the dignity or sublimity of one’s own morally good will’ can be the 
genuine (and proper) moral motive is not foreign to Kant.284 But as Sensen shows, even 
here the focus is not on my good will (i.e., how others will see me as a morally good 
person), but on a will that is really purified, and that is good. This brings us into the 
domain of morality. Hence, it is really the ‘dignity of morality’ that motivates us and 
‘accounts for the practical necessity to abide by the Formula of Autonomy’ [emphasis 
mine].285 
The next two occurrences shed light on dignity as elevation: 
Occurrences 2 and 3: ‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a 
dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on 
the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a 
dignity.’ 286 
We see here that dignity is presented ‘as sublimity or the highest form of 
elevation.’287 For Sensen, Kant here treats of two forms of elevation. In the one case we 
find an elevation over things with a fixed (designated) price and which as such can be 
                                                                
283 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 184, 184 n 193. He quotes from Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:440.07-10. 
284 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 184, 184 n 194. Sensen refers to the following 
texts MM 483, 495; CPrR 152; Rel 183; CF 58. 
285 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 184. Sensen’s talk of ‘practical necessity’ 
shows that the Formula operates as what one might call an instrument of purgation, or 
purification. 
286 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:434.31-34. Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 184. 
287 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 184. 
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traded for other things of equal value. But what is ‘elevated above price and what has 
an elevated worth is morality.’288 This is borne out in the next two occurrences: 
Occurrences 4 and 5: ‘What is related to general human inclinations and needs 
has a market price; […] but that which constitutes the condition under which alone 
something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price but an 
inner worth, that is, dignity.’ 
‘Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end 
in itself […]. Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that 
which alone has dignity.’289 
‘Morality,’ ‘dignity’ and ‘worth’ are here brought into connection with one 
another. According to Sensen’s reading, that which has an inner worth here is morality. 
As he says: ‘Kant uses “inner” to express how one has to judge something in isolation, 
i.e., independently of any relation that may hold’ [emphasis mine].290 Having already 
determined that for Kant ‘worth’ functions as a ‘prescription of what one should value’ 
[emphasis mine],291 Sensen sees Kant here as emphasizing that morality should be 
valued unconditionally. This means it should be pursued without paying any regard to 
one’s own inclinations or of any other factors (like usefulness) that might effect or 
influence one’s moral actions. Sensen writes, ‘It is in this respect that moral worth is 
                                                                
288 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. 
289 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:434.35-435.09. Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 185. 
290 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. Sensen refers to CPR A 324 ff./B 381 ff. 
The words I emphasized give a clue as to Sensen’s reading: what is at stake is the 
conditions under or in which one judges something. 
291 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. 
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elevated over relative or conditional worth [which means] that something should be 
valued because something else holds.’292  
Sensen writes that ‘dignity’ could be taken here merely as ‘inner worth’ (in the 
meaning we described above). This would, however, not do justice to the many other 
ways Kant uses the word – uses that we saw in Sensen’s compilation above. This spurs 
him to delve deeper. He starts by returning to the broader context, recalling Kant’s 
question as to why a morally good person would adhere to the Formula of Autonomy. 
He finds that Kant is trying to point out that morality is higher (i.e., elevated or more 
important) ‘than other value’ and ‘dignity’ is the concept he uses to express this. 
‘“Dignity” is exactly the term’ Sensen writes ‘[that Kant] uses throughout his writings in 
order to express that something is raised above all else (in a certain respect).’293 Sensen 
now suggests that by this phrase ‘inner worth, that is, dignity’ Kant does not mean to 
define ‘dignity.’ Kant is making a statement that ‘“inner” is more important than or 
elevated over “relative.”’294 Sensen paraphrases this sentence accordingly: ‘Morality has 
not just a subordinate relative value (a price), but an elevated inner worth (a dignity in 
worth).’295 Sensen points to a certain discrepancy with regard to the way ‘dignity’ is 
brought to bear upon morality and humanity respectively. Different meanings are 
                                                                
292 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. He refers to G 428. 
293 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. If one reads this statement it might seem 
as if there is a hierarchy of value, and that the supreme value is given the title ‘dignity.’ 
If one were to be very dogmatic with this one could say mathematics has dignity, as do a 
teacher, etc. so which is the higher etc. However, that would not be a nuanced reading. 
Here Sensen honors this nuance by adding ‘in a certain respect.’ Sensen later adds that 
the demand to value something unconditionally ‘is not a necessary connotation of 
Kant’s usage of “dignity.”’ See also Ibid., 186 n 195. 
294 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. 
295 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 185. 
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intended. Using it with regard to morality Kant wants to say that ‘[morality] should be 
sought above all else’ and with regard to humanity it refers to the ‘sense of [humanity] 
being elevated over the rest of nature in being capable of morality.’296 For Sensen this is 
in line with the two-fold structure of the traditional paradigm with its ‘two stages of 
elevation.’ The initial dignity of humanity (in virtue of our moral capabilities) elevates us 
above nature, but this dignity is only realized in accordance with the real use of our 
moral capabilities, which results in observance of the moral law. In this part of the 
Groundwork Kant is focussed on ‘realized dignity,’ which Sensen describes as having ‘a 
morally good will.’297 This becomes clearer in the next instance:  
Occurrence 6: ‘Skill and diligence in work have a market price; […] fidelity in 
promises and benevolence from basic principles (not from instinct) have an inner worth. 
[…] Such actions […] present the will that practices them as the object of an immediate 
respect […]. This estimation therefore lets the worth of such a cast of mind be cognized 
as dignity and puts it infinitely above all price.’298 
In this passage Kant addresses moral themes (morality) which he then relates to 
dignity. It is therefore morality (the moral life) that is ‘raised above all else.’ In other 
words Kant stresses that ‘moral worth is raised above all price’ and ought to be ‘valued 
unconditionally.’299 Sensen adds that Kant specifies the moral life (morality) here in 
terms of ‘a morally good will,’ which he equates with ‘a moral cast of mind,’ bringing it 
                                                                
296 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 186. He refers to G 4:438.12 ff. 
297 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 186. 
298 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:435.09-28. Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 186. 
299 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 186. 
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in this way into proximity with the opening lines of the Groundwork (First Section) which 
state that ‘only a good will could be called unconditionally good.’300 Sensen paraphrases 
again as follows: ‘Kant says that it is a morally good cast of mind that has inner worth, 
and is therefore elevated over other talents and casts of mind which do not have this 
special worth (i.e., which should not be valued unconditionally).’301 And this is for 
Sensen an apt expression of the ‘realized dignity of a morally good person,’ and is, 
moreover, in accordance with the traditional model of dignity. 
The final two occurrences Sensen discusses justify morality’s elevated worth by 
considering the notion of autonomy. 
Occurrences 7 and 8: ‘And what is it, then, that justifies a morally good 
disposition [Gesinnung], or virtue, in making such high claims? It is nothing less than the 
share it affords a rational being in the giving of universal law […] For, nothing can have a 
worth other than that which the law determines for it. But the lawgiving itself, which 
determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, 
incomparable worth302 […] Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human 
nature and of every rational nature.’303 
                                                                
300 See G 393. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 186. 
301 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 186. 
302 Sensen writes, apropos the phrase ‘dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable 
worth,’ that it does not necessarily have to be taken as a definition of dignity. ‘It should 
be read as saying: “morality has an elevated position (dignity), in that it should be 
valued above all else (it has an incomparable worth).”’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 187 n 196. 
303 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:435.29-436.07. Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 186 -87. 
 237 
Here Sensen claims that Kant links four concepts, ‘autonomy,’ ‘morality,’ 
‘dignity,’ and ‘worth’ to the claim that a morally good person lives in accordance with 
the Formula of Autonomy because ‘morality has an elevated worth.’304 Kant provides his 
justification for this claim by relating ‘morality,’ ‘dignity’ and ‘worth’ to ‘autonomy,’ 
which he ‘shortens’ – as Sensen calls it here – to ‘lawgiving.’305 Kant begins the passage 
with the question as to why the ‘moral cast of mind,’ (which we saw is equivalent to the 
‘morally good will’) would possess ‘an absolute worth’? Sensen formulates it this way 
too: ‘why is [a moral cast of mind] elevated over other casts of mind (i.e., has a 
dignity)’?306 And Kant’s answer is because it ‘affords us a share in universal lawgiving or 
autonomy.’307  
Sensen unpacks Kant’s claim regarding the elevated worth of lawgiving. His 
argument runs as follows: The moral law, which in Kant is ‘a principle of right,’ is, as we 
have seen earlier, pre-existent or anterior to the good. As such the law ‘determines’ the 
morally good, and ‘all (moral) worth.’ Now, if the law determines all moral worth, 
obeying it results in our being not only morally good, but also having moral worth. (We 
might say, one travels through the law to moral worth.) Obeying the law, i.e., expressing 
in concrete actions what it commands, involves for Kant first of all the giving of the law 
(legislating). That is, we can only ‘do’ after the law ‘says’ what we are to do. And this 
                                                                
304 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 183, 187. 
305 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 187. Sensen writes: ‘To act with autonomy 
is to regard the adoption of one’s maxim as giving a law for all others.’ See G 432 ff. 
306 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 187. We saw in the previous passage that 
other casts of mind refer to, for instance, one’s talents and those things ‘which should 
not be valued unconditionally’ (Ibid., 186). 
307 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 187. 
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‘lawgiving’ is, as Sensen mentioned, just another word for ‘autonomy.’ For Sensen, Kant 
is saying here that ‘it is the lawgiving that has an unconditional […] or an elevated worth 
(i.e., a dignity in worth),’ which means, therefore, that ‘it is autonomy that is the ground 
of the (realized) dignity of human beings. Autonomy is the ground of the high claim a 
moral cast of mind can make [of] possessing dignity.’308 This is the answer to Kant’s 
opening question above. 
Sensen points out that the sentence ‘the lawgiving itself, which determines all 
worth, must for that very reason have […] an unconditional, incomparable worth’ is in 
itself a justification for the primordiality of the law or the elevated worth of morality.309 
This is also not an argument that claims we are owed respect because of a value we 
possess.310 The topic here addresses why a morally good person would adhere to the 
Formula of Autonomy and why such a disposition is special. And in answering Kant links 
different concepts to autonomy and the latter to moral motivation. 
 
5.4 Dignity as a Virtue 
 
 
For Sensen Kant writes on dignity from within the framework of the traditional 
notion. The cotemporary notion uses many of the same core phrases like ‘inner worth, 
that is, dignity,’ (occurrence 4 above) or, ‘worth […] be cognized as dignity,’ (6) and 
‘dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth’ (7). These might reasonably 
                                                                
308 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 187. 
309 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 187. He points out that these arguments are to 
be found in the Critique of Practical Reason and in the First Section of the Groundwork. 
310 See Sensen’s refutation of this interpretation and why it does not work. Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 53-69. 
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induce one to read Kant as flouting the contemporary notion of dignity! Sensen adds 
that when one combines this understanding of ‘dignity as inner worth’ with the notion 
that ‘humanity has dignity’ (5), one will conclude that ‘humanity has inner worth’ and 
consequently come to the conclusion that ‘one should respect humanity because it has 
an inner worth.’311 Sensen thinks that he has – at least for the Groundwork – laid the 
ghost of the contemporary notion in Kant to rest. In order to bring this home he 
presents us with three points pertaining the notion of ‘dignity as a value’ especially (and 
mostly) according to the Groundwork. 
The first is that the good depends and is conditioned by the right. Kant writes 
clearly: ‘For, nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for 
it.’312 Sensen continues: ‘There is therefore no independent worth that could ground the 
requirement to respect others, but for Kant the relationship is the other way around: 
One should respect others because it is commanded by the Categorical Imperative in 
the Formula of Humanity. It is in virtue of the moral law – and not because of an inner 
worth of human beings – that one should respect them.’313  
The second point Sensen makes is that for Kant ‘absolute inner worth’ is 
‘(almost) exclusively tied to morality and not to human beings as such.’314 This is evident 
from the opening of Section I in the Groundwork (where Kant says that only a good will 
                                                                
311 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 188. 
312 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 189. Sensen quotes from Kant, Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 4:436.01 ff. 
313 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 189. This in essence is Sensen’s thesis 
beautifully put. 
314 He notes ‘[t]wo rare exceptions:’ G 4:428.04 and MM 6:462.13. See Sensen, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2011, 189 n 198. 
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can be considered absolutely good) but also in the dignity passage discussed above. It is 
furthermore in line with his other writings too. Inner worth, as Sensen explains, is 
something a human being can ‘only give himself in being morally good.’ As Kant says, 
‘[I]t is the value that he alone can give to himself, and which consists in what he does, in 
how and in accordance with which principles he acts, not as a link in nature but in the 
freedom of his faculty of desire; i.e., a good will is that alone by means of which his 
existence can have an absolute value.’315 So, our ‘absolute worth’ is subordinate to and 
contingent upon a morally good will. As Sensen showed earlier, Kant’s ethics is not 
based on the worth of human beings just as rights are not based on the value they 
possess.316  
Sensen’s final point is that worth is not a ‘distinct metaphysical property’ that 
grounds respect from others. Sensen notes how Kant in fact presents ‘inner worth’ in 
the Groundwork passage ‘merely negatively.’ He writes, ‘inner worth is “raised above all 
price”, “admits of no equivalent” (occurrence 3), “has not merely a relative worth” (4), 
                                                                
315 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 189-90. As quoted from CJ 443. Sensen refers 
also to G 439, 449 ff., 454; CPrR 110 ff., 147 ff.; and CJ 208 ff. He mentions that some 
would agrue given Kant’s notion of evil humanity would not as such be able to claim 
‘absolute value’ (Ibid., 190 n 199). 
316 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 190. His argument is: We should respect all 
humans (their right); not all humans have a morally good will; since absolute worth is 
tied to a morally good will, not all have therefore absolute worth; yet, all should be 
respected nonetheless (MM 239). Therefore the requirement to respect others (their 
right) cannot be based on absolute worth. Even criminals deserve respect. Sensen refers 
to the following passage where Kant writes: ‘I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious 
man as a human being; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his 
quality as a human being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it.’ 
Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:463. 
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but an “unconditional, incomparable worth” (7)’ [Sensen’s emphasis].317 As he argued 
earlier (as we saw in our Interlude) he reads ‘inner worth’ as expressing ‘what one 
should value, independent of its usefulness, or something that one would value if one 
were fully governed by reason.’318  
 
6. Dignity in the Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Virtue 
 
 
Sensen says that even if we accept what he has advocated for in his exposition of 
the Groundwork we might still wonder whether Kant had not perhaps changed his 
position later by the time he wrote the Metaphysics of Morals. Sensen draws attention 
to two passages from the Doctrine of Virtue where Kant writes that ‘a human being 
regarded as a person […] possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he 
exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world.’ And later we read: 
‘The respect that I have for others or that another can require from me […] is therefore 
recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings, that is, of a worth that has no 
                                                                
317 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 190. 
318 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 190, see also nn 202-03 where he shows how 
this reading is in accord with other scholars’ interpretation too. Sensen points out that it 
would be possible to read G 434-36 as an instance where Kant takes dignity as ‘a value 
in the more modest sense, meaning that it is a ‘prescription of reason.’ He 
acknowledges that this is the more ‘natural reading’ in virtue of the way Kant structures 
his argument here. He refers namely to the parallel that seems to be established 
between ‘two types of value, price and dignity’ and between ‘relative worth and inner 
worth.’ Even if this were the case, it would not affect his overall argument, since Kant is 
not establishing value as a justification for the duty to respect other human beings. See 
Ibid., 190 ff. 
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price, no equivalent for which the object evaluated […] could be exchanged.’319 Sensen 
asks whether these passages do not suggest that Kant changed to the contemporary 
paradigm of dignity. Sensen then discusses these passages in the same thorough way he 
did the Groundwork passages. Here I shall only mention his results and refer the reader 
to his actual presentation and exegesis.320 
All in all Kant uses ‘dignity’ in the Doctrine of Virtue twenty-one times.321 These 
occur ‘isolated and scattered’ throughout without following any ‘systematic pattern.’ In 
fact this ‘scattered and sparse’ usage has Sensen wondering ‘whether Kant considers 
“dignity” to be a key concept for the Doctrine of Virtue.’322 
Sensen lists the way ‘dignity’ is used as follows: Three instances refer to the 
aristocratic paradigm where the elevation does not imply a moral ranking (i.e., elevation 
above other values). Three times he refers to the ‘dignity of morality’ (of virtue, of 
reason’s moral interest and of one’s morally practical reason). The other fifteen times 
refer to the ‘dignity of humanity.’323 Sensen finds that Kant uses ‘humanity’ here to 
indicate ‘the sense of one’s idea of a morally good being.’ This means that ‘humanity’ is 
seen ‘as ideal or noumenon’ as we saw earlier. Humanity does then not refer to 
someone who has fully realized his or her dignity in terms of ‘actually being morally 
                                                                
319 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 191. He quotes from MM 434 ff., and 462; 
respectively. 
320 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 192-202. 
321 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 192 n 204. Sensen lists MM 6:420.16 and 
22; 429.16 and 24; 435.2 and 15 and 19; 436.12 and 16 and 29; 449.28; 459.23; 462.12 
and 21 and 24 and 30; 464.18; 467.25 and 26; 468.09; 483.03. 
322 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 192. 
323 He points out that this is the older German ‘Würde der Menschheit,’ which is 
comparable to today’s ‘Menschenwürde.’ See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193. 
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good.’ It refers rather to ‘the capacity for morality, which for Kant is the same as free 
will.’ And ‘being free’ means the same as ‘being under the moral law.’ 324 
Sensen notes that Kant defines ‘the “dignity of humanity in his person” as the 
“prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in accordance with principles, that is, inner 
freedom.”’325 ‘Dignity’ is, furthermore, used to give voice to the idea that human beings 
are elevated ‘above the rest of nature.’ As Kant says: ‘his dignity […] by which he raises 
himself above all other beings in the world.’326 It is freedom that gives us ‘a prerogative,’ 
i.e., elevates us over the rest of the world and this Kant calls ‘inner freedom, the innate 
dignity of a human being.’327 This ‘form of dignity’ pertains to all human beings 
‘innately.’ 
There are only three instances (out of twenty-one) where Kant uses ‘dignity’ in 
conjunction with ‘worth.’328 They occur in two passages whose context is with regard to 
the first two instances, the duty against false humility and the introduction to the duties 
of respect owed to others.329 Sensen’s conclusion after thorough exegesis is that even 
here Kant’s uses ‘the dignity of humanity’ to refer to ‘the capacity to be moral.’ He 
writes: ‘Throughout the Doctrine of Virtue Kant’s point is that one should not deprive 
oneself of the prerogative of being able to act freely (i.e., in accordance with morality). 
                                                                
324 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193. 
325 Quoted from MM 420.16. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193. 
326 Sensen quotes MM 462.24. See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193. 
327 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193; quoting MM 420.22. 
328 See MM 435.02, 436.12 and 462.12. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193. 
329 See MM 434-36 and 462-64 respectively. 
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This is not a new justification or application of morality, but is just a different way of 
saying that one should act as the Categorical Imperative commands.’330  
Sensen remarks that the duties Kant discusses here in the beginning of the 
Doctrine of Virtue (against the vices of lying, avarice and servility) are duties we have 
toward ourselves merely as mortal beings. By this Kant regards the human being 
without reference to his animality or bodily nature. In a move that reminds one of 
Shell’s argument concerning the importance of the body (with regard to Kant’s 
prohibition of suicide), Sensen says these vices are forbidden because they ‘directly 
violate the moral law in its form.’ This means, in the words of Kant that ‘[t]hey adopt 
principles that are directly contrary to his character as a moral being (in terms of its 
form).’331 He points out that Kant defines a character as ‘a law of causality.’ And if we 
ask what the causal law of a moral being might be, Kant’s answer would simply be ‘the 
moral law,’ i.e., ‘the Categorical Imperative.’332 In this sense then these vices defy the 
heart of an existing moral command, viz. according to Sensen, ‘to act on universalizable 
principles and thereby to be free,’ and for Kant this means ‘they make it one’s basic 
principle to have no basic principle and hence no character.’ These vices then result in 
someone ‘depriving himself of the prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in 
accordance with principles, that is, inner freedom.’ This deprivation of the prerogative 
amounts for Sensen to a denial of one’s dignity of being able to act true to principle, 
which in the words of Kant makes oneself ‘a plaything of the mere inclination and hence 
                                                                
330 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 193. 
331 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 194. He quotes from MM 420. 
332 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 194. He refers respectively to CPR A 539/B 
567 and G 446 ff.  
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a thing.’333 According to Sensen then, Kant employs the notion of ‘dignity’ here to 
restate that one should act true to the Categorical Imperative.334 
Sensen looks next at this passage from the Doctrine of Virtue that opens the 
section ‘On Servility.’ I quote the first two two paragraphs. 
In the system of nature, a human being (homo pheanomenon, animal 
rationale) is a being of slight importance and shares with the rest of the animals, 
as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value (pretium vulgare). Although a human 
being has, in his understanding, something more than they and can set himself 
ends, even this gives only an extrinsic value for his usefulness (pretium usus); 
that is to say, it gives one man a higher value than another, that is, a price as of a 
commodity in exchange with these animals as things, though he still has a lower 
value than the universal medium of exchange, money, the value of which can 
therefore be called preeminent (pretium eminens). 
But a human being regarded as a person, that is, as subject of a morally 
practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he 
is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own 
ends, but as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner 
worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in 
the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value 
himself on a footing of equality with them.335 
 
Sensen states that no new conception of ‘value’ is being offered. He notes that 
Kant uses here the language of ‘lower’ and ‘higher.’ It relates to sublimity (i.e., our 
dignity), and as such to the elevation of what is of most (i.e., of highest) importance, and 
which is directly related to our self-esteem and self-abasement. The issue is to reveal 
the highest point of importance (worth) on which self-esteem is based. This is, namely, 
that we can attain this highest (sublime) importance, to wit ‘a good will as commanded 
                                                                
333 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 194-95. These last quotes were all from MM 
420. 
334 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 195. 
335 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:434 ff. See also Sensen, Kant on Human 
Dignity 2011, 195 ff. 
 246 
by the moral law.’336 ‘Dignity,’ which has ‘an absolute inner worth’ comes from one’s 
being a subject of ‘a morally practical reason.’337 Sensen writes: ‘As the subject of a 
morally practical reason, a human being is subject to the Categorical Imperative and can 
acquire a good will. This will is the only thing that is worth striving for unconditionally 
(i.e., it “has” an absolute inner worth).’338 Kant calls this whole process also under the 
rubric of one’s ‘moral calling.’339 This self-esteem is then the pride we take ‘in the 
dignity of our moral calling.’  
The second text that Sensen explores and which relates to the requirement to 
respect others reads as follows: ‘The respect that I have for others or that another can 
require from me […] is therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human 
beings, that is, of a worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the object 
                                                                
336 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 196. Sensen puts is beautifully here too with 
reference to Kant: ‘This aspect of oneself is therefore higher in importance: It is sublime 
in its importance and can exalt oneself over the rest of nature. This is how Kant puts it in 
his discussion of the vice of false humility: “In the system of nature, a human being […] is 
a being of slight importance […].” However, “his insignificance as a human animal may 
not infringe upon the consciousness of his dignity as a rational human being”. A human 
being therefore “should not disavow the moral self-esteem of such a being”, and should 
maintain this esteem “with consciousness of his sublime moral predisposition”. This 
means that “from our capacity for internal lawgiving and from the (natural) human 
being’s feeling himself compelled to revere the (moral) human being within his own 
person, at the same time there comes exaltation of the higest self-esteem”. The moral 
aspect of human beings is connected with a “feeling of his inner worth (valor), in terms 
of which he is above any price (pretium) and possesses an inalienable dignity.”’ Quoted 
from MM 434-36. 
337 This is another way of saying we are under the Categorical Imperative. Sensen, Kant 
on Human Dignity 2011, 196. 
338 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 196. 
339 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 197, and 197 n 205. According to Sensen this 
‘moral calling’ is used ‘in the sense of personality’ by Kant. He refers to Vigil 627; MM 
459; G 434. See Kant, Kant on the Metaphysics of Morals: Vigilantius's Lecture Notes 
1997, 27:627 where this falls under the heading: ‘The duty to govern oneself.’  
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evaluated […] could be exchanged.’340 The context reveals this not to be an instance 
reflecting the contemporary notion of dignity. Human worth is tied to morality. Sensen 
explains, ‘the passage is merely about what one should respect in others’ and this is, 
namely, ‘their striving for morality and an absolute worth.’341 He mentions later that 
‘worth’ refers also to ‘self-esteem,’ meaning here then that one should ‘acknowledge 
the self-respect the other is justified in placing on himself.’342 Sensen analyses Kant’s 
phrase ‘[h]umanity itself is a dignity,’ which Kant justifies in saying: ‘for a human being 
cannot be used merely as a means […] but must always be used at the same time as an 
end.’343 This is related to the Formula of Humanity, which demands that others are to be 
respected and not degraded through treating them as mere means. Sensen relates this 
to the previous argument with regard to self-esteem and our moral calling.344 Sensen 
explains Kant’s saying that respecting others is to respect their dignity as follows: ‘As 
one is oneself under the duty of moral self-esteem to realize one’s initial dignity and 
form a morally good will, so everyone else is under the same duty. If one should respect 
others – as is commanded by the Formula of Humanity – then one should respect them 
in their striving to realize their dignity and form a morally good will.’345 This again does 
                                                                
340 MM 462; as quoted by Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 197, (cf. 197-202 for a 
detailed discussion). 
341 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 198. 
342 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 199. 
343 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:462.21-3. Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 199 ff. 
344 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 199-201. 
345 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 200. 
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not introduce a new value-based justification. Rather: ‘Dignity is explicitly said to follow 
from the demand of the Formula of Humanity, it is not the ground of it.’346  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
After studying the history of the concept of dignity, Sensen identifies three main 
paradigms of dignity, operative at least in the Western way of thinking. The aristocratic 
and traditional paradigms bear affinity with each other while the contemporary 
paradigm is particular to the twentieth century. His thesis is that Kantians often read the 
contemporary paradigm back into Kant’s notion of dignity. This is seen when dignity is 
identified as a value, or with metaphysical properties that ground the moral law or the 
Categorical Imperative.  
Kant uses dignity, in a way akin to the aristocratic notion, in accordance with the 
traditional paradigm. Here dignity indicates ‘elevation’ or ‘sublimity.’ This is related to 
‘value’ insofar as the value expressed in terms of dignity is incomparable and hence 
absolute. It is not possible to measure or calculate it scientifically as with some 
measuring instrument, like a yardstick. It is truly immeasurable. We saw that even 
though Kant describes dignity, and at times the moral law and one’s inner life, as 
imbued with such incomparable value, he cannot have meant it in any way as referring 
to a metaphysical property within. If, for argument’s sake we were to take dignity as 
such an ontological reality, knowledge of it would have been precluded from us in virtue 
                                                                
346 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 201. 
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of Kant’s epistemology. We can know ourselves only as we appear and not in another 
way. Sensen has provided other arguments and exegetical evidence from Kant’s works 
to support his thesis. Most important would be that nothing could ground the moral law 
nor motivate its execution but the command of pure practical reason in the form of the 
Categorical Imperative. So there can be no talk of dignity (or any other value) grounding 
or motivating respect. What is to be respected is the moral law, and its possibility within 
us comprises our first stage or initial dignity. We have to become worthy of this dignity 
by living according to the dictates of the moral law (of the Categorical Imperative which 
also grounds the Formula of Humanity) and this expresses our second stage or realized 
dignity. Respect and treating others with dignity is the result of the demands of the 
Categorical Imperative and they have dignity because the Imperative demands from me 
to treat others with respect. This is Sensen’s thesis and he has provided ample evidence 
in support of it. He acknowledges that many Kantians do not hold this view and that it is 
therefore new. Now that we have seen his position clearly it remains to put the three 
positions we have studied into comparison and dialogue with each other.
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Conclusion: A Phenomenology of Dignity? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In this final chapter I will present the respective methodologies of the three 
Kantians we have studied. Secondly I will place them (and especially Shell and Sensen) 
into a conversation with each other. This I shall do in the following way: I propose to use 
Shell’s methodology and approach to develop a kind of ‘phenomenology’ of Kantian 
dignity. That is to say, I shall try to determine whether it is possible to approach our 
understanding of Kant’s concept of dignity through his own experience. Off course, since 
we do not have direct access to his experience, we rely on texts – texts which speak of 
his experiences and recount the biographical data available to us. By ‘phenomenology’ I 
then mean simply a focus on the lived experience that might have given Kant the raw 
data he could very well have mined in order to formulate a philosophical and conceptual 
understanding of dignity. Kant would obviously have filtered his experiences through 
the strictures provided by his own philosophical system. But I hope this 
phenomenological mining will bring to light two factors important for the dignity of 
persons – namely, transcendence and – for want of a better word – the good. I will then 
show how both Shell and Sensen address these issues, and how one can, through using 
their insights, better understand what I call the ‘phenomenology’ of dignity. This will 
lead us to a better position in which to ask whether Kant’s philosophy of dignity can give 
full expression to his experience of it. 
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2. Sensen: Clearing the playing field and clarifying the concepts. 
 
 
According to Sensen’s thesis, Kantians in the latter part of the twentieth century 
mistook the contemporary notion of dignity for Kant’s own notion and, as it were, read 
it back into Kant. As he writes: ‘In this context human dignity is often assumed to be an 
inherent value all human beings posses; as such, it is thought to be a value that grounds 
the requirement to respect other human beings.’1 Sensen has in mind Kantian scholars 
like Allen Wood, who, for instance, in discussing ‘[e]nds in themselves and existent 
ends,’ writes that in terms of ‘[v]alue conceptions,’ Kant gives an ‘account of the value 
he will ascribe to humanity or rational nature.’2 Looking at a passage in the 
Groundwork,3 Wood discerns ‘three distinct value conceptions:’ ‘end in itself,’ ‘existent 
end’ and ‘absolute worth.’ Suggesting that ‘absolute worth’ may relate to relative worth 
he writes that nonetheless ‘Kant also ascribes to rational nature an “absolute worth” in 
the sense of a dignity, a value that cannot be compared to, traded off against, or 
compensated for or replaced by any other value. […] “Absolute worth” in this passage 
may be an allusion to the dignity of rational nature. Strictly speaking, […] Kant ascribes 
dignity not to “humanity” but to “personality,” that is, not to rational nature in general 
but to rational nature in its capacity to be morally self-legislative.’4 Here, in short, we 
have the classical (Kantian) expression of Kant’s notion of human dignity. This resulted 
                                                                
1 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 1. 
2 Wood 1999, 114. He acknowledges though that this account is ‘entirely hypothetical.’ 
3 G 428: ‘Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence in itself had 
an absolute worth, which, as end in itself could be the ground of determinate laws, then 
in it and it alone would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, a 
practical law.’ Quoted by Wood 1999, 115. 
4 Wood 1999, 115. He refers to G 434.  
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in a notion of dignity regarded as a value that is, moreover, an inherent metaphysical 
property – one that gives a special status to human beings; one that grounds the 
requirement to respect them.5 This Sensen calls ‘the contemporary view of human 
dignity’ and it coincides with a tendency in some Kantian scholars to ‘humanize’ the 
Categorical Imperative by seeing as its basis a value-property tied essentially to human 
dignity. 
Using the tools of the analytical methodology, that is, analysis of words and their 
meanings in the context of arguments and especially of their historical usage, allows 
Sensen to establish that dignity is not seen or used by Kant as an inherent value 
property and that, consistent with his mature philosophy, such ‘value’ can ground 
neither respect nor the moral law. Indeed, respect is to be rendered not as an extra or 
addition to the moral law, but because the moral law itself commands it. As such it is 
part of the moral law. 
Sensen’s interpretation is highly original. He brings something new to the table: 
he explains why values cannot ground morality; he also provides a new understanding 
that challenges the notion, dear to orthodox Kant scholars, of dignity. The traditional 
Kantian notion (e.g. Woods’ notion) shares many features with the contemporary notion 
of dignity, as found for instance by the United Nations and in contemporary ethical 
thought. Although Sensen does not state this explicitly, his writing prompts the question 
                                                                
5 Sensen acknowledged, however, that not all the Kantians would hold that value is a 
metaphysical property. Some sees it like him as a reference to what should be valued. 
His argument with them though is that value per se cannot ground an imperative. See 
Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 5. 
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whether for the last sixty years, scholars have perhaps been reading contemporary 
notions back into Kant.  
Apart from the immense scholarship he brings to the field, as well as originality 
and lucidity, Sensen’s main contribution is, to my mind, fourfold: First, he brings 
conceptual clarity to the main notions associated with dignity. In this he provides us 
with a new way of looking at notions appropriate to the Formula of Humanity, namely, 
‘end in itself,’ ‘respect,’ and of course ‘humanity.’6 He brings this same clarity to his 
penetrating analysis of the individual concepts in the phrase ‘absolute inner value,’ 
highlighting each concept’s mutual relationship with the others and bringing the results 
of his analysis into relationship with ‘dignity.’ All this is immensely valuable. Secondly, 
he shows how these notions (and his interpretations of them), associated with ‘dignity,’ 
fit within the overall structure of Kant’s mature thought. Sensen takes the famous 
Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution’ of the First Critique and applies it to Kant’s Practical 
Philosophy.7 He finds, for instance, that we do not respect another because of his or her 
value, as some would argue, but because the moral law, that is, the Categorical 
Imperative demands it. This ‘Copernican Revolution in morality’ has also implications for 
our understanding of the relationship between duty and rights. He brings clarity and 
focus on the singular importance of the moral law; and his insights can be applied to 
other areas of Kant’s moral philosophy as well. Thirdly, Sensen provides a framework 
within which to understand dignity. In terms of the history of the concept of ‘dignity’ in 
the West he has managed to extract core ideas associated with the concept and by 
                                                                
6 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 7 ff. 
7 See Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 2, 4 ff. 
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means of these has identified some patterns of thought revealing the structure of the 
concept’s meaning as well as its implications. He discerns three basic models operative 
in western history. The contemporary model on the other hand does not see dignity in 
the first instance as a judgment of worth or value but as a metaphysical property within 
each person: A property whose presence grounds one’s value and worth and justifies 
therefore respect and human rights. Fourthly, Sensen has analysed and classified each 
and every instance of Kant’s use of this ‘dignity.’ He identifies three main ways Kant uses 
the concept Würde and from this he identifies and then systematically describes the 
essential structure of what Kant means by it. In light of his historical analysis of the 
history of the notion of dignity he finds that Kant’s understanding fits within the 
traditional model of dignity. In this Sensen has provided a systematic framework within 
which we may understand Kant’s use of the term and this allows us also to branch out 
to other areas of Kant’s philosophy.  
Kant uses ‘dignity’ not as a metaphysical property, but to express elevation and 
sublimity. One might say it is a stylistic instrument whereby Kant would typically place  
(two) notions alongside each other and signifying the one that is judged to be of higher 
value by means of describing it as having dignity. Most helpful is his presentation of 
dignity’s two-fold structure: an initial dignity, which each human being has, and which is 
the condition of the possibility of morality, and secondly, realized or actualized dignity, 
which is not something all have and depends on how one uses one’s initial dignity. In 
the concrete it comes down to one’s obedience to the moral law. Ultimately Sensen 
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finds that for Kant it is really the moral law itself where dignity is found. This means that 
what one really respects in another is the moral law. 
In the end Sensen concludes that for Kant, who uses the concept sparsely, 
dignity is ‘a secondary concept.’8 He concludes: ‘The place of human dignity in Kant’s 
framework, on my reading, is more modest than it is often taken to be; but it is not 
insignificant. Human dignity does not ground moral imperatives, but human beings have 
dignity because they are free and so bound by moral imperatives.’9 
The spirit of Sensen’s presentation is somewhat different from Sullivan’s and 
Shell’s. Not only does he discuss the works of other Kantians on dignity in Kant but he 
also does this at ‘a distance,’ or on a meta-level, where he judges the interpretations of 
his predecessors. His presentation is therefore like a ‘second generation’ Kant scholar 
confronting the problem of dignity. This dialogue with fellow scholars lends great power 
and credence to his claims and clarifications. It allows his readers to see the problem 
from a very wide angle of vision and to determine how it fits coherently within Kant’s 
system. 
 
3. Sullivan 
 
 
Both Sullivan and Shell would according to Sensen be proponents of the 
traditional Kantian understanding of dignity, even though Sullivan and Shell differ from 
                                                                
8 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 202. 
9 Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 2011, 213. 
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each other, not least in their methodologies but also with regard to central philosophical 
themes they choose to relate to dignity in Kant. 
Sullivan gave a solid presentation from the perspective of Kant’s moral 
philosophy. His strengths are numerous. For one, he presents human dignity in Kant not 
as an individual theme but places it in the context of Kant’s moral thought and presents 
it systematically as it fits into ‘the greater whole’ of Kant’s thought.10 His approach is 
somewhat analytical.11 In this he differs from Shell, and stands closer to Sensen. His 
Kantian methodology is that Kant respects ordinary moral consciousness and that Kant’s 
philosophy does not propose something new, that is, something that is not already 
inherent in people’s moral thinking. These ‘people’ are ordinary folks and not specialists 
or philosophers.12 This establishes some connection between him and Shell’s approach 
(more on this further on). He relates dignity, in the third place, directly (and almost 
exclusively) to the Second Formula, which he even calls: ‘the Formula of Respect for the 
Dignity of Persons.’13 He does not present this Formula as standing apart from the 
Categorical Imperative but as flowing from the Imperative and in fact being just a 
different expression of it.14 This, oddly enough, places him close to Sensen and his aim 
to bring everything (e.g., moral motivation) back to the Categorical Imperative and to 
relate duties to the same. Sullivan presents dignity in relation to (moral) personhood. He 
interprets Kant’s phrases regarding a person as ‘an end in himself’ and ‘an object of free 
                                                                
10 See Sullivan 1989, 1 ff., 11 ff. 
11 See Sullivan 1989, xv. 
12 Sullivan 1989, 4-6. On this note he appreciates the influence of Pietism on Kant as well 
(cf. Ibid., 6 ff.). 
13 Sullivan 1989, 193. 
14 See Sullivan 1989, 193 ff. 
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choice’ as concerned with persons who should, in accord with their own and others’ 
dignity, never be instrumentalized. He adds: ‘Persons as “self-existent” (selbständig), 
[have] intrinsic and objective worth simply by the fact that they exist, apart from any 
and all subjective prudential considerations.’15 In this Sullivan’s is the classic expression 
of the traditional Kantian interpretation, and one can see how it lends itself to being a 
basis for the contemporary model of dignity (as understood by Sensen). The question 
though is how we take this principle of life, which is itself the ‘intrinsic and objective 
worth’ Sullivan refers to. Do we take it as a metaphysical reality which would make of 
dignity a self-standing metaphysical property? Or, do we remain on the purely analytical 
level and say the concepts pertaining to dignity neither refer to, nor include, any such 
‘fact’ of life? In the fourth place, Sullivan argues that although ‘morality cannot 
ultimately be based on feelings, only on reason alone’ [emphasis mine], he states 
nonetheless that ‘respect or reverence is a special kind of moral feeling.’16 Respect 
cannot be sanctioned by any external authority, yet we have to ‘cultivate and act on this 
disposition’ – hence Kant’s calling it ‘a duty of virtue.’17 This raises the problem of how 
one is to understand respect for others as an emotion. The problem is not only that it 
might open the door to moral sentimentalism but also that in determining courses of 
action in thorny ethical issues disputes can arise resulting in people using the phrase 
‘respect for people’ with ‘its powerful emotional connotation,’ as an emotional 
‘sledgehammer.’ Rational argumentation has then all but disappeared. Here Sullivan 
                                                                
15 Sullivan 1989, 196. 
16 Sullivan 1989, 198. 
17 Sullivan 1989, 198. 
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anticipates the problems to which Sensen’s interpretation offers a solution. In fact he 
even refers to the sanity of the ‘strict method’ that is the Categorical Imperative as a 
way out.18 Although there are certain elements in Sullivan (like the two-fold structure of 
dignity) that remind one of Sensen, his is an expression of the classic Kantian notion of 
dignity. Dignity becomes a motivational force for morality. Sullivan writes: ‘the second 
formula […] emphasizes why we must be moral: to live up to the dignity we have by 
virtue of being rational beings, to sustain the right we and all other persons have to 
moral self-esteem.’19 
 
4. Shell 
 
 
Shell’s presentation starts with a question. She asks: ‘What does it mean to 
speak of “human dignity” or the dignity of man as man?’20 Her methodology is not 
analytical but what I would call for want of a better word, ‘anthropological.’ By this I 
mean that she follows an integrative approach where Kant’s biography and his texts are 
brought to bear upon one another. She tries to bring the human experience behind Kant 
to life and her interpretation returns constantly to this experience. In doing so she does 
not shy away from either the epistemological or metaphysical dimensions. Both Sensen 
and Sullivan tend to be shyer with regard to the metaphysical. Shell goes further though 
in that for her ‘these two realms are joined, however mysteriously, by a common 
                                                                
18 Sullivan 1989, 209. 
19 Sullivan 1989, 200. 
20 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 53. 
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inhabitant – man.’21 Her great strength is that she opens the way to discover Kant, the 
man, in and behind his texts. She also manages to bring him home to the contemporary 
world. 
Apart from these she brings unique elements to bear on the understanding of 
dignity. Her scholarship into the early and pre-critical works of Kant, together with her 
gift of allowing the man himself, in his humanity, to speak, is groundbreaking and 
without equal. In this she manages to show how the roots of Kant’s thinking lie in the 
questions that plagued him in response to the events of his day, the new scientific 
discoveries and new theoretical knowledge of the day. What is, secondly, of great 
importance is the way in which she shows how Kant’s early philosophy gradually 
became more concerned with the question of the meaning of human life and how this 
question was framed as a question of humanity’s value: a question about the dignity of 
man, and wherein this dignity was to be found. Thirdly, Shell uniquely addresses those 
concepts in which dignity is embedded, namely freedom and autonomy, imputability, 
personality, God, religion, history, and politics in relation to rights and government. Her 
work on the pre-critical Kant is invaluable here. She traces the development of Kant’s 
thoughts in a way that allows us to see how the key concepts that became the 
intellectual tools with which Kant thinks through the issue of humanity’s value are 
formed. We see, for instance, how concepts like value get related to meaning and 
worth; how interiority is not assumed but develops; how freedom becomes a 
cornerstone; how other people have moral implications for one’s own life; how Kant’s 
                                                                
21 Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 1980, 7. 
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own life-changing history brought him to rank morality higher than knowledge. I have 
not discussed all these themes in the chapter devoted to Shell, but her works address 
them.22 This shows that even though dignity is a ‘secondary concept’ it has a far reach in 
its influence and applicability. The most important point, though, is that it is intimately 
related to morality. Fourth, Shell links dignity to human consciousness and to the 
conscience. The latter is the awareness of the moral law within. Finally, her linkage of 
dignity with the body and ethical issues relating to the body is very valuable and 
relevant in our world today.  
Sensen suggests that Kant’s understanding of dignity is Stoic. And in presenting a 
short history of the concept Shell makes the same point – namely that Stoic, as well as 
Judaic-Christian influences, weighed heavily with Kant. Nevertheless, she says, Kant 
brings something new to the picture, namely, autonomy.23 Autonomy has to do with 
obeying the law, which we also legislate. In this process human consciousness of the 
moral law, which we can also call our conscience, plays a pivotal role. 
It is especially in her analysis of consciousness that I find her thought richly 
suggestive. She gives the impression that there must be more, that there is more, and 
yet we cannot grasp it directly. She finds in history the ultimate judge of our collective 
value. But even so she is open for ‘a glimpse of the eternal—a glimpse available to us by 
                                                                
22 See, for instance, Shell, The Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics 
1980; Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 
1996; Shell, Kant as Propagator: Reflections on Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime 2002; Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009. 
23 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 54. 
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virtue of our higher moral nature.’24 She does not state this dogmatically, yet this is a 
possibility opened up by consciousness, the moral law and dignity, which somehow 
express the sublimity that is appropriate to these experiences and that is, moreover, 
particular to man. 
In the final section of this conclusion I would like to place these three 
philosophers into a dialogue or conversation. I believe that especially between Shell and 
Sensen we can find common ground, not so much in forcing them to an agreement with 
each other’s positions, but as enriching each other. However, I shall first provide some 
background, taken from following an anthropological approach, as Shell does. We learn 
from Shell how to think with Kant. Let us imagine him then and try to see where thinking 
with him from his life experience (in so far as we know it) would take us. What would 
the experience, or phenomenology, of dignity look like, if there is indeed such an 
experience? 
 
5. The Experience of Dignity  
 
 
5.1 Definitions 
 
 
Philosophers like definitions. But there is no one neat definition of dignity. Here 
Sensen is most helpful in that he clarifies the basic concepts and provides not so much a 
definition as an uncovering of the inner structure of dignity. Dignity is elevation. Dignity 
has a two-fold structure: an initial dignity, in which all share, and which is nothing other 
                                                                
24 Shell, Kant on Human Dignity 2003, 70-71. 
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than that which makes moral life possible. Realized dignity is our responsibility and 
requires a life of effort to live in accordance with the moral law. We could also say: 
Dignity involves living authentically autonomous lives. In this sense not all people have 
the same level of actual dignity. But Sensen goes further: in the end, he says, it is really 
not human beings that are the locus of dignity, but the moral law. 
Associated with dignity is the command to respect others. As the meaning and 
dynamic of this respect is teased out it becomes clear that I first respect the moral law. 
In a footnote in the Groundwork, Kant explores the notion of ‘respect’ and remarks 
(against a possible objection that respect is ‘an obscure feeling’) that, ‘even though 
respect is a feeling, it is not one received through any outside influence but is, rather, 
one that is self-produced by means of a rational concept; […] What I recognize 
immediately as a law for me, I recognize with respect; this means merely the 
consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of other 
influences upon my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the 
consciousness thereof, is called respect, which is hence regarded as the effect of the law 
upon the subject and not as the cause of the law.’25 The effect of the mere presence (or 
possibility) of the moral law (e.g., to treat others in a certain way) produces this feeling 
of respect. But it is a respect for the law and not for the other as such. To put it in 
another way: the presence of the moral law awakens this respect.  
So, Sensen and others determine that the real object of respect in oneself and 
others is not directly persons per se but the moral law. What I respect in others is the 
                                                                
25 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 4:402 n 14. 
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presence of the moral law. In so far then as we saw that the concept of person pertains 
to the moral law – which means that a person is one under the law, responsible to obey 
what he legislates, and thus the one who makes the concrete expression of the moral 
law possible and actual – we can say we respect the person and thereby actually mean 
we respect the moral law.  
In Sensen’s whole presentation it is as if he moves, systematically and 
determinately, to present a vision of dignity as being actually the highest elevation and 
worth of the moral law. And in the execution of the moral law, in following it, he ever so 
deliberately excludes all possible motives that might intrude, be they hypothetical 
conditions or even values (as some would regard ‘dignity’ to be). The highest form of 
dignity (as even the concepts ‘inner,’ ‘absolute’ and ‘value’ show) is truly expressed 
thus: that what should be valued for itself is the law and nothing but the law. This 
relates to Kant’s notion of the absolute good as a good will, which means a will that acts 
only for sake of what it wills and for nothing else; and what it wills has no other external 
reference and is nothing other than the law itself. We are to value the law for the sake 
of the law alone (no other motivations reach the sublimity of the law). Similarly, the only 
pure good is the will that chooses the good (the law) for the sake of the law as an act of 
pure will, with no other external or internal motivation. The sublimity of the will mirrors 
the sublimity of the law. 
This is a vision that presents a search so pure for something so pure that it 
reminds one of a mystical search for the Divine. A sentiment like the following might 
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apply: ‘Nothing matters: all that suffices is God for the sake of God alone.’26 It is as if 
Sensen were to say: ‘Nothing matters: all that suffices is the Law for the sake of the Law 
alone.’ I do not mean this as a criticism. Just the opposite. Indeed, if one looks at the 
above quoted footnote, it appears just before Kant states the Categorical Imperative for 
the first time in the Groundwork.27 Moreover, the footnote is attached to a text where 
Kant talks about the moral worth of an action. It is only through the rational will that 
‘the highest and unconditioned good can alone be found.’ He continues by saying 
‘Therefore, the pre-eminent good which is called moral can consist in nothing but the 
representation of the law in itself, and such a representation can admittedly be found 
only in a rational being insofar as this representation […] is the determining ground of 
the will. The good is already present in the person who acts according to this 
representation, and such good need not be awaited merely from the effect.’28 
My impression is that Sensen senses this ‘goodness,’ which is something given; it 
is as if it is there before we act on it, even as we also legislate it. I understand Kant here 
to imply that we become the incarnators of the Good through the moral law, through 
the process of the Categorical Imperative.29 In these speculations then I admit that I go 
beyond both Sensen and Shell. 
                                                                
26 See for instance the motto of St Louis-Marie Grignion de Montfort (1673-1716) whose 
motto was ‘God Alone.’ His collective writings are published under this title. See 
Grignion de Montfort 1988. 
27 See G 402. 
28 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 4:401. Even this phrase ‘the 
highest good alone’ reminds one of a sentiment like ‘God, for God alone, suffices.’ 
29 Sensen does not pursue this line of thought. He states clearly at the end: ‘One has to 
explain why freedom as a descriptive metaphysical property (the ability to determine 
oneself independently of nature) should yield a moral law.’ And he clearly admits: 
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I intend to present now a phenomenology of dignity. What I mean by this is a 
presentation of Kant in accordance with his biography and some writings that reflect his 
biography in a way that highlights how his experiences feed into the concept of dignity. 
Experiences we take to be subject to the phenomenological realm (hence a 
‘phenomenology’ of dignity); but I intend to show how Kant’s own descriptions seem to 
point to the experience of transcendence (something Shell highlighted); I next intend to 
show that the noetic purity of the concept of dignity, as presented by Sensen, has its 
roots in an experience paralleling religious experience and which, for want of a better 
word, I would call the Good. My question at the end remains the same to both Shell and 
Sensen: whether their understandings describe the same reality albeit from different 
points of view and thus leave open the possibility that in dignity we experience or are 
witness to something pointing beyond phenomena even as we are bound to them. This 
is parallel to our autonomy, which involves both our legislating and obeying what we 
legislate. 
 
5.2 The Importance of Kant’s own experiences 
 
 
The assumption of Sullivan’s approach to dignity is that is it is part of Kant’s 
moral philosophy and that Kant, especially in the expression of the second formula of 
the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons as he calls 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘These questions were not the subject of this book.’ Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity 
2011, 214. 
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it, intends deliberately to ‘bring an Idea of reason … nearer to feeling.’30 To affect this 
Kant uses ‘emotional language’ deliberately in order to stress ‘that the subjective 
foundation of human morality consists of the dispositions of self-respect and respect for 
others.’31 Sullivan’s purpose in writing his book is to present ‘a synoptic and detailed 
exposition of Kant’s entire practical theory.’32 He admits that he has no particular theme 
through which he approached Kant’s practical philosophy, except a conviction that there 
is ‘an overall wholeness to Kant’s practical philosophy.’33 He confesses to being ‘more at 
home within the Anglo-American analytic tradition than […] with Continental 
phenomenology.’34 
In spite of his analytic proclivity, he does allow himself a few pages on Kant’s 
personal life in his introductory chapter. I refer to two insights he finds worth 
mentioning. Referring to the enforced training in piety in his youth, he states that Kant’s 
mistrust of ‘soft’ sentimental feelings find their origin here. Kant respected emotions 
‘recommended by the ancient Stoics [that reflected and promoted] a strong will and 
high principles.’ Sullivan remarks how Kant in fact strengthened his own ‘frail 
constitution’ by ‘a stern discipline’ that steadfastly refused himself to allow any ‘ease 
and indulgence.’ This was even the case in his personal relationships, where he 
maintained a ‘certain reserve.’35 We can see in this brief sketch how struggle and high 
ideals and a strong will (as lived realities for Kant) have a practical application; and when 
                                                                
30 Sullivan 1989, 193. Quoted from G 436. 
31 Sullivan 1989, 193. 
32 Sullivan 1989, xi. 
33 Sullivan 1989, xiv. 
34 Sullivan 1989, xv. 
35 Sullivan 1989, 2. 
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we meet them in his philosophy we can see them to be much more than theory. It is 
noteworthy that the last paragraph Sullivan devotes to Kant’s personal life is devoted to 
dignity. I quote the poignant paragraph in full: ‘In Kant’s moral theory the dignity of 
persons and their right to respect is grounded in their freedom – their ability to 
subordinate their particular desires and inclinations to the universal law of morality. To 
live up to this freedom is the meaning of integrity, and so it is understandable that more 
than anything else Kant treasured intellectual and moral integrity, both in himself and in 
others. He is remembered by those who knew him as the best model of his own moral 
doctrines: He valued the impersonal universal in all those with whom he dealt more 
than their individuality or particularity. An incident occurred about a week before his 
death that has often been used to illustrate how Kant guided his relationships with 
others by the disinterested interest of moral respect, which he nonetheless called the 
“courtesy of the heart.” Desperately weak, mentally unable to concentrate, and virtually 
blind, Kant insisted on rising and remaining standing until his doctor had seated himself. 
With great effort Kant then remarked that at least “the sense of humanity has not yet 
abandoned me.”’36 
We have already seen that Sensen refers to this same incident. While Shell goes 
into the life of Kant in a depth that the other two do not, their reference to this personal 
incident nonetheless highlights that however much one might focus on the analytical 
aspects of Kant’s thought with regard to dignity, the personal cannot be ignored. When 
Kant thinks of dignity, it is not so much about theory, but about life lived in a certain 
                                                                
36 Sullivan 1989, 2-3. Even here we may ask how we are to understand this phrase ‘the 
impersonal universal’? 
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way; about character, about respect. The question is what is the true object of respect; 
and what is the way life is to be lived; and in the sketch from Sullivan we have seen 
(what was already clear in Shell) the effort, which is a personal effort or cost involved in 
the attainment or execution of respect associated with dignity. Finally the true object of 
this effort or cost is not in the first place the other, but the self. This is the dynamic 
involved in the lived reality of dignity. Kant reflected this in his practical writings and in 
his philosophy. Shell referred to Herder’s accusation regarding Kant, that Kant saw his 
life as a ‘spiritual invention’ or as Shell puts it as an experiment.37 This means he puts his 
ideas into practise but also that his practise informs his ideas. Something of this is in fact 
evident in his moral philosophy, as can be seen in his insistence on the use of the word 
‘principle.’ Shell has shown that throughout Kant’s life –especially in his early life –
theoretical questions had their basis in his personal life. Not that Kant was an 
existentialist.38 In a section entitled: ‘The context for Kant’s moral philosophy,’ Sullivan 
talks about how the new sciences of Kant’s day seemed to challenge traditional morality 
because of their implicit mechanistic determinism. He refers to the preface of the 
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant states explicitly: ‘I have 
therefore found it necessary to put aside [theoretical/scientific] knowledge in order to 
make room for [moral and religious] faith [Glaube].’39  
                                                                
37 See Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 
1996, 1-2. 
38 As Sullivan mentions the motto to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
taken from Bacon: ‘De nobis ipsis silemus’ that is translated as ‘[a]bout ourselves we are 
silent.’ Sullivan 1989, 2. 
39 Quote taken from CPR B xxx. He refers also to B xxii, A 295-96 / B 352-53, 11 note; 
MM 378. Sullivan 1989, 11. 
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In his standard book on the early philosophy of Kant, Martin Schönfeld shares 
this impression of the philosopher: ‘But what always distinguished Kant was his 
extraordinary intellectual honesty. He admitted to himself the extent of his initial failure 
and carefully learned the painful lesson it entailed.’40 He points out how Kant time and 
again abandoned positions once he learned that they did not hold up to his rigorous 
scrutiny. Thus he abandoned Cartesean mechanics and embraced Newtonian physics. 
His adherence to the Leibnitzian-Wolffian metaphysics in which he was schooled 
suffered the same fate.41 
Additionally, and not least, this brings to light the image of an extraordinarily 
focussed human being, for whom philosophizing and living at its most mundane 
converged to a remarkable degree. Shell writes: ‘Kant’s greatness lies, at least in part, in 
a singularity of purpose – a self-imposed attentiveness – by which, in aiming to found 
philosophy as a systematic science, he also, and not incidentally, expressed and 
fashioned his own character. […] Herder accused his former teacher of trying to give 
spiritual birth to himself. More positively and accurately assayed, Kant’s systematizing 
efforts go together with – and in a nontrivial sense constitute – a lifelong self-
experiment. To this extent, Kant’s life can be (and was, evidently, by him) regarded as a 
“masterpiece.”’42 
                                                                
40 Schönfeld, The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project 2000, 19. The 
major project of the precritical period was for Schönfeld Kant’s attempt to reconcile 
natural science and metaphysics. Ibid., 10.  
41 See also Schönfeld, Kant's Philosophical Development 2012. 
42 Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community 1996, 
1-2. 
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Paul Schilpp remarks that Kant has often been misjudged based on the writings 
of the latter period as a pure rational being: cold, rigorous and emotionless. He points 
out, in fact, that a study of Kant’s other writings reveal a character that is ‘far from being 
a mere Verstandesmensch.’43 He refers to a passage in the Observations on the Feeling 
of the Beautiful and Sublime in which Kant describes the four temperaments. In 
agreement with others he takes the passage on melancholy as ‘largely 
autobiographical.’44 Schilpp quotes the passage in full and I follow suit. Kant writes: 
‘The person whose feeling leans toward melancholy is called melancholy, not 
because he broods in morose heaviness of heart robbed of all the joys of life, but 
because, if his emotional reactions were to be enhanced beyond a certain measure or 
were to be misdirected for any reasons, they would more easily tend towards that 
condition than to any other. He has a special feeling for the sublime. Even beauty, for 
which he also has a feeling, must not merely charm but also move him, inasmuch as it 
fills him at the same time with admiration. The enjoyment of pleasures is much more 
serious, but is on that account no less enjoyable. All emotions of the sublime contain 
more enchantment for him than all the deceitful enticings of the beautiful. His well-
being will be closer to contentment than to gaiety. He is steadfast. For that reason he 
regulates his emotions by principles. The more general the principle of regulation, the 
broader the high feeling which comprises the lower one within itself, the less these 
emotions yield to unsteadiness and change. … The person of melancholy frame of mind 
cares little for what others think, what they consider good or true; he trusts entirely to 
his own insight. Since his grounds of motivation take on the nature of principles he is 
not easily brought to other ideas; occasionally his steadfastness degenerates even into 
wilfulness. He looks upon the change of fashions with indifference and upon its glamour 
with contempt. Friendship is sublime and is therefore agreeable to his temperament. … 
Affable conversation is beautiful, thoughtful silence is sublime. He is a good keeper of 
his own secrets as well as of those of others. Veracity is sublime; he hates lies and 
pretense. He has a high regard for the dignity of human nature. He esteems himself and 
regards any man as a creature deserving respect. He will endure no depraved 
submissiveness and breathes freedom in a noble breast. He abominates all chains, from 
the gilded ones worn at court to the heavy irons of the galley-slave. He is a severe judge 
                                                                
43 Schilpp 1998, 3; see esp. 2-7. 
44 Schilpp 1998, 4; see also 3 esp. n 4. He refers to Observations 220-221. 
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of himself and of others and not rarely is disgusted with himself as well as with the 
world.’45 
If we grant Schilpp that this is indeed autobiographical, we can see the rich 
interior life of an author who is aware of his feelings and their power, who reveals an 
astounding psychological self-awareness and a similarly remarkable degree of self-
mastery. This is achieved by means of a lived-through and tested, experimental 
approach to the self where, by means of reasonable principles, one masters passions 
that can lead one astray. This is something we saw in Shell’s account, namely that Kant’s 
life was something of ‘an experiment’ and in fact a ‘masterwork.’  
Schilpp refers to the third part of The Conflict of the Faculties. Here Kant writes 
in response to a letter from one Professor Hufeland who asked Kant to comment on his 
attempt ‘to present the whole human being, including his physical side, as a being that 
is ordered to morality,’ and this for the sake of establishing a regimen in order to 
prevent illness. Kant, inspired by Prof Hufeland, sets about to formulate just such a 
regimen. In this he shows how practical (moral) philosophy does not provide a complete 
                                                                
45 Schilpp 1998, 4. What is noteworthy here in terms of our thesis on dignity is not only 
the reference to human dignity and respect but the use of ‘sublimity’ that clearly 
reflects ‘elevation.’ We see that ‘sublime’ is used in a context where two elements or 
activities are compared (e.g., ‘talkativeness’ vs. ‘thoughtful taciturnity’ [Guyer’s 
translation]) and that ‘sublime’ is used to declare which one is the better, i.e., beyond 
measure and calculation. The sublime awakens a feeling for whatever it regards as 
sublime – as in the case of friendship. It gives us an inner man’s view of lived dignity: 
‘Truthfulness is sublime, and he hates lies or dissemblance. He has a lofty feeling for the 
dignity of human nature. He esteems himself and holds a human being to be a creature 
who deserves respect’ [Guyer’s translation]. See Kant, Observations on the Feeling of 
the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) 2011, 2:220-221. While some of this will be modified in 
Kant’s mature thought, the sentiments and the basic intellectual tools pertaining to 
dignity are already present here. 
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answer, yet is nonetheless ‘an ingredient in every prescription.’46 In attempting his 
formulation, Kant’s first thesis reads: ‘On the power of the human mind to master its 
morbid feelings merely by a firm resolution.’ It is in the opening statement of this thesis 
that Kant writes the following: ‘My examples confirming the possibility of this 
proposition cannot be drawn from other people’s experiences, but, in the first instance, 
only from what I have experienced in myself; for they come from introspection 
[Selbstbewußtsein], and only afterwards can I ask others whether they have not noticed 
the same things in themselves. – I am […] dealing, not with common experience, but 
with an inner experiment or observation that I had to make on myself before I could 
submit, for others’ consideration, something that would not of itself occur to everyone 
unless his attention were drawn to it.’47  
We see something of the experimental nature of Kant and of his own ‘inner 
history’ and its importance in formulating his doctrines. We can also better understand 
the importance of the first duty toward oneself, namely, honesty – not to mention the 
role and function of consciousness. This is not meant to reduce Kant’s philosophy to his 
biography or to his psychology; but if we do not see that Kant lived concretely and that 
his life was brought to bear truthfully upon his philosophy, we miss a fuller picture of 
the man and his thought, not to mention the power of his thought. It is especially in his 
practical thought that his experience and honesty drove his philosophizing. As a 
monument to his integrity, Sullivan quotes this sentence that Kant wrote on April 8, 
                                                                
46 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:97. See Schilpp 1998, 5. 
47 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:98.  The word translated here as 
‘introspection’ is in the original ‘Selbstbewußtsein,’ which Schilpp translates as self-
consciousness. His translation seems closer to the original. See Schilpp 1998, 5. 
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1766, in a letter to his friend Moses Mendelssohn: ‘Although I am absolutely convinced 
of many things that I shall never have the courage to say, I shall never say anything I do 
not believe.’48 Belief can be deeply personal and its expression highly philosophical. In 
Kant it was both. We find here an insight into just how concrete his purposes are and 
what instruments he proposes to utilize in attainment of his end, which is here to 
prevent illness through a dynamic of regulating oneself through the instrument of the 
maxim. We can see in this something analogous to the dynamic of Kantian morality, 
which also works through maxims and principles. 
The purpose of maxims is off course not to have them for their own sake. It is 
rather to better oneself as a human being, or as he puts it elsewhere, to gain character. 
Kant writes: ‘Wanting to become a better human being in a fragmentary way is a futile 
endeavor, since one impression dies out while one works on another; the grounding of 
character, however, is absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct as such.’49 
 
5.3 Absolute integrity of character: the search for the ‘absolute unity of the inner 
principle of conduct’ and dignity 
 
 
In his fortieth year Kant suffered some profound ‘life crisis.’ This resulted in a 
‘revolution and rebirth,’ which laid the ‘foundation of his own character’ [my 
emphasis].50 Kuehn points out that Kant’s description of this rebirth reflects not only the 
language but also parallels the process of religious conversion according to the 
                                                                
48 Sullivan 1989, 1. 
49 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:295. 
50 Kuehn 2001, 149. 
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Pietists.51 However, Kuehn also says that Kant’s conversion was not religious. Kant’s 
search for ‘the new man,’ according to Kuehn, lead Kant not to religion but to morality: 
‘By acquiring a character one becomes a new person.’52 Absolutely central in this 
process of recreating oneself is ‘the maxim.’ One masters oneself through maxims and 
in this there is also definite Stoic influence. Kuehn describes Kantian maxims as ‘really 
ordinary sorts of things.’ He writes: ‘They are precepts or general policies that we 
learned from others or from books, and that we choose to adopt as principles to live 
by.’53 This ability to formulate a principle and to be guided by it rather than by one’s 
inclination reveals our rationality. For Kant we act either out of instinct in accordance 
with our animal nature or according to reason. Maxims then, once formulated and 
decided upon, should be followed and never be revoked. They are truly ‘Lebensregeln 
[…] rules to live by’ and as such they not only ‘express what kind of a person one is; they 
constitute that person, in some sense. They constitute the person as character. In other 
words, to have a certain set of maxims and to have character (or to be a person) is one 
and the same thing.’54 Kuehn notes then that a good character is judged by the person’s 
maxims. Good maxims lead to good character and vice versa. However, in order to be 
good, these maxims, which limits our freedom, ‘must be constant.’ In fact, Kuehn states, 
‘[w]e are worth only as much as our maxims are worth.’55 Maxims are the way through 
which we legislate for ourselves, and how we manage to circumvent our feelings and 
                                                                
51 See Kuehn 2001, 150 ff. 
52 Kuehn 2001, 150. 
53 Kuehn 2001, 145. 
54 Kuehn 2001, 147. 
55 See Kuehn 2001, 148. ‘Worth’ here refers to the second stage of dignity, i.e., realized 
dignity. 
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inclinations. It is important to understand this. As Kuehn says: ‘All this has relevance for 
a better understanding of Kant’s mature philosophy, but it is also extremely important 
for understanding Kant’s own development as a person.’56 
Kuehn shows how around the year 1764 (when Kant turned forty) his life started 
to change. First, he suffered a perceptible change in his ‘circle of friends.’ Kypke, one 
friend, moved away, but the most painful was no doubt Funk’s sudden death – a few 
days short of Kant’s fortieth birthday. Funk was Kant’s ‘closest friend’ and for Kuehn his 
death meant more to Kant than any other (before or after). It stimulated Kant to a 
profound personal reflection on the value and meaning of life and death. This 
‘experience of human mortality’ was one of the reasons for Kant’s ‘palingenesis’ or 
‘rebirth.’57 Kant’s hypochondria and despair also necessitated a life under maxims. 
Kuehn concludes that one might judge Kant’s ‘regimen [as] perhaps just a simple and 
simple-minded form of mental hygiene’ but one that Kant found ‘necessary to engage 
in’ nonetheless.58 It was finally also Kant’s new friendship with the English merchant 
Joseph Green that influenced him profoundly. Kuehn dates the friendship back to the 
summer of 1765. ‘This much is sure,’ he writes, ‘by 1766 they were close friends; and at 
least from that time on Kant was a constant and very regular visitor at Green’s house.’59 
Green, who first came to Königsberg at a young age, was also ‘a bachelor like Kant, but 
                                                                
56 Kuehn 2001, 148. Kuehn develops the same points elsewhere. For him ‘the concepts 
of “moral sense”, “moral character”, “maxim” and “the good will”’ are closely related. 
Kuehn, Ethics and Anthropology in the Development of Kant's Moral Philosophy 2009, 9, 
7-28. 
57 Kuehn 2001, 150. 
58 Kuehn 2001, 153, cf 151 ff. 
59 See Kuehn 2001, 155. Kuehn mentions that Kant’s regularity was, at least initially, 
more due to Green’s example than to Kant’s habits. 
 276 
he lived a different life from the one Kant had lived until then. Rather than being driven 
by the whirlpool of events, Green lived by the strictest rules or maxims.’60 Kant and 
Green became close friends and eventually Kant gave up many of his earlier customs, 
like the theater, music concerts, playing cards and other diversions he loved (especially 
with Funk), partly under the influence of Green. ‘The days of the whirlpool of social 
diversions were coming to an end – not suddenly, but slowly: maxim by maxim.’61 They 
later shared the same circle of friends and shared the same interest in especially 
Rousseau and Hume. Kuehn judges that in the end ‘Green […] became the most intimate 
friend Kant ever had.’62 
This brief biographical sketch is important because it gives us an imaginative 
insight into a very human Kant, his life and some of the struggles he endured, but 
especially also the lengths he had to go and the efforts he had to expend in order to 
form his character and to overcome this crisis. This relates to the years of Kant’s 
‘anthropological revolution’ and to the conversion experience Shell pinpoints in which 
Rousseau ‘set [Kant] upright.’63 It also reveals the intimate connection between Kant’s 
life and thought; which reveals the integrity of the man. 
All these themes are addressed by and incorporated into his philosophy – for 
instance in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In the second part Kant 
addresses ‘Anthropological Characteristic.’ His subtitle is telling: ‘on the way of cognizing 
                                                                
60 Kuehn 2001, 154. 
61 See Kuehn 2001, 156. 
62 Kuehn 2001, 157, see also 154-58. 
63 See Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 39, cf. also 33 ff., 39-44, 45 ff. 
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the interior of the human being from the exterior.’64 This reflects not only the reality of 
the inner life and its knowability (and hence accessibility), through one’s exterior, but 
also the undeniably close relationship between interiority and exteriority. 
The key is character. Kant distinguishes between physical character and moral 
character. ‘The first is the distinguishing mark of the human being as a sensible or 
natural being; the second is the distinguishing mark of the human being as a rational 
being endowed with freedom.’65 When Kant discusses character more precisely he does 
it under the heading: ‘on character as the way of thinking.’66 Character has to do with 
the desire to become a better human being but the key to this is absolute integrity, or as 
he puts it the ‘absolute unity of [an] inner principle of conduct.’ Kant writes: ‘Wanting to 
become a better human being in a fragmentary way is a futile endeavor, since one 
impression dies out while one works on another; the grounding of character, however, 
is absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct as such.’67 
Kant associates character with dignity. In fact this initial section on character is 
sandwiched between two references to inner worth and dignity. I take this structure as 
akin to a literary device that implies that the material boxed in by this repetitive theme 
relates directly to the theme in such a way that it functions as an interpretative lens 
                                                                
64 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:283. 
65 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:285. 
66 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:291. That character 
is described as one’s way of thinking reveals the interior springs and dimension of 
character but in knowing it via the outside shows the unity between the inner and outer 
that is presupposed.  
67 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:295. 
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through which one ought to understand the theme thus sandwiched. If this is true, we 
can say that dignity bears directly upon character. 
Without using the word dignity, his opening description in this section already 
carries notions we have come to equate with dignity, namely to be special, to be worthy 
of respect and admiration, and, by implication, elevation.68 In what we would identify as 
relating to ‘realized dignity’ Kant writes ‘simply to have a character signifies that 
property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles 
that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason.’69 A few sentences later 
Kant says: ‘here it does not depend on what nature makes of the human being, but of 
what the human being makes of himself.’70 Character is what we make of ourselves. And 
this Kant values: ‘All other good and useful properties of the human being have a price 
that allows them to be exchanged with other things that have just as much use; talent 
has a market price, […] temperament has a fancy price [Affektionspreis] […] – but 
character has an inner worth, and is beyond all price.’71 Thus reads the beginning of this 
section. The end paragraph mentions the word ‘dignity’ twice (once in parenthesis as a 
                                                                
68 See Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:291 ff. Kant 
writes here: ‘To be able to simply say of a human being: “he has a character” is not only 
to have said a great deal about him, but is also to have praised him a great deal; for this 
is a rarity, which inspires profound respect and admiration toward him.’ 
69 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:292. This says 
nothing about the truth or correctness of the principles, it refers rather to the fact that 
one of character is ruled by principles. These make him distinctive. 
70 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:292. 
71 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:292. 
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clarifying description of the exact words ‘inner worth’72). In this it is clear that character 
relates to morality. 
What Kant discusses between these two inner worth/dignity references are, 
first, qualities that result from possessing a character or not. Here Kant makes three 
points. The first is that the imitator (‘in moral matters’) lacks character because 
character is expressed by ‘originality in the way of thinking.’ For Kant this means 
someone who ‘derives his conduct from a source that he has opened by himself [aus 
seiner von ihm selbst geöffneten Quelle].’73 The second point states that if one were to 
compare two different ‘temperamental disposition[s],’ to wit, maliciousness versus 
good-naturedness albeit without character, the former is ‘less bad’ since, at least, ‘by 
character’ one can overcome this maliciousness. The third point stresses that a ‘rigid, 
inflexible disposition’ that supports ‘a formed resolution’ is a valuable predisposition to 
character but not in itself a sign of ‘a determinate character.’ ‘For,’ Kant writes, 
‘character requires maxims that proceed from reason and morally-practical principles.’74 
What we have here is thus: that character is related to a way of thinking that is itself 
related to a source within us – a source which each can only open for himself; that 
‘redemption’ – to use a theological term (that Kant does not use here) – is possible 
                                                                
72 See Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:295. I will 
quote it below since it summarises the entire discussion. 
73 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:293. 
74 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:293. He adds that 
one may never attribute malice to someone’s character – that would be diabolical – and 
moreover a ‘human being […] never sanctions the evil in himself, and so there is actually 
no malice from principles; but only from forsaking them’ (Ibid., 7:293 ff.). 
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through character; that character requires moral maxims which follow from reason; and 
that evil is the result of the abandonment of principles. 
Kant presents next five principles ‘that relate to character,’ even though he 
states these in a negative way. The first one relates to honesty and forms to my reading 
the basis of the rest. It reads: ‘Not intentionally to say what is false; consequently, also 
to speak with caution so that one does not bring upon oneself the disgrace of 
retraction.’75 This indicates a deliberate determination for truth and psychologically is 
linked to conscience. The fact that it pertains here to speaking relates it very closely to 
thinking – but here in relation to and in front of others. That is why one should speak 
with caution so as to avoid losing face in retracting one’s statement. To speak with 
caution requires effort of will and attentiveness, a discipline of the mind. To speak with 
caution is to speak in truth and this has a reference to the future, insofar as one would 
want to prevent a retraction of what one said. To my reading it reveals an implicit 
dimension of truth as being faithful (truthful) and carries the connotation of a promise. 
A promise is nothing other than making my word come true, or honouring my word. 
This is all in the service of truth. The second principle reads: ‘Not to dissemble 
[heucheln, pretend, disguise, conceal]; appearing well disposed in public, but being 
hostile behind people’s backs.’76 This principle addresses one’s relation to the external 
world, but in a way that implies an inner source and that integrity resides in this inner 
                                                                
75 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:294. ‘Not 
intentionally [vorsetzlich]’ can also be translated in stronger terms as ‘not 
premeditatively’ or even ‘purposely.’ See Beolingus Online Dictionary at the Technische 
Universität Chemnitz 2006-2013. 
76 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:294. 
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reality. It is a challenge to have constancy of character when people see me and when 
they don’t. To achieve this requires radical honesty toward oneself that does not cover 
up. Thus far we are still facing an interior dynamic, even though it has moved into the 
public sphere. The third principle involves the interior dynamic but now moved to the 
point where it affects the lives of others, i.e., personal and social relationships. Kant 
writes: ‘Not to break one’s (legitimate) promise [sein (erlaubtes) Versprechen], which 
also includes honoring even the memory of a friendship now broken off, and not 
abusing later on the former confidence and candor of the other person.’77 We find the 
notion of promise explicitly mentioned here. The promise here establishes not only my 
word, but the word itself affects a reality – just as friendship is the promise embodied 
within a covenant.78 When such a friendship is broken it is traumatic but even (and 
especially) here Kant makes it radical: in one’s thinking, in one’s memory of a former 
friend one will still honor that friendship. It means one will not taint it internally with 
negative thoughts but harbour the spirit of gratitude. This implies safeguarding the 
former friend’s confidences and even his frankness (which is a further indication of 
                                                                
77 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:294. ‘Versprechen 
(promise)’ can also be translated as commitment and pledge. There is an etymological 
association with its root word sprechen, which means to speak. A promise is to make 
true what I speak, or to pledge to be faithful to my word. In German the phrase sich 
versprechen means ‘to misspeak’ or to ‘to make a slip (of the tongue).’ See Beolingus 
Online Dictionary at the Technische Universität Chemnitz 2006-2013. This lends 
emphasisis to the idea of the first principle: truth means not to speak anthing false. Its 
roots lie with thinking, as it is expressed in words, within myself. Truth (and authentic 
integrity) is the pledge of unity between my words and my manner of being in the world 
also as it pertains to my actions and relationships. This unity is guarenteed by the 
promise to remain faithful to my words. 
78 The very word ‘you are my friend’ establishes relationship, much like the official 
minister’s ‘you are now husband and wife.’ 
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honesty). Memory (Andenken) is an activity or dynamic that relates even etymologically 
to thinking (Denken). It speaks, furthermore, of a mental attitude of respect, which, as 
we saw, is intimately associated with dignity. This highlights the ethical importance of 
the private, inner sphere of thought for Kant and the extent to which respect – even for 
a former friend – demands control and mastery of one’s inner thoughts. The fourth 
principle states: ‘Not to enter into an association of taste with evil-minded human 
beings, and, bearing in mind the noscitur ex socio etc., to limit the association only to 
business.’79 The translation of the full proverb Kant refers to is ‘He who cannot be 
characterized by his own merits can be characterized by the company he keeps.’80 It is 
only now that Kant fully moves to the external world, but even so our association needs 
to be with good-minded people, so as to protect our own goodness. The last principle 
supports this movement outward but also confirms that there is a reciprocity involved 
insofar as our outer world results from (or at least influences) our inner world of 
thinking, but our exposure to the outer world similarly affects our inner world. There is a 
reciprocity at work here. Therefore the warning to take heed to whom and what we 
listen to. The fifth principle warns: ‘Not to pay attention to gossip derived from the 
shallow and malicious judgment of others; for paying attention to it already indicates 
weakness. Also, to moderate our fear of offending against fashion, which is a fleeting, 
changeable thing; and, if it has already acquired some importance in its influence, then 
                                                                
79 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:294. 
80 Kant, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in translation: 
Anthropology, History, and Education 2007, 521 n 116. The Latin phrase is: ‘Noscitur ex 
socio, qui non cognoscitur ex se.’ 
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at least not to extend its command into morality.’81 Admitting the reality of ‘outside’ 
influence, Kant seems to acknowledge that fashion (‘peer-group’ values) poses an 
inherent danger to the individuality of character. But it is a reality and he proposes the 
need of our own efforts to curb it. This is especially important to prevent its intrusion 
into morality. The purity of morality is non-negotiable. This affirms Sensen’s point that 
ultimately it is morality that grounds dignity. 
In terms of the two-fold notion of dignity, character is the provenance of realized 
dignity. Kant writes that character is revealed in one’s ‘way of thinking’ and is something 
to be ‘acquired.’ He talks of this acquisition as an event, a ‘grounding of character,’ 
which is ‘like a kind of rebirth, a certain solemnity of making a vow to oneself.’ This vow 
and resolution initiates the moment of transformation and institutes something ‘like the 
beginning of a new epoch.’82 This reflects the religious language of the Pietists, and, 
moreover, it expresses Kant’s real ‘conversion’ or ‘rebirth’ experience in a way that 
parallels the conversion experience as Pietists would express it. Why does Kant take 
refuge in religious language? Furthermore, the central necessity (the sine qua non) of 
character, morality and dignity, is truth and honesty. And truth and honesty relates for 
Kant intimately to religion and faith. We have already seen his words in this regard.83 
                                                                
81 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:294. 
82 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:294. 
83 Kuehn relates that when Kant was a pupil in Königsberg, the Pietist school (Collegium 
Friedericianum) he attended had as its aim the conversion of all its pupils. The way 
toward conversion, according to Pietist doctrine, was through the breaking of a person’s 
will, which would result in a supernatural experience leading one from the old man to 
the new. This experience is described as ‘the contrition and crushing of the heart in a 
repentance.’ The way this was measured was through different exercises, among others 
the keeping of a soul journal that the pupils had to keep and which the teachers read, to 
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Kant concludes this section by writing: ‘In a word: the only proof within a human 
being’s consciousness that he has character is that he has made truthfulness his 
supreme maxim, in the heart of his confessions to himself, as well as in his behavior 
toward everyone else; and since to have this is the minimum that one can demand of a 
reasonable human being, but at the same time also the maximum of inner worth (of 
human dignity), then to be a man of principles (to have a determinate character) must 
be possible for the most common human reason and yet, according to its dignity, be 
superior to the greatest talent.’84 
Why truthfulness? Shell quotes from the Remarks: ‘Truth has no value in itself, it 
is all the same whether an opinion about the inhabitation of many worlds is true or 
false. One must not confuse truth with truthfulness. Only the manner [Art] in which one 
arrives at truth has a determinate value, because that which leads to error can also do 
so in practical matters. If the pleasure of the sciences is supposed to be the motive, then 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
search for the results of the desired effects in the pupil’s soul and in the emotional 
reactions of the students. Kuehn states that Kant early on came to reject this as 
hypocrisy, because his friends would cry and repent of their sins and yet their lives did 
not change at all. One can also see here the importance of truth as personal honesty 
(integrity), where (in the light of what we saw earlier in Shell) losing one’s freedom (the 
breaking of one’s will) becomes the greatest ground for fear in Kant. See Kuehn 2001, 34 
ff., 45 ff., esp 52-55. See also Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 55-59, esp 56 
ff. where she discusses Remarks 91-93. 
84 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 7:295. Kant sees the 
presence of truthfulness as supreme maxim, i.e., as orginizing principle as the only 
‘proof’ within our consciousness that we have character. This is telling because it is not 
the truth per se that is so significant but what it effects or demands in terms of its 
implication in my relation toward myself (my confessions to myself) and how I regulate 
my relationships to others. What is significant here is that the value of truth involves our 
measuring it against something else. This ‘something else’ is not explicitly mentioned 
here, but its presence is, as it were, like a shadow, against which we discern the 
movements of the dance we dance to. 
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it is all the same whether it is true or false. […] The final end is to find the human being’s 
vocation.’85 What comes to the fore here is that the importance of truth is not so much 
in its theoretical correctness but rather the way [Art] one arrives at it. The reference to 
motive points to an internal process. This seems to be confirmed in the Metaphysics of 
Morals where Kant – under the heading: ‘The human being’s duty to himself merely as a 
moral being’86 – treats three vices opposed to this duty (lying, avarice and false 
humility). Kant writes: ‘The greatest violation of a human being’s duty to himself 
regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his own person) is the contrary of 
truthfulness, lying.’ He then quotes the Latin proverb as illustration, which reads in 
translation: ‘To have one thing shut up in the heart and another ready on the tongue.’87 
He distinguishes between an external lie (lying to others) and internal (lying to oneself). 
The former brings ‘contempt in the eyes of others’ but the latter is worse: ‘he makes 
himself contemptible in his own eyes and violates the dignity of humanity in his own 
person,’ and a few sentences later he repeats this ‘[by] a lie a human being throws away 
and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being.’88 Kant also states that one 
renounces one’s personality by lying. ‘[Lying] by its mere form [is] a crime of a human 
being against his own person and a worthlessness that must make him contemptible in 
                                                                
85 Kant, Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764-
1765) 2011, 20:175. See also Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy 2009, 77 ff. in her 
own translation. 
86 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:428. The phrase ‘merely as a moral being’ 
seems to suggest that duty which grounds one’s being moral. Kant equates this also 
with ‘the humanity in his own person’ (Ibid., 6:429); and later also as ‘homo noumenon’ 
(Ibid., 6:430). 
87 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:429; (see also 552 note l for the translation). 
88 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:429. 
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his own eyes.’89 There seems to be an inner dynamic or manner (an Art) whereby I come 
to know when I lie and it affects my relationship with myself. It means there is some 
measure against which I measure myself or am measured, and this determines how I 
see myself in my own eyes. This process involves one’s conscience.90 Contemptibility is 
the denial of respect. 
One might wonder then where this truthfulness comes from. For Kant it comes 
from the homo noumenon. It also involves a purity of motives as well as not confessing 
something one does not believe in. Kant gives the following example: ‘Someone tells an 
inner lie, for example, if he professes belief in a future judge of the world, although he 
really finds no such belief within himself but persuades himself that it could do no harm 
and might even be useful to profess in his thoughts to one who scrutinizes hearts a 
belief in such a judge, in order to win his favor in case he should exist.’91 Kant also 
writes: ‘Truthfulness in one’s declarations is also called honesty [Ehrlichkeit] and, if the 
declarations are promises, sincerity [Redlichkeit]; but, more generally, truthfulness is 
called rectitude [Aufrichtigkeit].’92 In a remark Kant notes that the first crime ‘through 
which evil entered the world,’ according to the Bible, was not Cain’s fractricide, but the 
first lie. The Bible calls the ‘author of all evil a liar from the beginning and the father of 
                                                                
89 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:430. 
90 See MM 431. 
91 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:430. It involves a listening attentiveness to 
what is found given within one’s heart, and obeying it, even if acquiescingly. In this one 
can discern a pattern that parallels the dynamic of both legislating the moral law and 
obeying it. 
92 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:429. 
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lies.’93 Lying and truthfulness form a pivot of sorts upon which inner self and outer 
actions unite in integrity or disunite in hypocrisy. Central to the process of legislating the 
law is one’s truthfulness because in one’s inner self one measures oneself against the 
law and this process of conscience is a requirement of realizing the moral law within 
one’s person. There is a dynamic in living truthfulness and in our conscience where we 
come face to face against ourselves, where we are judged in our own eye. 
We have seen how dignity is used in reference to concrete experiences and 
character formation. We have also noted Kant’s recourse to religious language to 
express the importance of interior integrity as well as the ‘vocation of man.’ This 
religious language will only intensify in the next section. 
 
5.4 Experiencing dignity? 
 
 
We have seen then that dignity is not a mere intellectual concept. Kant describes 
it as something to be sought and to be experienced. We are inspired by it, that is, by its 
expression in people who exemplify living the moral law. Its proximity to the moral law, 
which by nature requires expression in our lives, in accord with our duties, makes of 
dignity something to be lived. Evidence for this follows in a passage in The Conflict of the 
Faculties. Before we look at this passage in detail let us look at its context. 
After critiquing the suggested solutions offered by the Pietist and Moravian sects 
within Christianity for the solution as to the best way in which one ought to ‘set about 
teaching [Christianity] so that it will really be present in the hearts of human beings (… 
                                                                
93 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 6:431. 
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this [being] one with the question of what to do so that religious faith will also make 
human beings better),’94 Kant sets about identifying the one (true) principle of the Bible 
that offers in his mind the true solution. This solution cannot, according to Kant, come 
from revelation, or miracle, or anything that would remain ‘foreign to [man].’ It has to 
be ‘drawn from the human being’s own soul.’95 And Kant claims to have found it. In the 
following passage Kant specifically speaks of the experience of dignity. Let us examine it 
in order to see what we may gain from it. 
This passage from The Conflict of the Faculties consist of three sections. In the 
first, Kant writes: ‘For there is something in us that we cannot cease to wonder at when 
we have once seen it, the same thing that raises humanity in its idea to a dignity we 
should never have suspected in the human being as an object of experience [emphasis 
mine]. We do not wonder at the fact that we are beings subject to moral laws and 
destined by our reason to obey them, even if this means sacrificing whatever pleasures 
may conflict with them; for obedience to moral laws lies objectively in the natural order 
of things as the object of pure reason, and it never occurs to ordinary, sound 
understanding to ask where these laws come from, in order, perhaps to put off obeying 
them until we know their source, or even their validity.’96 
                                                                
94 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:53. I thank Prof. Ronald Tacelli for 
making me aware of the religious dimension related to dignity and for pushing me on it.   
95 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:58. This reflects the same idea we 
saw above namely that one should derive one’s conduct ‘from a source that [one] has 
opened by himself.’ See Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 
2007, 7:293. 
96 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:58.18-30. 
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Kant talks about something that brings us to wonder – as opposed to the 
miraculous wonders propagated by religious sects. Just before this (quoted) passage he 
talks about rejecting ‘faith in miracles’ (‘kein Glaube an Wunder’)97 and being brought to 
wonder is contrasted with faith in miracles, whose source lies beyond humanity. In this 
case, he says, what brings us to wonderment is something in us. This wonderment, or 
awe, however, occurs only after ‘we have seen it’ – it does not occur automatically. It 
requires a sight that sees within, in other words it is an awareness of the within, which is 
self-awareness or self-consciousness. This links strongly with the importance Shell 
assigns to consciousness. This self-consciousness gives us the knowledge that causes us 
to wonder, and it is a different type of miracle.98 Kant defines or describes this 
something in us, of which we are aware, as ‘the same thing that raises humanity in its 
idea to a dignity.’ We might ask what the idea is that Kant refers to? I take it to be the 
idea or notion of humanity, that is, humanity itself, as it is understood notionally. 
However, Kant adds, we never expected that this very thing that leads us to 
wonderment is actually an object of experience. Being an object of experience means 
two things. In the first place, for Kant, dignity is something to be experienced. Being  
‘experience-able,’ we may look for it – and indeed, demand to find it – within our life-
experiences. So we are justified in seeking its corollary in Kant’s own life. The second has 
epistemological implications. If it is an object of experience it cannot be ‘miraculous’ – it 
                                                                
97 See Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:58.15. 
98 This passage uses derivatives of this word Wunder many times, as noun and verb, 
here to admire or to wonder about. The German Wunder is both a wonder (as in 
‘wonderful,’ ‘awe,’ ‘wonderment’ or ‘admiration’) and also a miracle. There is thus an 
etymological connection operative here. See Beolingus Online Dictionary at the 
Technische Universität Chemnitz 2006-2013. 
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is from the phenomenal realm and as such it falls within all the rules and laws that 
govern the realm of nature and all phenomena. As he says, what is not cause for 
wonderment is that we are subject to moral laws in the same way as we are subject to 
all laws (as phenomenal beings). 
Kant continues to explain what it is we wonder at: ‘But we do wonder at our 
ability so to sacrifice our sensuous nature to morality that we can do what we quite 
readily and clearly conceive we ought to do. This ascendancy of the supersensible 
human being in us over the sensible, such that (when it comes to a conflict between 
them) the sensible is nothing, though in its own eyes it is everything, is an object of the 
greatest wonder; and our wonder at this moral predisposition in us, inseparable from 
our humanity, only increases the longer we contemplate this true (not fabricated) ideal. 
Since the supersensible in us is inconceivable and yet practical, we can well excuse those 
who are led to consider it supernatural – that is, to regard it as the influence of another 
and higher spirit, something not within our power and not belonging to us as our own. 
Yet they are greatly mistaken in this, since on their view the effect of this power would 
not be our deed and could not be imputed to us, and so the power to produce it would 
not be our own.’99 
We wonder at our ability and what it achieves or implies. This wonderment 
reminds one of the wonderment in the passage from the Critique of Practical Reason, 
which Shell analysed. There Kant writes, ‘two things fill the mind with ever new and 
                                                                
99 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:58.30 – 59.09. 
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increasing admiration [Bewunderung] and awe.’100 This wonderment similarly increases 
the more we contemplate it. The source of this true wonderment is that we have the 
ability to transcend our sensuous, animal nature in order to do ‘what we clearly 
conceive we ought to do’ – in other words our duty toward the moral law. This is 
interesting because in the first part of the passage we looked at above, he talks exactly 
of our ability to sacrifice our pleasures in order to obey the law, and yet he states 
explicitly that he does not find this fact worthy of wonder. What is worthy of wonder is 
the ascendency or dominance of the supersensible human being in us over the sensible. 
I would argue that the supersensible part is more than just the rational, as opposed to 
the sensual. The supersensible (übersinnlichen) refers rather to the noumenal in us 
which is transcendent (Überlegenheit); it has superiority and is predominant over the 
phenomenal and sensuous. What is marvellous or the ground for wonder is the (fact of 
the actual) transcendence of the supersensible over the sensible. This ability is a moral 
disposition and is inseparable from our humanity. It is part of the structure of our 
humanity and is the real ground of wonder the longer we contemplate this as a true 
(wahre) and not as a fabricated (erdachte)101 ideal. And although this transcendence in 
us is theoretically ungraspable (Unbegreiflichkeit) it is nonetheless practical and as such 
it enters our phenomenal human reality. So to recap: it is not just the noumenal that 
grounds the awe, but the fact of transcendence over the sensible. This transcendence is 
                                                                
100 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788) 1996, 7:161.33-34. See also Shell, Kant on 
Human Dignity 2003, 59. 
101 Erdachte in this context is translated as fabricated and implies the opposite of truth, 
although here it literally means conceived, which is a way of thinking or looking at 
something. See Beolingus Online Dictionary at the Technische Universität Chemnitz 
2006-2013. 
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mixed, that is, it is experiential and therefore phenomenal, but it also points to 
something more or beyond itself, to the incomprehensible. Its presence within is a 
witness to something beyond us.  
Our humanity, then, is like a being with two arms, one roots us in the practical 
and phenomenal and therefore within empirical experience and is as such not foreign to 
humanity at all and the other reaches to the noumenal. But the fact of our 
transcendence makes the noumenal then somehow real, because it occurs within us, 
within our humanity. The human becomes the meeting point of these two realms. This 
moral transcendence points to it. This is a deeply religious concept pointing to 
something of the divine with and within us. Speaking phenomenologically, it bears 
resemblance to experiences described by the sects as miraculous. Kant even admits that 
those who see this as supernatural and miraculous could be forgiven. But of course for 
him this is a power within us and not attributable to a divinity. This power of 
transcendence is the real ground for wonder. And more so that it belongs to us: we 
produce it – it is not from outside of ourselves, and yet it points to something more – to 
my mind, the Good. 
Kant concludes with the third section: ‘Now the real solution to the problem (of 
the new man) consists in putting to use the idea of this power, which dwells in us in a 
way we cannot understand, and impressing it on human beings, beginning in their 
earliest youth and continuing on by public instruction. Even the Bible seems to have 
nothing else in view: it seems to refer, not to supernatural experiences and fantastic 
feelings which should take reason’s place in bringing about this revolution, but to the 
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spirit of Christ, which he manifested in teachings and examples so that we might make it 
our own – or rather, since it is already present in us by our moral predisposition, so that 
we might simply make room for it. And so, between orthodoxy which has no soul and 
mysticism which kills reason, there is the teaching of the Bible, a faith which our reason 
can develop out of itself. This teaching is the true religious doctrine, based on the 
criticism of practical reason, that works with divine power on the hearts of all human 
beings toward their fundamental improvement and unites them in one universal 
(though invisible) church.’102 
This is the last section we shall look at. Note the religious concept of ‘the new 
man,’ meaning the converted man. Kant here explicitly refers to religion and to the 
Bible. Here he returns to the initial problematic he discussed, namely, how best to teach 
Christian faith so that it is really present in the hearts of people. Note again the desire of 
Kant to be practical and concrete. This is intended for living and not for theoretical 
knowledge. And it is to counter the unhelpful notions of revelation or supernatural 
miracles as sources for acquiring the new man, all which imply that the power of change 
and transcendence does not come from within. The reason for the awe and 
wonderment is really that this power of transcendence or toward transcendence is 
present within each one. This power or ability abides with (in) us in a truly 
incomprehensible manner.103 Teaching people that they have this ability within is the 
solution. And it is a democratic solution, awakening the responsibility to use it from 
                                                                
102 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 1996, 7:59.09-25. 
103 The German reads: ‘dieses uns unbegreiflicher Weise beiwohnenden Vermögens.’ See 
Kant, Korpora.org: Bereitstellung und Pflege von Immanuel Kants Werken in 
elektronischer Form 2008. 
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within instead of seeking it from that which is without and foreign to humanity. This is 
for Kant the real intended (‘demythologized’) message of the Bible and is in full accord 
with his understanding of his practical philosophy. He invokes the doctrine of the 
incarnation here but in a way that implies that we become carriers of the ‘spirit of 
Christ’ through this dynamic process of transcendence when ‘we make it our own,’ 
although it is already present within us.104 This reflects the two-fold notion of dignity. In 
terms of initial dignity, we may say that the transcendence toward the moral law is 
already present as ability within us; but only ‘when we make it our own’ do we realize 
our dignity, which is concretely to express the ‘spirit of Christ.’ Kant adds that we have 
to make room for it. We have to cultivate this transcendence through obedience to the 
law. We have seen above that Kant admits his description mirrors religious faith. Kant 
does not mention faith here as such. 
But moral faith is practical; it is meant to be lived and creating space for it means 
we have to accept this dimension of the noumenal, within us, operative in dignity and 
morality. One cannot wish it away or ignore it. Its presence in a discussion of themes so 
closely associated with dignity means that dignity has this metaphysical dimension too. 
In Shell’s presentation we saw that both dimensions, the epistemological and 
metaphysical, find a home within humanity itself. Sensen and Sullivan refer to the 
                                                                
104 I am indebted to Prof. Ronald Tacelli for this point. He made me aware that the 
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation lies behind Kant’s conception here and that Kant 
used it (analogically) to express a personal incarnation of the ‘spirit of Christ’ within 
each person, and which he related to dignity. Tacelli holds, furthermore, that there are 
insights to be gained by investigating late-scholasticism (especially in Germany) as 
another source utilized by Kant both in his terminology and arguments. One example 
being Kant’s conception of ‘humanity in one’s person.’ I have not explored this latter 
possibility in this dissertation. 
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metaphysical dimension, though in a less explicit way, seeing it more in terms of 
methodology. We have not gone into the interpretative differences among Kantians 
regarding metaphysics in Kant; but certainly one area these three authors might 
fruitfully engage in dialogue with each other regarding dignity would be the relationship 
of dignity to metaphysics and even to religion. For Kant they certainly seem to be linked. 
This dynamic of transcendence we have been discussing is paralleled in the 
Groundwork passage we discussed above where Kant discusses respect.105 It is because 
of the moral law’s presence and where it comes from – homo noumenon – that we 
respect ourselves. I see the fact of our legislating the very law we obey as revealing a 
similar structure. Even though transcendence and the origin of legislation cannot be 
notionally determined, we can – indeed must – see them as pointing to openness within 
our humanity. That it is a moral openness points I believe to the Good. This seems to me 
congruent with Shell’s account of man in which such openness resides. I have already 
described Sensen’s vision of the purity of the law for the law alone, and this dynamic 
speaks to me of the reality and primordiality of the moral law that demands absolute 
adherence. It stands in itself and speaks for itself and demands adherence only in its 
own terms and for its own sake. This is language that reflects a deep religious 
sentiment. That we can grasp and desire that is the result of this dynamic of 
transcendence.  
 
                                                                
105 G 402 note. 
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6. The Experience of Dignity: Quo Vadis? 
 
 
We have looked at this passage on the experience of dignity and how might we 
describe this experience then. We have seen how Kant’s desire for change in his life 
brought him to an insight concerning the importance of character. We have also seen 
that this process of change could not have taken place without the use of maxims; and 
we know how important, how central maxims came to be in Kant’s later life as he 
worked out his moral philosophy. Throughout this process Kant remained committed to 
humanity’s rationality – the field on which he experienced the majesty of the stars 
above and the moral law within. It was also in the experience of self-consciousness 
where he discovered a dynamic within that allowed him time and again to overcome in 
himself many obstacles in fulfilment of the moral law. This experience of transcendence 
became for him the object of the experience of dignity. As I mentioned, this would be an 
instance of realized dignity, because occurring in the context of fulfilling the moral law. 
In this experience of transcendence he discovers a ‘dualism’ where, on the one hand, 
we are rooted in the phenomenal world of experience and causal laws, and yet, on the 
other, must be more than our sensing, animal nature, able to discern another 
dimension, which is not accessible to empirical experience or theoretical knowledge, but 
which needs to be ‘there’ and ‘active.’ And this places man in two ‘worlds.’ This process, 
I suggest, is paralleled in Kant’s insight that we both obey the moral law (in the practical 
world of experience) and legislate the moral law, becoming the authors of the law. And 
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yet we saw that respect is the natural result of the effect of the presence of this law, 
which suggests that even as it comes from us (as noumenal) it also in some sense does 
not come from us (as phenomenal). This is the pivotal ‘handle’ where what we called 
‘transcendence’ comes into play unleashing a dynamic whereby we stand both in this 
world and yet at the same time are open and receptive to another world. This 
receptivity impresses itself upon us in terms of ‘duty,’ of ‘obedience,’ ‘respect’ and 
‘humility.’ It is also the ‘other’ world that grants us ‘personhood’ and ultimately 
‘freedom’ and its ‘responsibility.’ We see the same dynamic when we legislate the moral 
law: when Kant says we have to universalize our maxims it is we who universalize and 
legislate, but at the same time the universalizing is simultaneously not our invention; it 
is only universal if it is given as universal. We thus do not create thus universality – we 
discover it. We test to see if our maxims fit with universality. And in this we are also 
receptive; we receive the law we both legislate and obey. The source is, for want of a 
better word, the Good, and we participate in it because we incarnate its spirit in 
following the moral law. Might this be the transcendence to which our dignity points? 
We are receptive and yet the question remains: Where does what we receive 
come from? Sullivan, Shell and Sensen all acknowledge this receptivity in their own way. 
I have focussed in this dissertation more on Shell and Sensen. Shell describes this 
process in terms of consciousness and its dynamic acknowledging that in the moral we 
find something akin to a ‘revelation’ even of the ‘infinite’ albeit in a non-religious sense. 
Shell does not reduce Kant only to the epistemological. She is open to metaphysical as 
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well as epistemological concerns. This makes her treatment especially rich and 
suggestive. 
Sensen spends less time on metaphysical issues but he describes a dynamic, 
which, if we were to imagine ourselves concretely, would yield results similar to Shell’s. 
His description of the ultimate elevation of the moral law, conveys with unique power 
how that law alone suffices for motivation and fulfilment. In other words when we want 
to truly honor the moral law as the law deserves we are to allow no other motives, no 
other influences but the law for its own sake, on its own behalf. This pure vision is a 
moral vision and, as such, points to the dynamic of transcendence that has occupied us 
in these pages. 
In the end we may say that dignity is a gift and with this gift comes a great 
responsibility. This gift is the gift of our being that is geared towards the moral law. And 
we need to develop it by means of following the law. Kuehn quotes Rink, who quotes 
Kant on the religiosity of his parents. We see a phenomenological description here of 
dignity: ‘Even if the religious views of that time … and the concepts of what we called 
virtue and piety were anything but clear and sufficient, the people actually were 
virtuous and pious. One may say as many bad things about Pietism as one will. Enough 
already. The people who took it seriously were characterized by a certain kind of dignity. 
They possessed the highest qualities that a human being can possess, namely that 
calmness and pleasantness, that inner peace that can be disturbed by no passion. No 
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need, no persecution, no dispute could make them angry or cause them to be enemies 
of anyone.’106 
If what I have said is true, I would suggest that dignity is also, in terms of its use, 
an ‘inspirational’ category. It does not motivate one to follow the law, but rather in 
following the law and experiencing the self-transcendence implied in living the law, the 
law becomes its own inspiration and this we may also call ‘dignity.’ I end with this 
footnote Kant wrote in the Groundwork: 
‘I have a letter […] which asks me why it is that moral instruction accomplishes so 
little, even though it contains so much that is convincing to reason. My answer was 
delayed so that I might make it complete. But it is just that the teachers themselves 
have not purified their concepts: since they try to do too well by looking everywhere for 
motives for being morally good, they spoil the medicine by trying to make it really 
strong. For the most ordinary observations shows that when a righteous act is 
represented as being done with a steadfast soul and sundered from all view to any 
advantage in this or another world, and even under the greatest temptations of need or 
allurement, it far surpasses and eclipses any similar action that was in the least affected 
by any extraneous incentive; it elevates the soul and inspires the wish to be able to act 
in this way. Even moderately young children feel this impression, and duties should 
never be represented to them in any other way.’107 I propose this elevation and 
inspiration to be an experience of dignity in another. 
 
                                                                
106 Kuehn 2001, 40. 
107 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1981, 4:410 n 2. 
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7. Final Conclusion 
 
 
Scholars may disagree on some points of interpretation, partly because they 
start from different questions, follow different methodologies and come with various 
interpretative frameworks to the texts. But no one denies that in his philosophy of 
human dignity (if we might call his thoughts on dignity a philosophy) Kant presents a 
world and vision that is profoundly and pre-eminently moral. It is in the moral world and 
its possibilities, which fall to human beings to realize or incarnate, that our only true 
value and worth lies. This realization comes through obedience to the moral law, which 
becomes ‘an entity in itself’ to such a degree that it is to be sought and realized for its 
own sake. And this realization involves the transcending of our own animal natures in 
obedience to our duty to the moral law. And yet, if we dare ask further, could this 
movement of transcendence in our reaching out for the moral law not be a witness to or 
pointer to something truly Transcendent, which is the Good itself?
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Key to Abbreviations 
 
 
The following abbreviations were used in referring to the relevant texts of Kant. 
When quoting from a particular translation the full bibliographical data was noted. 
 
Anthr  Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
CF  The Conflict of the Faculties / The Contest of Faculties 
CJ  Critique of Judgment / Critique of the Power(s) of Judgment 
Collins  Lectures on Ethics (Collins) 
CPR  Critique of Pure Reason 
CPrR  Critique of Practical Reason 
Ed  Lectures on Pedagogy 
G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals  / Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals 
HH  Conjectural Beginning of Human History 
Logic  Lectures on Logic 
MM  The Metaphysics of Morals 
Mrong  Lectures on Ethics (Mrongovius)  
NH Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or Essay on the 
Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Whole Universe according 
to Newtonian Principles 
Observations Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime 
Refl  Reflection (number) from Notes and Fragments 
Rel  Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
Remarks Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime 
Vigil  Lectures on Ethics (Vigilantius) 
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